Garnett v. State, 86-294

• Decision Date: 17 February 1989
• Docket Number: No. 86-294,86-294
• Citation: 769 P.2d 371
• Parties: Kerry Eugene GARNETT, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 371

769 P.2d 371

Kerry Eugene GARNETT, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 86-294.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Feb. 17, 1989.

Wyoming Public Defender Program, Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, Timothy C. Kingston, Student Intern, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., David K. Gruver, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ., and HANSCUM, District Judge.

THOMAS, Justice.

The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether a motion for a new trial is an appropriate remedy to seek relief from a conviction based upon a plea of guilty to a criminal charge. The briefs present additional issues with respect to the obligation of the district court to hold a hearing prior to denying the motion for a new trial and the denial by the district court of a motion for peremptory disqualification. We hold that a motion for a new trial will not lie to attack a judgment and sentence based upon a plea of guilty, and the district court did not err in denying the motion for peremptory disqualification. The disposition of the contention concerning the motion for a new trial leads ineluctably to the conclusion that there was no obligation to hold a hearing. We affirm the district court.

In his Brief of Appellant, Garnett states these issues for review:

"I. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying the appellant's motion for a new trial without holding a hearing.

"II. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying the appellant's motion for a new trial."

In a Supplemental Brief of Appellant, the following issue is added:

"I. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Motion for Peremptory Disqualification."

The State of Wyoming, in its Brief of Appellee, rephrases the issues in this way:

"I. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying appellant's motion for new trial.

"II. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying appellant's motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing.

"III. Whether the district judge erred by failing to remove himself pursuant to appellant's peremptory challenge."

On September 17, 1984, Garnett and his co-defendant entered pleas of guilty to one count of first degree murder in violation of § 6-2-101(a), W.S.1977 (June 1983 Repl.), and one count of aggravated burglary in violation of § 6-3-301(a), (c)(i), W.S.1977 (June 1983 Repl.), which consolidated two acts of burglary occurring in separate premises. These charges arose out of the April 25, 1984 murder of James Exley at the Valli-Hi Supper Club near Torrington. Exley owned and operated this restaurant and lounge. The burglaries of the supper club and an adjacent house trailer, which was Exley's residence, were committed on the same day. Garnett and his co-defendant were arrested the following day and questioned about these events. Both confessed to Exley's murder and the two burglaries. The confessions were consistent in all material respects.

After the filing of charges, both defendants entered pleas of not guilty by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency and not triable due to mental illness or deficiency. Pursuant to the statutory procedure, the court ordered Garnett and his co-defendant to be taken to the State Hospital at Evanston for psychiatric examination. The examiner's report set forth the conclusion that neither Garnett nor his co-defendant suffered from mental illness or deficiency on the night of the murder, and both were competent to stand trial. Upon receiving the report of the examination, Garnett and the co-defendant decided to enter pleas of guilty.

In order to establish a factual basis for those pleas, the court received testimony from Garnett and his co-defendant. Their recitations established that the two went to the supper club at about 8:30 P.M. on April 25, 1984, intending to beat Exley and rob him. By 10:30 P.M., all other customers had departed, and Garnett and the co-defendant, being the recipients of free drinks from Exley, remained. Between the hours of midnight and 1:00 A.M., Garnett struck Exley on the head with a liquor bottle causing Exley's hands to contact the co-defendant's shoulders. As Exley collapsed to the ground, Garnett then raised him back to his feet, and the co-defendant stabbed him several times. The co-defendant claimed in his testimony that the stabbing was in retaliation for homosexual advances made toward him by Exley during the evening. After the stabbing, the two "busted" a sliding glass door to create the impression that someone had broken into the club. They then collected money and liquor, stowed it in Garnett's car, and left. They returned about an hour later to remove a watch and some rings from Exley's body, and then they broke into the adjacent house trailer where they slashed Exley's water bed and stole an electric razor and portable hand phone. The district judge concluded that this testimony constituted a sufficient factual basis to accept the pleas of guilty.

Before pronouncing sentence in the case, the court received testimony from the psychiatrist who had examined Garnett and the co-defendant. That testimony was to the effect that there was no indication that Garnett and the co-defendant were so intoxicated that they did not understand their criminal activity. The witness stated:

" * * * Even though they [Garnett and the co-defendant] were drinking afterwards, they were able to drive their car, conceal the property they had taken, attempt to establish an alibi, all before returning and going to their residence eventually, and I felt that that indicated to me that they could--that they understood the nature of the crime and demonstrated a capacity to--or competency to attempt to defend themselves.

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" * * * I think they understood that what they were doing was wrong. It was somewhat modified by the fact that they had--they felt disgust toward James Exley because of his alleged homosexual responses or approaches to them, and it was somewhat, I thought, probable that there was a decrease in their inhibitions at the time of the committing of the crime because of alcohol intake which may have resulted in the crime being more vicious and resulting in more serious injuries to Mr. Exley than was originally planned. However, I thought they knew what they were doing was wrongful and had the capacity to understand what the possible consequences were.

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"I saw nothing that would indicate diminished capacity or insanity or irresistible impulse."

After receiving this testimony, the court sentenced each defendant to life imprisonment for Exley's murder and to a consecutive sentence of twenty to twenty-five years for the burglary.

Almost two years later, Garnett presented a pro se motion to the district court requesting a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. By his affidavit in support of his motion, Garnett alleged that the newly discovered evidence was that his co-defendant had "as a part of his scheme to induce my cooperation in robbing Mr. Exley, caused me to become temporarily insane by surreptitiously dissolving two portions of LSD in a coca-cola which I was preparing to drink." Garnett's affidavit also stated that he was not aware that the LSD had been placed in his drink until his co-defendant had furnished that information during a conversation at the penitentiary, and that the co-defendant had not told him of this conduct previously because the co-defendant "did not believe such information to be of probative or exculpatory value." A supporting affidavit of the co-defendant also was filed which stated, in part:

"On or about April 1, 1984, I obtained two 'hits' of what is commonly known as 'windowpane acid.' (LSD-lysergic acid diethylamide, a chemical compound extracted from ergot alkaloids, as used in the study of schizophrenia and other mental disorders and as a psychedelic drug: it produces hallucinations, delusions, etc. resembling those occurring in a psychotic state).

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* * *

"The reason I chose this opportunity to induce insanity into Mr. Garnett was to calm his nerves and to make him more susceptible to following through on our plan to rob Jim Exley; which plans had, to this time, only been discussed in vague terms and more of a lark than actual 'plans.'

"Once the acid began to take effect upon Mr. Garnett it was easy for me to manipulate him into accompanying me to Mr. Exley's place of business; the 'Valli-Hi Supper Club.'

"Mr. Garnett did, in fact, become automatistic, susceptible to unquestioned obedience to my order.

"On or about August 25, 1986, while discussing with Mr. Garnett the circumstances surrounding the events which led to our imprisonment I blurted out: 'I don't see how you could even walk with all the acid you drank.' Mr. Garnett then asked me what in the world I was talking about and I then related to him the events described heretofore."

Garnett also filed a motion for peremptory disqualification of the district judge pursuant to Rule 23(d), W.R.Cr.P.

The district court summarily denied Garnett's motion for a new trial and his motion for peremptory disqualification. The record does not contain any statement of reasons for the rulings on these two motions. Garnett then filed a pro se notice of appeal, and this court appointed the public defender's office to assist him in prosecuting his appeal.

The essential claim by Garnett is that the new evidence which he recites in his motion and which is set forth in the accompanying affidavit could establish a defense of involuntary intoxication to the crimes to which he had entered pleas of guilty, and that this evidence meets the requirements of Rule 34, W.R.Cr.P., as well as the standard established by Opie v. State, 422 P.2d 84 (Wyo.1967...