Garrett v. Derbes, 96-30737

Decision Date23 April 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96-30737,96-30737
Citation110 F.3d 317
PartiesDaniel GARRETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard S. DERBES, A Professional Law Corporation; Richard S. Derbes, Attorney at Law, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Garth Jonathan Ridge, Baton Rouge, LA, Richard John Rubin, Santa Fe, NM, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Joseph Russell Raggio, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana.

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, PARKER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In early April 1993, Bell South Mobility retained the law firm of Richard S. Derbes, A Professional Law Corporation, to collect delinquent telephone bills from certain customers. Over the next nine months, Richard S. Derbes, on behalf of the law firm, mailed approximately 639 demand letters to individual customers of Bell South. Daniel Garrett received one of these demand letters and then filed an action against Derbes and his law firm (jointly, "Derbes") alleging several violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits a "debt collector" from making false or misleading representations and from engaging in various abusive and unfair practices. Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, ----, 115 S.Ct. 1489, 1490, 131 L.Ed.2d 395 (1995). The act defines a "debt collector" as "any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).

The district court first determined that the "principal purpose" of Derbes' law practice was not the collection of debts. It then determined that Derbes did not "regularly" attempt to collect debts owed another because (1) Derbes' work for Bell South constituted less than 0.5 percent of his entire practice during the nine-month period his law firm represented Bell South, (2) there was no ongoing relationship between Derbes and Bell South, and (3) Derbes had not represented Bell South in other matters. On this ground, the district court granted Derbes summary judgment and dismissed Garrett's complaint with prejudice. Our review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo. Fairley v. Turan-Foley Imports, Inc., 65 F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir.1995). Moreover, when the relevant facts are undisputed, as here, the applicability of a statute's terms is a question of law for the court to decide. Coffman v. Trickey, 884 F.2d 1057, 1061 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
44 cases
  • KEAUHOU MASTER HOMEOWNERS v. HAWAI'I CTY
    • United States
    • Hawaii Supreme Court
    • April 8, 2004
    ...the "principal purpose" prong to differ from the "regularly" prong of its definition of "debt collector." See Garrett v. Derbes, 110 F.3d 317, 318 (5th Cir.1997) (per curiam ). Thus, one "may regularly render debt collection services, even if these services are not a principal purpose of hi......
  • Elizarov v. Equity Experts LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
    • May 9, 2018
    ...the "principal purpose" prong to differ from the "regularly" prong of its definition of "debt collector." See Garrett v. Derbes , 110 F.3d 317, 318 (5th Cir.1997) (per curiam). Thus, one "may regularly render debt collection services, even if these services are not a principal purpose of hi......
  • Havens-Tobias v. Eagle
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
    • January 2, 2001
    ..."may regularly render debt collection services, even if these services are not a principal purpose of his business." Garrett v. Derbes, 110 F.3d 317, 318 (5th Cir.1997). As another court explained, "the word `regular' is not synonymous with the word `substantial.' Debt collection services m......
  • Passa v. City of Columbus
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
    • September 28, 2010
    ...the “principal purpose” prong to differ from the “regularly” prong of its definition of “debt collector.” See Garrett v. Derbes, 110 F.3d 317, 318 (5th Cir.1997) ( per curiam ). Thus, one “may regularly render debt collection services, even if these services are not a principal purpose of h......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT