Garrett v. Mobil Oil Corporation
Decision Date | 02 June 1975 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 20202-3. |
Citation | 395 F. Supp. 117 |
Parties | Betty GARRETT, Plaintiff, v. MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
William H. Pickett, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.
Harry P. Thomson Jr., and Fred J. Wilkins, of Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, Kansas City, Mo., for defendant.
FINDINGS OF FACT,1 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND FINAL JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT ON BOTH COUNTS
This is an action for injunctive relief and damages by a former employee of the defendant. In each of two separate counts, plaintiff, a Negro female, seeks to recover damages, including loss of wages and other benefits, and injunctive relief, as a result of the alleged intentional and wrongful termination of her employment with the defendant. Plaintiff contends in each count that her employment with the defendant was terminated because of her race, and also in retaliation to her complaints to the defendant about defendant's alleged discriminatory treatment of other employees of defendant of the same race as the plaintiff. In Count I of the complaint, relief is sought under the provisions of Section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 2000e-5(e), Title 42, United States Code. In Count II, relief is sought under Section 1981, Title 42, United States Code. In each count jurisdiction is asserted under Section 1343, Title 28, United States Code. In addition, jurisdiction of Count II is asserted under Section 1331, Title 28, United States Code.
The claim for relief in Count II under Section 1981 was based on the allegations that
Jurisdiction exists under Section 2000e-5(e), Title 42, United States Code, in respect to Count I, and under Section 1343, Title 28, United States Code, in respect to Count II.
There were no allegations nor any request that this action be determined to be a class action. Furthermore, no class action determination was made on the initiative of this Court.
After the joinder of issues and the completion of pretrial proceedings, a plenary evidentiary trial without a jury was accorded the parties. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, counsel for defendant filed defendant's "Motion of Defendant for Judgment at the Close of Plaintiff's Evidence." At the close of all of the evidence, counsel for defendant filed a "Motion of Defendant for Judgment at the Close of All Evidence." Both motions were denied. Because the material factual issues have been determined against the plaintiff, it will be unnecessary to evaluate the legal theory asserted by the plaintiff in Count II.
Prior to trial, both parties filed herein their extensive proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Subsequent to the trial, counsel for plaintiff filed "Supplementary Suggested Conclusions of Law." Thereafter, counsel for defendant filed his response to plaintiff's supplemental proposed conclusions of law.
Based on a careful review of the contentions of the parties and the evidence presented, the following factual and legal determinations have been made.
Plaintiff Betty Garrett, a Negro female, sought and secured employment with the defendant on August 18, 1969. Prior thereto, plaintiff had been employed as an assembly line worker with the Western Electric Company. Plaintiff was employed by the defendant for duties in the defendant's Credit Card Center at Kansas City, Missouri. This Center, at the time of plaintiff's employment there, performed the functions of billing and collection for all Mobil Oil credit card accounts in 41 states. At the time of her employment, plaintiff was given an employee handbook which set forth the appropriate administrative procedures for lodging employee grievances and complaints.
Plaintiff was initially employed as a balance clerk "B" (salary group 4) at $345.00 per month on the evening shift. Thereafter on or about October 20, 1969, she was transferred to the day shift in the incoming mail section as an Office Services Clerk, but without a reduction in salary.
Plaintiff's first "Employee Appraisal and Development" report was dated February 13, 1970, and was prepared by plaintiff's Supervisor in the Income Mail Section, Jerry Eklund. That report concluded that plaintiff "fully meets job requirements" only in the category of adaptability; "fully meets job requirements (minus)" on quality of work; "barely meets job requirements (plus)" on attitude; "barely meets job requirements" on quality of work; and "barely meets job requirements" on stability. According to the initial appraisal, the plaintiff's strongest single qualification was potential or inherent ability to perform assigned tasks. The factor determined to need improvement the most was overall consistency in production, attitude and work habits. The initial appraisal was orally discussed with the plaintiff.
On March 11, 1970, plaintiff inquired of Mr. Eklund when her next review would be made, who would make such a review, and why she had not been given duties other than "traying" of mail (verifying the correctness and legibility of incoming charge tickets). The "other duties" apparently sought by plaintiff included xeroxing and microfilming. Mr. Eklund advised her that her duties would remain the same until the deficiencies in her appraisal report were remedied. He further advised her that her attitude and her willingness to comply with defendant's rules needed improvement. At the time of the March 11, 1970, meeting with Mr. Eklund, plaintiff expressed her personal doubt concerning the accuracy of her work records. A memorandum by Mr. Eklund with respect to the March 11, 1970, conference was placed in plaintiff's personnel file.
Thereafter, on March 18, 1970, plaintiff discussed her February appraisal with Beverly Lake, plaintiff's new Supervisor and successor to Mr. Eklund. Plaintiff advised her new Supervisor that she considered the appraisal to be unfair. A memorandum in plaintiff's personnel file concerning this discussion stated that plaintiff's work product had been better since her February appraisal, but that there were irregularities in her work record which represented carelessness. The memorandum further noted that such irregularities should be eliminated in the next thirty days in order to change plaintiff's performance rating.
On March 18, 1970, after the discussion with Mrs. Lake, plaintiff left her work station during working hours on two separate occasions and unilaterally attempted, without permission or knowledge of her Supervisor and without appointment, to meet with Mr. Fish, the Center Manager of Operations. Plaintiff was advised that Mr. Fish was in a meeting and was directed to contact her Supervisor. After her unsuccessful attempt to meet with Mr. Fish and after being advised to return to work, plaintiff again left her work station during working hours, and went directly to the office of Mr. Ittel, Employee Relations Manager. Mr. Ittel's secretary advised plaintiff to return to her work station. Plaintiff responded by stating in words to the following effect: "I am not moving my ass out of this office until I see Mr. Ittel." Plaintiff never received any implied or direct permission from her Supervisor, Mrs. Lake, to leave her work station on this second occasion.
On this second occasion, plaintiff's Supervisor, Mrs. Lake, who was in conference with Mr. Ittel, requested that the plaintiff return to her work station. Plaintiff complied with Mrs. Lake's request and a brief conference between the two occurred. Mrs. Lake thereafter advised plaintiff that the proper procedure to present a complaint was to always discuss the matter with the Supervisor initially and, if not satisfied, to request the Supervisor to schedule an appointment with the next higher level of management. This oral explanation was authoritative and clear, clarifying the meaning of the printed handbook on procedures, which plaintiff had been given earlier. Plaintiff stated that she had not previously been aware of this procedure; that she felt she was being watched too closely; that she was fed up with the way the mail room was operated; and that she felt her Supervisors were concentrating on her and treating her like a child. Mrs. Lake explained to plaintiff the necessity of supervision. In addition, Mrs. Lake asked for plaintiff's suggestions on what she thought should be changed. Plaintiff presented no suggestions.
At the trial, plaintiff testified she believed earlier on March 18, 1970, that she had a right to go directly to higher authority and to leave her work station at any time without permission by her Supervisor. Under the circumstances, this was not a reasonable belief, even if it were held by plaintiff. This contention of rights by the plaintiff is unreasonable and is precluded by the overwhelming evidence of procedures in effect which were communicated to plaintiff and explained clearly.
On April 22, 1970, the plaintiff, without the prior knowledge or permission of her Supervisor, met with Mr. Sandy Mitchell, Department Supervisor of Accounting and Office Services, during a recess for coffee. Plaintiff asked Mr. Mitchell when her next appraisal would be made and complained about not receiving assignments in addition to traying of mail. Plaintiff again complained about her February appraisal. Plaintiff contends that she was free to complain to higher authority without permission or knowledge of her Supervisor during recess from work. The evidence is to the contrary. On that same day, Mrs. Lake conferred with plaintiff,...
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