Garner v. Stephens, No. 71-2030.

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: KENT, Circuit
• Citation: 460 F.2d 1144
• Parties: Eliza Chapman GARNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Buel STEPHENS et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Decision Date: 01 June 1972
• Docket Number: No. 71-2030.

460 F.2d 1144 (1972)

Eliza Chapman GARNER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Buel STEPHENS et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 71-2030.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

June 1, 1972.

Henry A. Triplett, Louisville, Ky., for plaintiff-appellant; David N. Everett, Douglas B. Taylor, Hogan, Taylor, Denzer & Bennett, Louisville, Ky., on brief.

Hollis E. Edmonds, Russell Springs, for defendants-appellees; Robert L. Bertram, Jamestown, Ky., on brief.

460 F.2d 1145

Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, KENT, Circuit Judge, and FEIKENS, District Judge.^*

KENT, Circuit Judge.

This appeal requires the determination of which Kentucky Statute of Limitations will be applied to a case arising under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, when there is no claim of physical injury.

The plaintiff (the parties will be referred to as in the court below) is a school teacher in Russell County, Kentucky. Pursuant to a regulation of the Russell County Board of Education she was not permitted to teach during the school year 1968/1969 because she was pregnant on the day the school year began. She gave birth to a child nine days later. The defendants are the members of the Russell County Board of Education.

In 1965 the Board of Education had adopted a regulation which required teachers pregnant at the commencement of the school year to take a full year's leave of absence. Plaintiff did not commence this action until July 1, 1970, when she sued contending that the regulation and the action of the Board violated her Civil Rights. In her prayer for relief plaintiff asked that the regulation be declared null and void and that she be reimbursed for the monetary loss suffered because of the action of the School Board in denying her the right to be a full-time teacher. In her complaint the plaintiff set forth that she had been permitted to act as a substitute teacher and credited the amounts received in computing her monetary loss.

On motion the trial court dismissed the action as being barred by the provisions of KRS 413.140:

"(1) The following actions shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued:

(a) An action for an injury to the person of the plaintiff, or of his wife, child, ward, apprentice or servant."

because the plaintiff had not commenced her action within the required one year from the date the cause of action accrued. In applying the one year Statute of Limitations of Kentucky the trial court relied upon Krum v. Sheppard, 255 F.Supp. 994 (W.D.Mich., 1966), Aff'd. 407 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1967), and Madison v. Wood, 410 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1969). Each of these decisions required the application of the three-year Statute of Limitations of the State of Michigan. The law is clear that in determining the Statute of Limitations period applicable to actions based upon Section 1983, which does not by its terms provide a period of limitations, the law of the state in question must be examined to determine the appropriate period. As stated by this Court in Madison v. Wood, 410 F.2d 564, 566 (6th Cir. 1969):

"Since the Civil Rights Act and the federal statutes do not contain a statute of limitations for actions brought under Section 1983, we will apply the most analogous period of limitations under Michigan law. Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1968); Crawford v. Zeitler, 326 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1964); Mohler v. Miller, 235 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1956); Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1957)."

and see also Swan v. Board of Higher Education of the City of New York, 319 F.2d 56, 59 (2nd Cir. 1963), where the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated:

"Because a statute of limitations for actions of the present kind is not contained in either the Civil Rights Act itself or elsewhere in the federal statutes, the applicable period of limitation is that which New York would enforce had an action seeking similar relief been brought in a court of that state. O\'Sullivan v. Felix, 233

460 F.2d 1146

U.S. 318, 34 S.Ct. 596, 58 L.Ed. 980 (1914); Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9 Cir. 1959); Wilson v. Hinman, 172 F.2d 914 (10 Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 970, 69 S.Ct. 933, 93 L.Ed. 1121 (1949). This, of course, is the rule which prevails generally when Congress has not

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