Garrett v. Governing Bd. of Oakland Unified Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 04 February 2022
• Docket Number: Case No. 21-cv-03323-HSG
• Parties: Gina GARRETT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GOVERNING BOARD OF OAKLAND UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

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Gina GARRETT, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
GOVERNING BOARD OF OAKLAND UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 21-cv-03323-HSG

United States District Court, N.D. California.

Signed February 4, 2022

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James Franklin Drake, IV, Drake Legal Group, Newport Beach, CA, Kay McKenzie Parker, Law Offices of Kay McKenzie Parker, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff Gina Garrett.

Katherine A. Alberts, Leone Alberts & Duus, APC, Concord, CA, for Defendants Kyla Johnson-Trammell, Tara Gard.

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 14, 34

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR., United States District Judge

On May 4, 2021, Plaintiffs Leslie Tavernier ("Plaintiff Tavernier") and Gina Garrett ("Plaintiff Garrett") brought this lawsuit alleging that they were unjustifiably and discriminatorily disciplined and terminated by the Oakland Unified School District ("OUSD"). See Dkt. No. 1 (or "Compl."). The Complaint names as defendants the Governing Board of Trustees of the Oakland Unified School District (the "OUSD Board"), as well as three OUSD employees—Kyla Johnson-Trammell, Tara Gard, and Jenine Lindsey—who are being sued in their individual capacities (collectively, the "Individual Defendants"). See id. Both the OUSD Board and the Individual Defendants filed motions to dismiss the Complaint, and both motions are fully briefed. See Dkt. Nos. 14 ("OUSD Mot."), 16 ("OUSD Opp."), 21 ("OUSD Reply"), 34 ("Mot."), 48 ("Opp."), and 51 ("Reply").¹ Having considered the parties’ arguments, the Court GRANTS the OUSD Board's Motion to Dismiss with prejudice and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.²

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Tavernier was employed by OUSD as the Financial Services Director of Budget. Compl. ¶ 5. In that capacity, she oversaw a staff of 14-16 financial analysts. Id. ¶ 18. The Complaint alleges that some of those financial analysts received stipends while four financial analysts—three of whom were Black employees approximately sixty years old—did not. Id. More specifically, the Complaint alleges that Defendant Tara Gard intentionally withheld the stipends from Tavernier's employees. Id. ¶ 20. Tavernier opposed this perceived discrimination by processing the stipends herself without the approval of Human Resources. Id. As a result, Tavernier was put on administrative leave. Id. ¶ 21.

Jenine Lindsey, OUSD's Director of Labor Relations, investigated Tavernier's alleged misconduct. See id. ¶¶ 28-30. Plaintiff Tavernier alleges that, during this investigation, Jenine Lindsey falsely represented herself as a neutral arbiter and attorney despite ultimately being the prosecutor in Tavernier's Skelly hearing. Id. Plaintiff Tavernier was ultimately terminated for financial mismanagement. Id. ¶ 21. Based on these facts, Plaintiff Tavernier brings three claims against the Individual Defendants and the OUSD Board: (1) federal claims for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) federal claims for violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (3) a state law claim for violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (or "FEHA"). See id. at 6, 10, and 18.

Plaintiff Gina Garrett was employed by OUSD as the Senior Executive Director of Budget. Id. ¶ 4. The Complaint alleges that the OUSD Board, through Defendant Kyla Johnson-Trammell, approved the hiring of Preston Thomas, a white man, to be the Chief Services & Support Officer, and Plaintiff Garrett's supervisor, even though Thomas had no relevant experience in school finance or managing financial staff. Id. ¶ 36. When Defendant Johnson-Trammell told Plaintiff Garrett that Preston Thomas would be evaluating her, Plaintiff Garrett objected on the grounds that "he had no experience in anything that would allow him to fairly evaluate her." Id. ¶ 40. She then requested that someone from the County Office of Education evaluate her if no one at OUSD was able to evaluate to do so. Id.

Plaintiff Garrett alleges that she was placed on paid administrative leave pending investigation of misconduct on February 18, 2020. Id. ¶ 41. Although the Skelly hearing officer issued a recommendation not to terminate Garrett, she was later notified that her position would be eliminated due to lack of funds. Id. ¶ 52, 59. Plaintiff Garrett also alleges that OUSD violated the California Education Code by later advertising a position similar to her old job without informing her of the opening. Id. ¶¶ 59-62. Like Plaintiff Tavernier, Plaintiff Garrett brings three claims against the Individual Defendants and the OUSD Board: (1) federal claims for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) federal claims for violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments;

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and (3) a state law claim for violation of California's FEHA. See id. at 11, 14, and 18.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). "Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory." Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr. , 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts "accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. , 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, courts do not "accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig. , 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors , 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) ). And even where facts are accepted as true, "a plaintiff may plead [him]self out of court" if he "plead[s] facts which establish that he cannot prevail on his ... claim." Weisbuch v. Cty. of Los Angeles , 119 F.3d 778, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997).

Even if the court concludes that a 12(b)(6) motion should be granted, the "court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith , 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

The Complaint alleges that OUSD disciplined and terminated Plaintiffs in violation of their federal Equal Protection and Substantive and Procedural Due Process rights under the U.S. Constitution, as well as their rights under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"). See generally Compl. Defendants’ motions seek to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants the OUSD Board's Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. The Court denies the Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss only as to Plaintiff Garrett's sex discrimination claim and grants the motion as to the remaining claims.

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The OUSD Board contends that it is immune from Plaintiffs’ claims under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See generally OUSD Mot. The Court agrees and dismisses the OUSD Board from this action.

The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution embodies the principle of "sovereign immunity" and bars a federal court from hearing claims by private citizens against state governments, their agencies, or the officials of those agencies unless the state consents to suit, or Congress has expressly abrogated the state's immunity. See

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Seminole Tribe v. Florida , 517 U.S. 44, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) ; Natural Res. Def. Counsel Santa Monica Baykeeper, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp. , 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996). Ordinarily, courts in this Circuit apply a multi-factor balancing test to determine whether a governmental agency is an "arm of the state" that is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Belanger v. Madera Unified School Dist. , 963 F.2d 248, 250–51 (9th Cir. 1992). But because California's school districts are "controlled and funded by the state government rather than the local district," the Ninth Circuit has held that they are "arms of the state" under the Eleventh Amendment and are therefore entitled to sovereign immunity. Id. at 251 ; see also Stoner v. Santa Clara Cnty. Office of Educ. , 502 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2007) ("[A] California school district and county office of education are arms of the state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity."). There is no question, then, that OUSD is an "arm of the state" entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Plaintiffs’ claims.

In this case, however, Plaintiffs sued OUSD's Governing Board of Trustees instead of OUSD itself. But the Court does not find this to be a meaningful distinction. In California, the authority of a school district's governing board is coextensive with that of the school district itself. See California Education...