Garraway v. Lappin

• Decision Date: 21 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 4:CV-10-1697,4:CV-10-1697
• Parties: Mitchell Theophilus Garraway, Plaintiff v. Harley G. Lappin, et al., Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

Mitchell Theophilus Garraway, Plaintiff

v.Harley G. Lappin, et al., Defendants

No. 4:CV-10-1697

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dated: March 21, 2012

(Judge Nealon)

MEMORANDUM

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, an inmate confined in the United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg ("USP-Lewisburg"), Pennsylvania, filed the above captioned Bivens¹ action, in which he raises "challenge[s] under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLIUPA) 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. to frivolous and arbitrary Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) rules and policies which severely and unnecessarily burden Muslim prisoners' private religious exercise."(Doc. 27, Amended Complaint).

Garraway, a military prisoner, was sentenced on February 18, 1986, to a term of Life. (Doc. 39, Declaration of Kevin Kelley, Bureau of Prisons Regional Chaplain Administrator at ¶ 4). He was incarcerated at USP-Lewisburg from October 15, 2007, through June 4, 2009. Id. at ¶ 3. He was then transferred to USP-Canaan until his transfer back to USP-Lewisburg on or about May 24, 2011. (See Doc. 52, Notice of Change of Address).

Garraway names as Defendants: Harley Lappin, Director; Current/former employees of USP-Lewisburg: Troy Williamson, Warden (retired); Frank Strada, Correctional Services Administrator (former Associate Warden); Kevin Kelley, Regional Chaplaincy Administrator (former Supervisory Chaplain); Rod Kerstetter, retired (former Inmate Systems Manager); Salvadore Irizzary, Chaplain, USP Hazelton (former Chaplain); and R. Rogers, Food Services Administrator. (Doc. 27, Amended Complaint). Garraway also names the following employees of USP-Canaan: Ronnie Holt, Warden; John Johnson, Supervisory Chaplain; Angela Dunbar, Associate Warden; D. Mrad, Lieutenant; R. Sorenson, Lieutenant; ThomasDiehl, Trust Fund Manager; and Ralph Gundrum, Food Services Administrator.² Id.

Currently pending before the court is Defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. (Doc. 31). The parties have fully briefed the issues and the motion is now ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.

I. Standards of Review

A. Motion to Dismiss

The Court in Williams v. Hull, 2009 WL 1586832, *2-*3 (W.D.Pa.), set forth the Motion to Dismiss standard of review, as annunciated by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, (2007), and as refined in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), as follows:

The issue is not whether the plaintiff will prevail at the end but only whether he should be entitled to offer evidence to support his claim. Neitzke; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 419 U.S. 232 (1974). A complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ---U.S. ----, ----, 129 S.Ct. 1937, ----, 173 L.Ed.2d 868, ----, 2009 WL 1361536 (May 18, 2009) (specifically applying Twombly analysis beyond the context of the Sherman Act). The court must accept as true all allegations of the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Securities. Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir.1985). The Court, however, need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir.2004) citing Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Although the United States Supreme Court does "not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, [the Court does require] enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."

Id. at 570. In other words, at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff is "required to make a 'showing' rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief." Smith v. Sullivan, 2008 WL 482469, at *1 (D.Del. February 22, 2008) quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir.2008). "This does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of thenecessary element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n. 3.

B. Summary Judgment

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a): see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).

A disputed fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Anderson. 477 U.S. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers. Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 927 F.2d1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).

When determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the court must view the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Electric Company, 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). In order to avoid summary judgment, however, parties may not rely on unsubstantiated allegations. Parties seeking to establish that a fact is or is not genuinely disputed must support such an assertion by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record," by showing that an adverse party's factual assertion lacks support from cited materials, or demonstrating that a factual assertion is unsupportable by admissible evidence. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (requiring evidentiary support for factual assertions made in response to summary judgment). The party opposing the motion "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Parties must produce evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its case that they bear the burden of proving at trial, for "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily rendersall other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U .S. at 323; see Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992). Failure to properly support or contest an assertion of fact may result in the fact being considered undisputed for the purpose of the motion, although a court may also give parties an opportunity to properly provide support or opposition. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

II. Statement of Facts

Due to the voluminous allegations contained within the complaint, the Court will dispense with a separate statement of facts and, instead, will apply the undisputed facts to each of Plaintiff's individual claims as they are derived from the pleadings, declarations and exhibits submitted therewith.

III. Discussion

A. RLUIPA

Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), "government" is defined as "a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the authority of a state," and "any branch, department, agency, instrumentality or official," thereof, and "any other person acting under color of State law." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4). Accordingly, federal courts have held that RLUIPA "only applies to state and local governments, not afederal prison." Pineda-Morales v. DeRosa, 2005 WL 1607276, at *4 (D.N.J. 2005). See also Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008). Because Plaintiff is a federal inmate, all RLUIPA claims will be dismissed.

B. Statute of Limitations for RFRA Claims

RFRA contains no express limitations period, "a void which is commonplace in federal statutory law." Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980).

In 1990, Congress established a general statute of limitations. See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 379-80 (2004). Section 42 U.S.C. 1658(a) provides: "Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not be commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658(a).

RFRA was enacted in 1993, and § 1658 therefore applies to claims arising under it. See, e.g., Jama v. U.S. INS, 343 F.Supp.2d 338, 365 (D. N.J. 2004) ("RFRA has a statutory four-year statute of limitations."). Thus, Garraway had four years to file his action from the time the cause accrued. The majority of Plaintiff's allegations concern time...