Garrett-Alfred v. Facebook, Inc.

Decision Date14 May 2021
Docket NumberCase No. 8:20-cv-0585-KKM-CPT
Citation540 F.Supp.3d 1129
Parties Debrynna GARRETT-ALFRED et al., Plaintiffs, v. FACEBOOK, INC. and Cognizant Technology Solutions U.S. Corporation, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

Jay Paul Lechner, Lechner Law, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiffs Jessica Young, Daniel Walker, Dawnmarie Armato.

Joshua C. Webb, Tori Simmons, Dennis Parker Waggoner, Hill Ward Henderson, PA, Tampa, FL, for Defendant Cognizant Technology Solutions U.S. Corporation.

ORDER

Kathryn K. Mizelle, United States District Judge

This cause comes before the Court on Defendant Facebook's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 35) and Defendant Cognizant's Motion to Dismiss1 (Doc. 36). Plaintiffs oppose both motions (Docs. 55 & 56) and request attorneys’ fees under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (Doc. 56). Facebook opposes their request for fees. (Doc. 60). For the following reasons, both motions to dismiss are granted in full and Plaintiffsrequest for attorneys’ fees is denied.

I. Background2

This case arises from Plaintiffs’ employment with Cognizant Technology Solutions U.S. Corporation (Cognizant), where they performed content moderation services for Facebook, Inc. (Doc. 23 at 2–3). Cognizant is a professional services vendor incorporated under the laws of Delaware with headquarters in Texas, and Facebook is a social media and technology company incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in California. (Doc. 23 at 6). As most Americans know, Facebook is a social networking platform that enables people to connect and share content across the internet. (Doc. 23 at 5–6). The named plaintiffs, who were living in Arizona or Florida while employees of Cognizant, bring this putative class action claim on behalf of all Florida and Arizona citizens who performed content moderation as employees of Cognizant within the last three years. (Doc. 23 at 20).

Facebook's administration of social networking platforms includes content moderation. (Doc. 23 at 6). Content moderation involves reviewing media content reported by platform users and removing content that violates the platform's terms of use. (Doc. 23 at 6). Cognizant contracts with Facebook as a third-party vendor to handle Facebook's content moderation. (Doc. 23 at 3). Plaintiffs, as employees of Cognizant, were responsible for reviewing graphic content such as murders, tortures, child pornography, and rapes. (Doc. 23 at 17–18). In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs detail the risks of repeated exposure to images of extreme violence and support their claims by citing numerous studies conducted by scientific organizations and government task forces. (Doc. 23 at 9–10). These studies specifically highlight that psychological trauma may result in both mental and physical symptoms as well as greater risk of substance abuse. (Doc. 23 at 11). As a result of their employment, Plaintiffs allege that they are at an "increased risk of developing serious mental health injuries, including but not limited to, PTSD [posttraumatic stress disorder

], and associated physical injuries." (Doc. 23 at 27, 29).

Facebook helped create the Technology Coalition, a group that crafts industry standards for minimizing harm to content moderators. (Doc. 23 at 12–13). Some of the practices recommended to support content moderators include using clear terms in interviews and allowing candidates to ask questions before hiring; limiting exposure and providing counseling sessions; and permitting breaks and time off as a response to trauma. (Doc. 23 at 14). Additionally, these guidelines advise internet sites contracting with third-party vendors to clearly outline procedures to limit harmful exposure to graphic content. (Doc. 23 at 14). Plaintiffs allege that neither Facebook or Cognizant adhered to these standards. (Doc. 23 at 14–16).

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Cognizant concealed from employees the danger of viewing graphic images. (Doc. 23 at 22–23).

Cognizant did not conduct psychological evaluations on new hires and did not provide real counseling services to employees. (Doc. 23 at 15–16). Facebook pushed high standards for accuracy and timeliness, and Cognizant, in turn, placed pressure to perform on its employees. (Doc. 23 at 15–16). Facebook and Cognizant also demanded content moderators sign non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), which prohibited them from speaking about the content that they viewed. (Doc. 23 at 16). Further, Plaintiffs allege that Cognizant advertised the content moderator jobs as "prestigious career[s] in high technology that simply required them to become knowledgeable about ‘leading social media products and community standards,’ to ‘assist our community and help resolve inquiries empathetically, accurately and on time,’ and to ‘make well balanced decisions and personally driven [sic] to be an effective advocate for our community.’ " (Doc. 23 at 23).

II. Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction with Regard to Arizona Plaintiffs’ Claims

First, both Facebook and Cognizant (collectively referred to as Defendants) argue that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that this Court has personal jurisdiction over them with respect to the claims of the Arizona plaintiffsMichael Wellman and Alexander Roberts. Because the Arizona plaintiffs’ claims do not arise from or relate to Defendants’ contacts with Florida, Defendantsmotions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are granted.

Plaintiffs argue that this Court should exercise jurisdiction over the Arizona plaintiffs’ claims because personal jurisdiction principles do not bar nationwide class action suits with non-resident class members. For support, Plaintiffs cite the Seventh Circuit's decision in Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc. , 953 F.3d 441, 447–48 (7th Cir. 2020), and the D.C. Circuit's decision in Molock v. Whole Foods Market Group., Inc. , 952 F.3d 293, 300 (D.C. Cir. 2020), for the proposition that Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017), does not bar the exercise of specific jurisdiction over defendants when the named non-resident class members’ contacts with defendants do not arise from or relate to conduct occurring within the state. (Doc. 55 at 2–4). Plaintiffs’ reliance on these cases, however, is misplaced because those cases addressed personal jurisdiction over unnamed class members.

Named plaintiffs in a putative class action suit must comply with personal jurisdiction requirements. Story v. Heartland Payment Sys., LLC , 461 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1231 (M.D. Fla. 2020) ; see also Mussat , 953 F.3d at 447–48 ("We see no reason why personal jurisdiction should be treated any differently from subject-matter jurisdiction and venue: the named representatives must be able to demonstrate either general or specific personal jurisdiction, but the unnamed class members are not required to do so."); cf. A&M Gerber Chiropractic LLC v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co. , 925 F.3d 1205, 1211 (11th Cir. 2019) (applying standing requirements to named plaintiffs); Allapattah Servs. v. Exxon Corp. , 333 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2003) (applying subject matter jurisdictional requirements to named parties), aff'd 545 U.S. 546, 566–67, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005). Accordingly, the named plaintiffs in this action must show that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.

To have personal jurisdiction over a party, a federal court sitting in diversity must determine if the state's long-arm statute is satisfied and ensure that the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Waite v. All Acquisition Corp. , 901 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 2018). Under Florida's long-arm statute, a defendant is subject to either specific jurisdiction, which applies if the claim arises out of or is related to defendant's contacts with Florida, or general jurisdiction, which applies regardless of whether the claims involve the defendant's activities in Florida if the defendant engages in substantial and not isolated activity in Florida. Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc. , 789 F.3d 1201, 1203–04 (11th Cir. 2015). Personal jurisdiction over a defendant comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if the defendant's affiliations with the State are "so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State," id. at 1204 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown , 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011) ), or the defendant has such contacts with the State that "maintenance of the suit is reasonable in the context of our federal system of government and does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024, 209 L.Ed.2d 225 (2021) (quotations omitted).

" [A] corporation's operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business’ will be ‘so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State’ only in ‘exceptional’ cases." Carmouche , 789 F.3d at 1204 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. 117, 137, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014) ). Cognizant is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Texas; Facebook is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in California. The only alleged connection of either corporation to Florida is the operation of Cognizant's Tampa content moderation site. (Doc. 23 at 6). These affiliations are not continuous and systematic enough to render Defendants at home in Florida. Clearly, Arizona plaintiffs have not established general jurisdiction over Cognizant or Facebook, nor do they attempt to argue otherwise. See Waite , 901 F.3d at 1316 ("Because Florida's long-arm provision ‘extends to the limits on personal jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process Clause,’ we ‘need only...

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