Garrelts v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., C 95-3081-MWB.
| Court | United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. Northern District of Iowa |
| Writing for the Court | Bennett |
| Citation | 943 F.Supp. 1023 |
| Parties | John W. GARRELTS and Judith K. Garrelts, Plaintiffs, v. SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CORP., d/b/a/ SmithKline Beecham Animal Products, Defendant. |
| Docket Number | No. C 95-3081-MWB.,C 95-3081-MWB. |
| Decision Date | 29 October 1996 |
v.
SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CORP., d/b/a/ SmithKline Beecham Animal Products, Defendant.
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John G. Martens of Sanderson, Ridout & Martens, Estherville, IA, for plaintiffs Garrelts.
Scott A. Smith of Popham, Haik, Schnobrich & Kaufman, Ltd., Minneapolis, MN, and Margaret M. Prahl of Heidman, Redmond, Fredregill, Patterson, Schatz & Plaza, L.L.P., Sioux City, IA, for defendant SBC.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BENNETT, District Judge.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND .............................................. 1028
II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ........................................... 1029
III. FINDINGS OF FACT ......................................................... 1030
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS ............................................................ 1032
A. Preemption Doctrine .................................................... 1032
1. "Statutory" preemption .............................................. 1032
a. "Flavors" of statutory preemption ............................... 1033
b. Congressional intent ............................................ 1034
c. The presumption against preemption .............................. 1034
2. "Agency" or "regulatory" preemption ................................. 1036
a. Source and legitimacy ........................................... 1036
b. Nature of the agency preemption inquiry ......................... 1036
i. The agency's intent to preempt state law ..................... 1038
ii. The agency's authority to preempt state law .................. 1038
c. Deference to agency determinations to preempt state law ......... 1040
i. The City of New York analysis ............................... 1042
ii. The applicability of Chevron ................................ 1044
iii. The continued relevance of congressional intent ............. 1047
iv. Agency accountability ....................................... 1048
v. The presumption against preemption .......................... 1050
B. The Preemptive Effect of APHIS Regulations ........................... 1051
1. Prior decisions ................................................... 1051
a. Lynnbrook Farms ................................................ 1051
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b. Other decisions ................................................. 1055
2. This court's preemption analysis ................................... 1057
a. APHIS's intent to preempt ....................................... 1057
b. Congressional authorization ..................................... 1060
c. Are the Garrelts' claims preempted? ............................. 1069
C. Certification For Interlocutory Appeal ................................. 1070
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................. 1071
Defendant's motion for summary judgment in this products liability action involving a cattle vaccine poses the question of whether certain state tort claims are barred by federal "agency" or "regulatory" preemption, as distinct from federal "statutory" preemption. Thus, not only does the scope of preemption here involve questions of federalism and supremacy among sovereigns, it also involves the still more complicated questions that arise when an agency, a delegatee of Congress, not Congress itself, exercises, or is asserted to be exercising, supreme federal power. These questions involve the judiciary in an intricate dance between fulfilling its role as a co-equal branch of government charged with reviewing the exercise of federal power and the deference the judiciary is nonetheless supposed to accord most federal agency interpretations of congressional acts. In other words, what is at stake here, in this court's view, is both the concrete question of whether a particular individual has a remedy for alleged wrongs, and the abstract question of the constitutional scope of an agency's power to determine its own jurisdiction.
In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that they suffered injuries when one of them accidentally inoculated himself with a veterinary vaccine for cattle manufactured by the defendant. The defendant has moved for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiffs' state-law claims are preempted by federal agency regulations. At its most basic level, the question raised by defendant's motion for summary judgment, therefore, is whether regulations promulgated by a federal agency pursuant to the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act (VSTA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-159, preempt plaintiffs' state tort claims, because plaintiffs' claims are allegedly premised on inadequate labeling of a product whose label had been approved by the agency under its regulations.
Plaintiffs John W. Garrelts and Judith K. Garrelts filed their complaint in this action on October 11, 1995, against defendant SmithKline Beecham Corporation d/b/a SmithKline Beecham Animal Products (SBC). Subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship and sufficient amount in controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Garrelts allege that John suffered injuries when he accidentally inoculated himself with SBC's Ultrabac 7 vaccine for cattle. The Garrelts allege that SBC's Ultrabac 7 vaccine was defective in that product labeling on the vaccine failed to warn against certain alleged dangers to humans in the event of accidental injection with the vaccine. SBC answered the complaint on December 13, 1995, denying, in the first instance, that its vaccine caused any injuries to the plaintiffs, and further asserting seven affirmative defenses.1
SBC filed a motion for summary judgment on May 10, 1996, seeking dismissal of the
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Garrelts' state-law claims on the ground that these claims are preempted by regulations promulgated pursuant to the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act (VSTA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-159, by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Specifically, SBC contends that the Garrelts' state tort claims are premised upon allegedly inadequate labeling, but that such claims are preempted by APHIS regulations, because the claims would impose requirements different from or in addition to those imposed by APHIS. SBC contends that APHIS has declared its intention to preempt state tort causes of action, and that APHIS's decision is reasonable and within the authority granted to it by Congress. The present motion for summary judgment therefore involves the issue of "agency" or "regulatory" preemption, as distinct from the more familiar issue of "statutory" preemption. Furthermore, the court finds but little authority from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning agency preemption, as well as little authority from any jurisdiction on the question of the propriety of APHIS's preemption of state tort actions. However, the court recognizes, as do the parties, that almost all of the courts to consider whether APHIS's regulations properly preempt state tort actions have found the agency's regulations did properly preempt the state tort claims presented.2
The Garrelts resisted the motion for summary judgment on July 9, 1996. In essence, the Garrelts argue that the federal agency regulations do not preempt their state tort causes of action, because APHIS either did not intend, or was not authorized, to preempt causes of action based on injury to humans. In a reply brief filed July 19, 1996, SBC argues to the contrary, asserting that APHIS's intent and authority to preempt state tort causes of action sweep broadly enough to encompass the Garrelts' claims.
The court held oral arguments on SBC's motion for summary judgment on August 7, 1996. At the oral arguments, the Garrelts were represented by counsel John G. Martens of Sanderson, Ridout & Martens, in Estherville, Iowa. Defendant SBC was represented by counsel Scott A. Smith3 of Popham, Haik, Schnobrich & Kaufman, Ltd., in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Margaret M. Prahl of Heidman, Redmond, Fredregill, Patterson, Schatz & Plaza, L.L.P., in Sioux City, Iowa. The parties have filed thorough and extensive briefs in support of their respective positions, and have supplemented those briefs from time to time with recent decisions involving identical issues. This matter is now deemed fully submitted.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes "that summary judgment is a drastic remedy and must be exercised with extreme care to prevent taking genuine issues of fact away from juries." Wabun-Inini v. Sessions, 900 F.2d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir.1990). On the other hand, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have authorized for nearly 60 years "motions for summary judgment upon proper showings of the lack of a genuine, triable issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Thus, "summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Wabun-Inini,
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900 F.2d at 1238 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555); Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 396 (8th Cir.1992).
The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part:
Rule 56. Summary Judgment
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim ... is asserted ... may, at any time, move for summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motions and Proceedings Thereon.... The judgment sought...
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