Garrett v. Bissell Chilled Plow Works
| Decision Date | 09 March 1900 |
| Docket Number | 18,750 |
| Citation | 56 N.E. 667,154 Ind. 319 |
| Parties | Garrett v. Bissell Chilled Plow Works |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the St. Joseph Circuit Court.
Affirmed.
George G. Feldman, for appellant.
A Anderson, J. Du Shane and W. G. Crabill, for appellee.
This appeal is from a judgment in favor of appellee on demurrer to appellant's complaint for libel.
The complaint was in two paragraphs, which were substantially the same, and predicated upon the following letter:
It is admitted by appellant in his brief that the letter is not libelous per se. The part upon which he predicated his right to recover reads as follows: "The plow that Mr. Garrett used is ours." Unless the extraneous matter set forth by way of inducement makes the letter libelous, the court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint.
It is alleged in the first paragraph of complaint, by way of inducement, that appellant is, and has been for many years, a resident of St. Joseph county, Indiana, and has had and still has control of a farm in said county, which was farmed by himself and his tenants; that for some time prior to the delivery of said letter to said Bufanger, he had owned a riding plow which he had used on his farm, and which he had sold for $ 45 to said Bufanger, to whom he had rented said farm. From these allegations, considered in connection with the statement in said letter,--"the plow that Mr. Garrett used is ours",--the inference drawn by appellant, and alleged in said first paragraph of complaint, was that appellee thereby charged that appellant was guilty of the crime of embezzlement, had feloniously appropriated and converted property of appellee to his own use, was guilty of obtaining money and property under false pretenses, and by false representations, and of feloniously, wrongfully, and unlawfully disposing of defendant's property.
It is the office of the innuendo to explain, not to extend or enlarge, the meaning of the words. An innuendo cannot aver a fact or change the ordinary meaning of language. If words not libelous per se are charged, the absence of inducement showing by extrinsic matter that said words are actionable is not supplied by an innuendo attributing to those words a meaning which renders them actionable. Hays v. Mitchell, 7 Blackf. 117; Stucker v. Davis, 8 Blackf. 414; Harper v. Delp, 3 Ind. 225, 231, 232, and cases cited; Ward v. Colyhan, 30 Ind. 395; Hart v. Coy, 40 Ind. 553; Rock v McClarnon, 95 Ind. 415; Seller v. Jenkins, 97 Ind. 430; Townshend on Sl. and Lib., §§ 335, 336; 13 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 465, 466; 13 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 51, 52, 53, 54. Words are to be understood in their plain and natural import, according to the idea they are calculated to convey to those to whom they are addressed. In ascertaining the meaning, reference must be had to the words used and the circumstances under which they were uttered, and the author is presumed to have used them in the sense which their use is calculated to convey to the minds of the hearers. Seller v. Jenkins, 97 Ind. 430; Townshend on Sl. & Lib., §§ 133, 137. While a written publication may be libelous, and the same words, if spoken, would not be slanderous, yet the rule...
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