Garrish v. Intern. Union United Automobile

• Decision Date: 05 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-2468.,03-2468.
• Citation: 417 F.3d 590
• Parties: Dale GARRISH, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE, AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA; Local 594 International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America; and General Motors Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

417 F.3d 590

Dale GARRISH, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE, AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA; Local 594 International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America; and General Motors Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 03-2468.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: June 8, 2005.

Decided and Filed: August 5, 2005.

ARGUED: Harold Dunne, Livonia, Michigan, Steven B. Potter, Dinn, Hochman Potter & Levy, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants. Samuel C. McKnight, Klimist, McKnight, Sale, McClow & Canzano, Southfield, Michigan, Stuart M. Israel, Martens, Ice, Klass, Legghio & Israel, Royal Oak, Michigan, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Harold Dunne, Livonia, Michigan, Steven B. Potter, Dinn, Hochman, Potter & Levy, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants. Samuel C. McKnight, Klimist, McKnight, Sale, McClow & Canzano, Southfield, Michigan, Stuart M. Israel, Martens, Ice, Klass, Legghio & Israel, Royal Oak, Michigan, Andrew M. Kramer, Jones Day, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

Before: SILER and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges; WILLIAMS, District Judge.^*

SILER, Circuit Judge.

In this action brought under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, Plaintiffs Dale Garrish, et al.,¹ appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America ("UAW"), its affiliated Local 594 ("Local 594"), and General Motors Corporation ("GMC"). The district court concluded that Plaintiffs' action was barred by the statute of limitations because they failed to timely bring their claims. Having concluded that Plaintiffs' allegations are untimely and fail to state a cause of action, we AFFIRM.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are GMC employees who work in its Pontiac, Michigan Facility and members of UAW and Local 594.² GMC and UAW are parties to a National Collective Bargaining Agreement ("NCBA"), while Local 594 and the Facility are parties to a National Collective Bargaining Agreement ("LCBA"). These two collective bargaining agreements govern the terms and conditions of Plaintiffs' employment. The NCBA specifically governs employment rights, including wages, hours of employment, and working conditions. The LCBA permits its parties to negotiate those matters not covered by the NCBA.

In early 1997, Local 594's Shop Committee renegotiated the LCBA between GMC management and the Facility. Jay Campbell was the Shop Committee Chairman in charge of the renegotiation and was assisted by Donny Douglas, a UAW International Representative assigned to UAW's GMC Department. These 1997 negotiations pertained to the settlement of specific written demands and grievances immaterial to this appeal. On April 23, 1997, Local 594's members began a strike at the Facility over these unresolved demands and grievances. This strike lasted eighty-seven days, finally ending in July 1997. Thereafter, Plaintiffs asserted that although GMC met Local 594's demands within the strike's first month, the union fraudulently prolonged the strike for two more months. Plaintiffs claimed that the union extended the strike to (1) require GMC to hire Gordon Campbell (Jay Campbell's son) and Todd Fante (a friend of Donny Douglas's son) and (2) obtain approximately $200,000 in payoffs from GMC to Local 594's upper-level officials.

When the strike began Gordon Campbell and Fante were neither GMC employees nor union members. On August 4, 1997, GMC hired Gordon Campbell and Fante as journeymen vehicle builders, i.e., in skilled trade positions. Pursuant to the NCBA, Plaintiffs insisted that the only way a non-GMC individual can be hired as a journeyman in a skilled trades classification is through either having become a journeyman by way of an apprentice program or having gained eight years of experience in that skilled trade. On August 19, 1997, Plaintiffs challenged the credentials of all new hires and demanded a complete investigation into Gordon Campbell's and Fante's credentials. On August 29, 1997, two additional grievances were charged against Gordon Campbell and Fante, again challenging their credentials and claiming that they were wrongfully hired during the strike.³

All grievances against Gordon Campbell and Fante, however, were withdrawn by Skilled Trades Zoneman William Coffey in February 1999. On February 22, 1999, Garrish and other members of Local 594 (including some Plaintiffs) appealed the withdrawal of the grievances. On March 30, 1999, Plaintiffs' appeal was held "to be filed in an untimely manner in accordance with Article # 33 of the [UAW] International Constitution." On April 21, 1999, Garrish protested to Jay Campbell that the appeal was timely and must be heard. Jay Campbell never responded, so Garrish filed his appeal with the membership of Local 594. Although again considered untimely, on February 1, 2000, the membership ultimately concluded that the appeal was timely filed. Plaintiffs were very concerned that any internal appeal would be futile — Garrish opined that his "appeal has been delayed literally years under the guise of untimeliness."

Ultimately, on August 7, 2000, Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants pursuant to § 301 of the LMRA, as amended 29 U.S.C. § 185, for breach of contract and the duty of fair representation. Plaintiffs sought the removal of Gordon Campbell and Fante from their skilled trade positions, as well as compensatory damages in lost wages for 5,000 employees during the prolonged strike and punitive damages from all Defendants. Plaintiffs also alleged that Local 594 extended the strike two more months than necessary to force GMC to pay off upper-level Local 594 officials. In the meantime, GMC determined that under the NCBA only the UAW, and not any local union affiliate, may demand reinstatement of a grievance. Therefore, GMC concluded that Local 594's decision to withdraw the grievances challenging these two employees was reasonable and Local 594 was correct in deciding that an arbitrator would not uphold the grievance. While Garrish was advised that he could appeal this decision under Article 33 of the UAW Constitution, he (and other Plaintiffs) still did not believe that the UAW would properly consider an appeal.

After many other instances of procedural wrangling and several years after the grievances were originally filed, the district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. It concluded that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute of limitations because they failed to timely file their complaint.⁴

DISCUSSION

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Lautermilch v. Findlay City Sch., 314 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir.2003). "Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.; see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). All evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

"A hybrid § 301 suit implicates the interrelationship among a union member, his union, and his employer." Vencl v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 18, 137 F.3d 420, 424 (6th Cir.1998) (citation omitted). Jurisdiction arises under § 301 because Plaintiffs alleged breaches of the NCBA. See id. "To recover against a union under § 301, the union member must prove both (1) that the employer breached the collective bargaining agreement and (2) that the union breached its duty of fair representation." Id. (citation omitted). If both prongs are not satisfied, Plaintiffs cannot succeed against any Defendant. See id.; Bagsby v. Lewis Bros. of Tennessee, 820 F.2d 799, 801 (6th Cir. 1987).

A six-month statute of limitations applies to Plaintiffs' hybrid § 301 action. See Martin v. Lake County Sewer Co., 269 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir.2001) (citing DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983)). "Such a claim accrues when an employee discovers, or should have discovered with exercise of due diligence, acts giving rise to the cause of action." Wilson v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 83 F.3d 747, 757 (6th Cir.1996). While "[T]he determination of the accrual date is an objective one: `the asserted actual knowledge of the plaintiffs is not determinative if they did not act as reasonable persons and, in effect, closed their eyes to evident and objective facts concerning the accrual of their right to sue.'" See Noble v. Chrysler Motors Corp., Jeep Div., 32 F.3d 997, 1000 (6th Cir.1994). Plaintiffs are "not required to sue on a hybrid claim until . . . [they] reasonably should know that the union has abandoned [their] claim." Wilson, 83 F.3d at 757. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on August 7, 2000; accordingly, it was timely filed only if their claims accrued after February 7, 2000. If Plaintiffs' claims accrued before then, their complaint is time-barred unless they did not discover, or could not have discovered through due diligence, that Defendants' acts causing the alleged injuries occurred prior to February 7, 2000.

Plaintiffs allege two counts in their hybrid § 301 claim: (1) GMC breached the NCBA by hiring Gordon Campbell and Fante and the union breached the duty of fair representation by protracting the strike until GMC agreed to hire them; and (2) GMC's purported payoffs to Local 594 officials were connected to the union's extension of the strike.

1. The hiring of Gordon Campbell and Todd Fante.

Plaintiffs first argue that their timely pursuit of internal union remedies (beginning with their August 1997 grievances) capable of affording them some relief tolled the statute of limitations. Before bringing a hybrid § 301 claim, an employee "first...