Garrison v. Berryhill
| Decision Date | 10 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. 1:17-cv-00302-FDW |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | BROOKE D. STEWART GARRISON, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Brooke Delee Stewart Garrison's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 11) filed April 11, 2018, Defendant Acting Commissioner of Social Security Nancy A. Berryhill's ("Commissioner") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 13) filed on June 8, 2018, and Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Doc. No. 18) filed on July 19, 2018. Plaintiff, through counsel, seeks remand of her case for a new hearing pursuant to Rule 7(b). In the alternative, Plaintiff seeks judicial review of an unfavorable administrative decision on her application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB").
Having reviewed and considered the written arguments, administrative record, and applicable authority, and for the reasons set forth below, the COURT DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff filed an application for disability benefits under Title II on November 8, 2013, alleging disability beginning Match 11, 2010. (Tr. 14). After her application was denied initially and upon reconsideration (Tr. 112, 130, 134), Plaintiff requested a hearing (Tr. 139). A hearing was held on October 12, 2016. (Tr. 14, 33, 222). On November 15, 2016, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Tr. 11). Plaintiff's request for review by the Appeals Council was denied on September 15, 2017. (Tr. 1).
The ALJ determined Plaintiff was not disabled since the date the application was filed. (Tr. 14). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of November 8, 2013. (Tr. 16). Then, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the severe impairments of status-post left shoulder surgery with mild osteoarthritis, degenerative disc disease lumbar spine, torticollis, migraines, status-post left knee arthroscopy, seizures, unspecified depressive and anxiety disorders, posttraumatic stress disorder, personality disorder, and post-concussive syndrome. (Tr. 16). The ALJ determined that none of these impairments nor any combination of the impairments met or medically equaled a per se disabled medical listing under 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. (Tr. 16). The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC"):
[T]o perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except she cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and she cannot perform overhead work with the left upper extremity. The claimant can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and stairs, she can occasionally use the left upper extremity for pushing, pulling, handling, and fingering, and she should avoid concentrated exposure to hazards. The claimant can perform and maintain concentration for simple, routine, repetitive tasks for two-hour segments, and she can tolerate occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public.
(Tr. 18). The vocational expert ("VE") testified that the Plaintiff's past relevant work as a home health aide and telemarketer exceeded Plaintiff's RFC and that Plaintiff was unable to perform the duties of her past relevant work. (Tr. 25). In response to hypotheticals that factored in Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the VE testified that an individual with these limitations could perform jobs in the national economy and listed jobs, which work exists in significant numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 26-27). Thus, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiffwas not disabled, as defined in the Social Security Act. (Tr. 27).
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand under Lucia, seeking a new hearing, before a different ALJ, on the grounds that the ALJ presiding over her claim was not constitutionally appointed. (Doc. No. 18). In Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018), the Supreme Court recently held that ALJs of the Securities and Exchange Commission are "Officers of the United States" and thus subject to the Appointments Clause. However, Lucia made it clear that, with regard to Appointments Clause challenges, only "one who makes a timely challenge" is entitled to relief. Id. (quoting Ryder, 515 U.S. at 182-83). In Lucia, the Supreme Court acknowledged the challenge was timely because it was made before the Commission. Id. To the extent Lucia applies to Social Security ALJs, Plaintiff has forfeited the issue by failing to raise it during her administrative proceedings. (See AR 8, 32-63; J. Stip. at 4-9, 19-22); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) (as amended) (plaintiff forfeits issues not raised before ALJ or Appeals Council). For these reasons, this Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (Doc. No. 18) and addresses the arguments made on summary judgment.
Plaintiff has exhausted all administrative remedies and now appeals. (Doc. No. 1). In Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ's decision should be reversed because the ALJ committed error to the prejudice of the Plaintiff in his evaluation of the vocational expert's (VE) testimony. (Doc. No. 12 at 13).
Section 405(g) of Title 42 of the United States Code provides judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of social security benefits. When examining a disability determination, a reviewing court is required to uphold the determination when an ALJ has appliedcorrect legal standards and the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Westmoreland Coal Co., Inc. v. Cochran, 718 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir. 2013); Bird v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012). A reviewing court may not re-weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations because "it is not within the province of a reviewing court to determine the weight of the evidence, nor is it the court's function to substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary if his decision is supported by substantial evidence." Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 2013).
"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). "It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be less than a preponderance." Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts do not reweigh evidence or make credibility determinations in evaluating whether a decision is supported by substantial evidence; "[w]here conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ," courts defer to the ALJ's decision. Johnson, 434 F.3d at 653.
"In order to establish entitlement to benefits, a claimant must provide evidence of a medically determinable impairment that precludes returning to past relevant work and adjustment to other work." Flesher v. Berryhill, 697 F. App'x 212 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508, 404.1520(g)). In evaluating a disability claim, the Commissioner uses a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Pursuant to this five-step process, the Commissioner asks, in sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the severity of a listed impairment; (4) could return to his past relevant work; and (5) if not, could perform any other work in the nationaleconomy. Id.; see also Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 861 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2015)); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4)). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. See Lewis, 858 F.3d at 861; Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 179-80 (4th Cir. 2016).
"If the claimant fails to demonstrate she has a disability that meets or medically equals a listed impairment at step three, the ALJ must assess the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") before proceeding to step four, which is 'the most [the claimant] can still do despite [her physical and mental] limitations [that affect h[er] ability to work].'" Lewis, 858 F.3d at 861-62 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1)). In Lewis, the Fourth Circuit explained the considerations applied before moving to step four:
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