Garrett v. Tandy Corp., No. CIV. 00-384-PH.
| Decision Date | 12 June 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. 00-384-PH. |
| Citation | 142 F.Supp.2d 117 |
| Parties | John GARRETT, Plaintiff v. TANDY CORPORATION d/b/a Radio Shack, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
Jeffrey Neil Young, McTeague, Higbee, MaCadam, Case, Watson & Cohen, Topsham, ME, for John Garrett, plaintiffs.
Jonathan Shapiro, Melinda J. Caterine, Moon, Moss, McGill, Hayes & Shapiro, P.A., Portland, ME, for Tandy Corporation dba Radio Shack, defendants.
Racial profiling or stereotyping is highly objectionable. But when a private retailer engages in the practice, it does not create a basis for a federal claim by a customer unless the retailer deprives the customer of a right or interest protected by federal statute. Here, the customer tries to fit his complaint under two old civil rights statutes (one of them more recently amended), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1982, that protect primarily contractual relations and property. I conclude that no property or contract interests of the customer were affected here. I also conclude that a store employee's report to the police that he "suspects" a customer of theft is a statement of opinion that does not imply any defamatory facts; it therefore is not actionable under Maine's defamation law.
Jurisdiction is based upon federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993), and diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1993 & West Supp.2000). The matter is before me on a motion to dismiss Count I (the federal count charging racial discrimination) and Count III (a state defamation charge) of the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, I treat as true all facts alleged in the Amended Complaint.1
The plaintiff, John Garrett, a disabled black Vietnam veteran, shopped at the Cook's Corner Radio Shack store in Brunswick on December 21, 1998. He was looking for a police scanner, but ultimately could not find his desired model in that store. He ended up purchasing a telephone/answering machine, a book, and batteries. After giving his name and address in connection with the purchase, he left the store. Up until this point, nothing objectionable had happened. It is what occurred later that evening that prompts Garrett's lawsuit.
The store manager and two other employees on duty that night were white. After Garrett left the store, the store manager discovered that a $2,000 computer was missing. He had the names of three or four white shoppers who had been there at about the same time as Garrett. The store manager informed the Brunswick Police Department that he suspected Garrett of stealing the computer. The Brunswick Police called the nearby Bath Police Department; the Bath police visited Garrett and obtained his verbal consent to search his house and car. They did not find the computer. Garrett then called the Radio Shack store manager and complained that he felt he was being singled out because he was black. The store manager assured Garrett that he had reported white shoppers as well. In fact, that was untrue. Radio Shack has made no other efforts to locate the missing computer. Garrett would like to return the telephone/answering machine but is now reluctant to go to any Radio Shack store for fear of being accused of shoplifting.
(1) Discrimination
The relevant federal civil rights statutes provide:
§ 1981. Equal rights under the law
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens....
For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce contracts" includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (1994) ().
§ 1982. Property rights of citizens
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1982 (1994).
Garrett claims that Radio Shack singled him out because of his race in calling the police, and that this conduct interfered with his "right to enter into, enforce, and enjoy the benefits and privileges of a contractual relationship" with Radio Shack; his "prospective contractual relations" with Radio Shack; and his "ability to purchase personal property" from Radio Shack.
If Garrett was singled out because he was black, that is reprehensible.2 But his federal claim depends on whether he was denied any contractual rights or property rights within the meaning of the two statutes. On the allegations of the Amended Complaint, no such disruption occurred. Specifically, Garrett consummated his contractual relationship with Radio Shack: he purchased his supplies and went home, without any interference based upon his race. The objectionable conduct all occurred thereafter, and did not have anything to do with the purchase Garrett made. As a result of what happened, Garrett may be personally fearful of risking racially unfair treatment on another visit to Radio Shack, but there is no suggestion in his Amended Complaint that Radio Shack wants to discourage him from further purchases. That is the focus of these two statutes: restrictions on the ability to contract or purchase property, not general mistreatment related to race. Radio Shack's store manager may have treated Garrett badly, but on the allegations here, he did not interfere with contract or property rights based upon Garrett's race.3
According to the Amended Complaint, Radio Shack defamed Garrett when it reported him to the police as a suspect in the computer theft. Am. Compl. ¶ 18 (); Am. Compl. ¶ 25 (); Am. Compl. ¶ 33 (). The nub of the dispute is the word "suspected": The Amended Complaint does not allege that Radio Shack told the police that Garrett committed a crime, but that the manager suspected him of committing a crime. On its face, that is a statement of opinion, not fact.
An opinion that "cannot reasonably be understood as implying unstated defamatory facts" is not actionable. True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257, 262 (Me.1986); see also Fortier v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 2327, 605 A.2d 79, 80 (Me. 1992). An opinion can be actionable, however, if it "could reasonably be understood by the ordinary person as implying unstated defamatory facts." True, 513 A.2d at 262; see also Fortier, 605 A.2d at 80.4 In that event, the jury is asked to determine whether it is a statement of fact or opinion. True, 513 A.2d at 262. Otherwise, it is a question of law for the court. Caron v. Bangor Publ'g Co., 470 A.2d 782, 785 (Me. 1984).
In this case, the store manager's statement to the police officer that he "suspected" Garrett of taking the computer explicitly stops short of asserting that Garrett actually committed the crime. Nor does it assert that the manager personally believed that Garrett committed the crime: "I suspect" connotes less certainty than "I believe," or "I think."5 Indeed, "suspect" connotes only that the manager had some suspicion that Garrett was the culprit. To suspect is to surmise, based on little or no evidence.6 The statement's very uncertainty stops it from implying anything defamatory (for example, it does not imply that the manager actually saw Garrett stealing the computer). Rather, if it implies any factual assertions at all, they are not defamatory (for example, it might imply underlying assertions such as that Garrett was at the store before the computer was discovered missing, or, more seriously but still not defamatory, that Garrett had behaved in some way the manager deemed suspicious.) Therefore, I conclude that the statement is nonactionable opinion.
On his remaining count — for violation of the Maine Human Rights Act — Garrett seeks both damages and a permanent injunction enjoining Radio Shack from engaging in any policy or practice that discriminates against him on the basis of race. Radio Shack has moved to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief, arguing that the complaint does not allege a real and immediate threat of present or future harm.
The Maine Human Rights Act directs that if a court finds unlawful discrimination, "its judgment must specify an appropriate remedy or remedies for that discrimination." 5 M.R.S.A. § 4613(2)(B) (West Supp.2000). One of the statute's suggested remedies is: "(1) An order to cease and desist from the unlawful practices specified in the order." 5 M.R.S.A. § 4613(2)(B)(1) (West Supp.2000). It is premature to decide at this point that no such relief is available. Radio Shack's motion to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief is DENIED.
Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss Counts I and III of the Amended Complaint is GRANTED and the motion to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
1. In its reply memorandum on the motion to dismiss, the defendant makes factual assertions, which it supports with documents attached to the reply. The assertions and the documents are not properly before me on a motion to dismiss, and I do not consider them.
2. I will pass over the fact that the Amended Complaint does not actually allege that Garrett was similarly situated to the white shoppers except for his race — i.e., it does not allege that the store...
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Garrett v. Tandy Corp.
...After briefing and argument, the district court granted the motion with respect to the first and third counts. Garrett v. Tandy Corp., 142 F.Supp.2d 117, 121 (D.Me.2001). The court allowed the MHRA claim to proceed, id., but later dismissed it without prejudice, presumably for failure to sa......