Garnett v. Phoenix Bridge Co.

• Decision Date: 29 November 1899
• Docket Number: 19.
• Citation: 98 F. 192
• Parties: GARNETT v. PHOENIX BRIDGE CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

98 F. 192

GARNETT v. PHOENIX BRIDGE CO.

No. 19.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

November 29, 1899

A. S Ashbridge, Jr., for plaintiff.

Joseph H. Taulane and Richard P. White, for defendant.

DALLAS Circuit Judge.

This action was brought to recover for personal injury suffered by the plaintiff, in consequence, as alleged, of the negligent conduct of the defendant. When the accident occurred the plaintiff was a man of about 40 years of age, and of at least ordinary intelligence. Having previously been employed successively in two rolling mills, he, in May, 1896, entered the service of the defendant corporation, which was then engaged in erecting the board walk on the beach at Atlantic City. At first, and for about two weeks, he helped to raise girders with a windlass, and then he was sent out into the water to loosen an endless rope from joists which were brought by sea near to the shore. The men who composed 'the riveters' gang' were required to 'use the hammer to set and rivet the heads. ' They were paid higher wages than the plaintiff received, and for this reason he, although he had never done such work, applied, but unsuccessfully, to be put upon that gang. His wages were however, made equal to those of a riveter; and on July 23 1896, a Mr. Fisher, whom the plaintiff, in testifying characterized as 'the superintendent in charge of this work,' gave the plaintiff a wrench about 18 inches long, and told him to help tighten the nuts upon the rods which extended from beam to beam, or from girder to girder; and this the plaintiff, though inexperienced in the use of a wrench, and without receiving or asking any instructions, proceeded to do. In doing it he stood upon a trestle about eight feet in height and five or six inches in width at its top, which rested upon the sand directly under the board walk. The wrench was designed to fit a two-inch nut, and its length had been extended by adding about two feet of pipe to it. At the time of the accident the plaintiff was standing on the top of the trestle, and was holding with his left hand to one of the girders. He had set the wrench on a nut which was about two feet above his head, and pulled with his right hand on the end of the piece of pipe until, when about one turn had been made, the wrench opened in the jaw, and he, in consequence, fell from the trestle, and was seriously hurt. These are the facts, so far as material, to which the plaintiff himself testified, and this statement of them substantially presents his own story of the accident and the attending circumstances.

There is, perhaps, no rule which has been more frequently enunciated by the courts than that which defines the master's duty respecting the appliances provided by him for the use of his servants, and yet there is probably no rule which is more constantly invoked without properly regarding its principle and limitations. The relation of master and servant is not analogous to that of guardian and ward. The employed is not to be regarded as an infant, nor the employer as his caretaker. A master owes no duty to his servant, which, under like circumstances, he does not owe to any other person. 'Negligence is where a person neglects or omits to do a thing which he is by law obliged to do,' and the legal obligation of a master to take ordinary care for the prevention of harm to his servant does not result from any doctrine which is peculiar to the contract for personal service, but from the general rule that every one is, in his acts and conduct, bound to be duly careful to avoid doing hurt to others. Wherever, by invitation, and not as a trespasser, one man comes upon the premises of another, or is, as matter of business, supplied by another with any article which is liable to inflict injury when being used, he, though not a servant, is entitled, precisely as if he were, to assume that the place or the article is reasonably safe, and to be informed of any latent source of danger of which he is ignorant. Dixon v. Bell, 5 Maule & S. 198; Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397; Smith v. Railroad Co., 19 N.Y. 127; Caswell v. Worth, 5 El. & Bl. 849; Blakemore v. Railroad Co., 8 El. & Bl. 1035; MacCarthy v. Young, 6 Hurl. & N. 329; Copeland v. Draper, 157 Mass. 558, 32 N.E. 944, 19 L.R.A. 283; Story, Bailm. Secs. 275, 390, 391a; Redf. Carr. Sec. 513, note. The relation of master and servant existed between the plaintiff and the defendant at the time this accident occurred. Therefore, while the plaintiff had assumed all the risks incident to his employment, the defendant, though not the guardian of her person, had become bound to protect him from any injury, while pursuing that employment, which might be averted by the exercise of ordinary care to furnish him with reasonably safe appliances. The France, 20 U.S.App. 215, 8 C.C.A. 185, 59 F. 479; Paving Co. v. Odasz's Adm'x, 20 U.S.App. 326, 8 C.C.A. 471, 60 F. 71; Reilly v. Campbell, 20 U.S.App. 334, 8 C.C.A. 438, 59 F. 990; Baulec v. Railroad Co., 59 N.Y. 356-359. 'The liability of the master for injuries to the servant received in the service is based upon his personal negligence, and the evidence must establish some personal fault or neglect of duty on his part, or what is equivalent thereto, in order to justify a verdict, and he is entitled to the presumption that he has performed his duty until the contrary is made to appear. * * * If the injury to the servant is attributable to the master's neglect in omitting to furnish safe and adequate appliances for the work, according to the nature of the business, or competent...