Garnick v. Miller

• Decision Date: 07 July 1965
• Docket Number: No. 4869,4869
• Parties: Billie J. GARNICK, Petitioner, v. Francis E. MILLER, Chief Parole and Probation Officer, Department of Parole and Probation, and Willard Weaver, Assistant Parole and Probation Officer, Carson City, Nevada, Respondents.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Page 850

403 P.2d 850

81 Nev. 372

Billie J. GARNICK, Petitioner, v. Francis E. MILLER, Chief Parole and Probation Officer Department of Parole and Probation, and Willard Weaver, Assistant Parole and Probation Officer, Carson City, Nevada Respondents.

No. 4869.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

July 7, 1965.

Stanley H. Brown, Marshall A. Bouvier, Reno, for petitioner.

Harvey Dickerson, Atty. Gen., C. B. Tapscott, Deputy Atty. Gen., Carson City, John W. Diehl, Special Deputy Dist. Atty., Fallon, for respondents.

THOMPSON, Justice.

By an original habeas corpus application to this court Billie Garnick seeks her freedom, claiming that she was unconstitutionally denied the assistance of counsel when she entered a plea of guilty to the felony of passing a bad check. This claim and the preliminary question of the availability of habeas corpus to one on probation are the issues we must decide. We hold for the petitioner in each instance, and grant the writ.

Mrs. Garnick waived a preliminary hearing. When arraigned in the district court on June 2, 1964, she was represented by counsel of her choice and pleaded not guilty. Trial was scheduled to commence December 8, 1964. Seven days before trial Mrs. Garnick appeared in court without her attorney, requested permission to withdraw her not guilty plea, which request was granted, and proceeded to enter a plea of guilty. The change of plea had been preceded by an informal conference in the judge's chambers at which the judge, the prosecuting attorney, a service station operator, and Mrs. Garnick, were the participants. Of course, the in-chambers conference was not reported. The record of it is in the form of affidavits later supplied by the participants. Their recollections do not coincide as to some of the statements and representations that were supposed to have been made. We find it unnecessary to relate the factual discrepancies, because of two overriding circumstances. First, the in-chambers conference was held in the absence of Mrs. Garnick's counsel of record. Second, at that conference, Mrs. Garnick professed her innocence and this is not denied. Indeed, the affidavit of the judge contains the following statement in referring to the affidavit of Mrs. Garnick: 'She states that several times she was not guilty of the charge. It is my recollection that this was only done once.' In spite of these circumstances, upon adjournment of the inchambers conference, court was convened and Mrs. Garnick, without her counsel, was permitted to change her plea to guilty. Sentencing was deferred to December 15, 1964, to allow time for a presentence investigation and report. Her attorney learned of what had transpired and promptly moved to set aside her guilty plea and reinstate the plea of not guilty. This motion was heard by a different judge, and denied. It was his view that Mrs. Garnick had intelligently waived her right to be represented by counsel when she appeared in court to change her plea from not guilty to guilty. Sentence was imposed, execution thereof suspended, and the defendant Garnick was granted probation. This application for habeas relief followed.

(1) We have not before decided whether habeas corpus is available to one on probation. NRS 34.360 reads: 'Every person unlawfully committed, detained, confined or restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.' By the explicit language of the statute, neither confinement nor imprisonment is a requisite for habeas relief--unlawful restraint is enough. The statute is of sufficient latitude to embrace one on probation, Noble v. Siwicki (R.I. 197 A.2d 298; Ex parte Bosso (Fla.), 41 So.2d 322, and is in harmony with the expression of the United States Supreme Court in Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285: 'History, usage, and precedent can leave no doubt that, besides physical imprisonment, there are other restraints on a man's liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally, which have been thought sufficient in the English-speaking world to support the issuance of haveas corpus.' Of course Jones v. Cunningham was concerned with whether one on parole was 'in custody' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Court held that a parolee was in custody and that federal habeas relief was available to him. Its reasons are equally applicable to one on probation. See also Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 682, 'Parolee's right to habeas corpus.' This court has characterized parole as a 'penological measure for the disciplinary treatment of prisoners who seem capable of rehabilitation outside of prison walls. It does not set aside or affect the sentence; the convict remains in the legal custody of the state and under the control of its agents, subject at any time, for breach of condition, to be returned to the penal institution.' Pinana v. State, 76 Nev. 274, 352 P.2d 824. Most of that language also has application to a probationer. One on probation remains in the legal custody of the state and under the control of its agents. To that extent, such a person is restrained of his liberty. Indeed, in this state probationers and parolees are supervised by the same staff. NRS 213.1095-213.1097. We hold that the writ of habeas corpus may be utilized to test the legality of the restraint of one on probation.

2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, held that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution makes the Sixth Amendment guarantee of right to counsel obligatory upon the states. This right extends to any critical stage of the proceeding. Significant differences in the criminal procedures of the respective states may cast doubt upon the right to counsel before an accused is arraigned in the court where he is to stand trial. This was made clear by the United States Supreme Court in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923. See also our opinions in Victoria v. Young, 80 Nev. 279, 392 P.2d 509; and Ex parte Hoff, 80 Nev. 360, 393 P.2d 619. However, there is no doubt but that a defendant's arraignment in the trial court is a critical stage of the proceeding. Hamilton v. State of Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114. The right to counsel at that point must be zealously guarded.

Here, Mrs. Garnick was represented by counsel and denied guilt. The court and prosecutor each knew that she had an attorney. The in-chambers conference and the subsequent court proceeding should not have occurred in his absence. We do not question the motives or integrity of the judge or the prosecutor, but heartily condemn their impropriety. It is suggested that the defendant's rights were fully protected throughout; that she requested the informal conference; and that she waived her constitutional right to counsel. The suggestion is without support in this record. The standards for testing the matter of waiver are explicitly stated in Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723, 68 S.Ct. 316, 323, 92 L.Ed. 309: 'We have said: 'The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused--whose life or liberty is at stake--is without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused.' To discharge this duty properly in light of the strong presumption against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, a judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand. The fact that an accused may tell him that he is informed of his right to counsel and desires to waive this right does not automatically end the judge's responsibility. To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation...