Garrett v. Southern Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 March 1900
• Docket Number: 750.
• Citation: 101 F. 102
• Parties: GARRETT et al. v. SOUTHERN RY. CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

101 F. 102

GARRETT et al. v. SOUTHERN RY. CO.

No. 750.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

March 15, 1900

C. G Bond and J. M. Boone, for plaintiffs in error.

W. J Lamb and F. P. Poston, for defendant in error.

Before TAFT, LURTON, and DAY, Circuit Judges.

TAFT Circuit Judge.

This is a writ of error brought to review a judgment for the defendant, the Southern Railway Company, in a suit filed against the company by G. W. Garrett and H. E. Ray for $20,000 damages for alleged negligence of the company resulting in the burning and destruction of the planing-mill plant and stock of lumber of the plaintiffs at Pocahontas Tenn., on December 27, 1898. The declaration alleged that the fire which destroyed the property was caused by sparks emitted from an engine negligently constructed and operated by the defendant company on its switch track in front of the plaintiff's mill. The cause was originally brought in the circuit court of McNairy county, Tenn., and was removed to the court below by the railway company on the ground of diverse citizenship of the parties. The defendant denied that sparks from its engine caused the accident, and further denied any negligence in the construction or operation of its locomotives. The case was heard, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant.

The sole question presented by the record for our consideration is whether the rule which the court laid down as to the burden of proof was correct. There is not in Tennessee, as there is in many other states, a statute defining the rule to be enforced as to the burden of proof in such cases. The question presented to the court below and presented here is one of common law. The court below, in effect, instructed the jury that, as the plaintiffs to show the defendant's negligence by a preponderance of the evidence; that, when the plaintiffs established by such preponderance the mere fact that the fire was caused by sparks from an engine of the defendant, it still remained for him to prove that the emitting of such sparks was due to defendant's negligence by a preponderance of the evidence; that, when the plaintiffs established by such preponderance the mere fact that the fire was caused by sparks from an engine of the defendant, it still remained for him to prove that the emitting of such sparks was due to defendant's negligence; that, if the jury found as a fact that under the present approved methods of constructing and operating locomotives it was improbable that fire could be communicated by sparks from an engine without negligence, then the jury would be justified inferring as a fact, from the mere circumstance of the fire and its origin in the emission of sparks, that the fire was caused by sparks from an engine was prima facie evidence of the negligence of the defendant. There is great contrariety of opinion in the cases upon the question whether the mere communication of fire by sparks of an engine is prima facie evidence of negligence in a railway company. The question is further complicated by the fact that in many states statutes have been passed which make such evidence prima facie evidence of negligence. Without examining the cases, we think we may say that nearly all the earlier cases hold that the burden is upon the plaintiffs not only to show that the fire was caused by the sparks, but that the sparks were emitted through the...