Garrigan v. United States

• Decision Date: 14 April 1908
• Docket Number: 1,341.
• Citation: 163 F. 16
• Parties: GARRIGAN v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

163 F. 16

GARRIGAN v. UNITED STATES.

No. 1,341.

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

April 14, 1908

Rehearing Denied June 4, 1908.

In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois.

For opinion below, see 141 F. 679.

The plaintiff in error, Daniel Garrigan, was adjudged by the Circuit Court guilty of contempt, in the violation of an injunctional order issued by that court, in aiding and abetting the parties enjoined and interfering with the business and employes under the protection of such order, and the proceedings and judgment are brought for review by this writ of error.

The judgment recites the proceedings and findings and reads as follows:

‘ It appearing to the court that on April 28, 1905, the Employers' Teaming Company filed its bill of complaint in equity in said court, in and for said district and division thereof, praying for an injunction, both temporary and permanent, and that on said April 28, 1905, on the application of said the Employers' Teaming Company, said court duly entered of record, in said chancery proceeding, a temporary stay and injunctional order, and that said the Employers' Teaming Company thereafter filed a petition in said chancery proceeding for a rule directing Daniel Garrigan to show cause by a short day why he should not be attached for contempt of said court for violating said temporary stay and injunctional order; and it further appearing to the court that affidavits were duly filed with and in support of said petition, and that upon the filing and presentation of said petition and affidavits, said Daniel Garrigan was duly ruled by said court, in said chancery proceeding, to show cause by May 31, 1905, at 10 o'clock a.m. why he should not be attached for contempt of said court for violating said temporary stay and injunctional order; and that said Daniel Garrigan was duly and personally served with a certified copy of said rule, and that he thereafter filed an answer thereto supported by affidavits, and that rebuttal affidavits were filed by said the Employers' Teaming Company; and the court having heard and considered said petition, answer, and all said affidavits, and also oral evidence then and there offered in open court by said the Employers' Teaming Company and also by said Daniel Garrigan; and the court having heard the arguments of counsel for said respective parties, and being fully advised in the premises, and said Daniel Garrigan having been present in open court in person and by counsel at the hearing on said rule, and being also now here present in open court in person and by counsel- the court finds: That said Daniel Garrigan on May 2, 1905, in the city of Chicago, in said district, had full knowledge of the existence of said temporary stay and injunctional order and of the terms thereof, and with such knowledge did then and there knowingly, willfully, and intentionally violate said stay and injunctional order, and did then and there, with full knowledge of the existence of said temporary stay and injunctional order, and of the terms thereof, knowingly willfully, and intentionally aid and abet the defendants, or some of them, to said bill of complaint in committing acts and grievances complained of in said bill of complaint and prohibited by said stay and injunctional order. And the court further finds that said Daniel Garrigan on the date and at the place last aforesaid, and with full knowledge of the existence of said temporary stay and injunctional order, and of the terms thereof, did knowingly, willfully, and intentionally and contrary to and in violation of the terms of said stay and injunctional order interfere with, hinder obstruct, and aid and abet the defendants, or some of them, to said bill of complaint in interfering with, hindering, and obstructing the business of said the Employers' Teaming Company, and also its employes and agents, while they were then and there engaged in the conduct and operation of its business; that said Daniel Garrigan has failed to show cause why he should not be attached and punished as for contempt of this court for violating said temporary stay and injunctional order; that said contempt has tended to defeat and impair the rights and interests of said the Employers' Teaming Company and to obstruct justice, and bring the administration of justice into contempt. Wherefore, the premises considered, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that said rule to show cause be and the same hereby is made absolute. And it is further hereby ordered and decreed by the court that the said Daniel Garrigan was and is, and he hereby is adjudged, guilty of and in contempt of this court, and that said Daniel Garrigan stand committed to and be confined and imprisoned in the county jail of Du Page county, in Wheaton, in said county, in the state of Illinois, for any during the period of three months, unless he shall be sooner discharged therefrom by due process of law, and that a warrant of commitment do now issue in due form for the arrest forthwith of said Daniel Garrigan, directed to the United States Marshal for the Northern district of Illinois, and that, when arrested by said marshal, said Daniel Garrigan be committed to said jail, and that he be there held for the said period of three months, unless sooner discharged therefrom by due process of law, and that said term of imprisonment shall begin when said Daniel Garrigan is lodged in said jail, as herein provided.‘ ’

The injunctional order referred to ran against various trade organizations and individuals, named as defendants in the bill filed by the Employers' Teaming Company- the plaintiff in error not being named therein, nor party of record in any form- and ‘ each and every of the agents and servants of the said defendants and of each of them, and any and all other persons and associations now or hereafter aiding or abetting or confederating or acting in concert with said defendants or any or either of them, in committing the acts and grievances or any of them complained of in said bill of complaint,‘ and restrained the commission of various acts, including the following: ‘ Hindering, obstructing, or stopping any of the business of the complainant, the Employers' Teaming Company, in the maintenance, conduct, management, or operation of any of its business, barns, stables, horses, wagons, or properties of any kind in the city of Chicago; * * * also, from in any manner interfering with, hindering, obstructing or stopping the passage along and through the streets of said city of any of complainant's wagons, teams, or teamsters in and about the business of complainant; * * * and also from accompanying, following, talking with, or calling upon any person or persons employed by or doing business with said complainant against the express will of said person or persons, for the purpose of or in such manner as to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any such person or persons; * * * and also, either singly or in combination with others, from picketing, besetting, or patrolling any place or places where said complainant's employes, teams, wagons, stables, barns, or other property may be or happen to be in said city; * * * and also, from ordering, assisting, aiding, or abetting in any manner whatsoever any person or persons to commit any of the acts aforesaid.‘ It further provided for service of the order upon and in respect of the defendants therein, and that it ‘ shall be binding upon all of said defendants and all other persons whomsoever from and after the time they severally have knowledge of the allowance of this order.‘

Daniel L. Cruice and William H. Slack, for plaintiff in error.

Levy Mayer, for the United States.

Before BAKER and SEAMAN, Circuit Judges, and SANBORN, District Judge.

SEAMAN Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

The plaintiff in error was not a party to the bill filed by the Employers' Teaming Company for injunctional relief, nor a member of either of the associations named as defendants therein, nor named in the restraining order whereof violation is averred in these contempt proceedings, and neither averment nor proof appears of his relation to or privity with either of the parties enjoined, prior to or apart from the alleged acts in violation and contempt of such order.

Thus the proceedings and conviction which are brought for review under this writ of error are distinctly criminal in their nature, and reviewable in conformity with the established doctrine of such procedure. Bessette v. W. B. conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 326, 24 S.Ct. 665, 48 L.Ed. 997; Matter of Christensen Engineering Co., 194 U.S. 458 459, 24 S.Ct. 729, 48 L.Ed. 1072. Whatever of confusion appeared in the authorities, prior to the decisions...