Garrison v. Bickford

• Decision Date: 22 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. E2010–02008–SC–R11–CV.,E2010–02008–SC–R11–CV.
• Citation: 377 S.W.3d 659
• Parties: Jerry GARRISON et al. v. Rita BICKFORD et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

377 S.W.3d 659

Jerry GARRISON et al.

v.Rita BICKFORD et al.

No. E2010–02008–SC–R11–CV.

Supreme Court of Tennessee,

at Knoxville.

May 8, 2012 Session.

Aug. 22, 2012.

Joseph H. Crabtree, Jr., Athens, Tennessee, for the appellants, Jerry Garrison and Martha Garrison.

Joseph B. Klockenkemper, II, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.

OPINION

CORNELIA A. CLARK, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, GARY R. WADE, WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined.

CORNELIA A. CLARK, C.J.

Following an accident which claimed the life of their teenage son, the deceased's parents filed claims for wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress against the driver and owner of the car that struck their son. The parents also sought to recover from their own insurance company under the uninsured motorist provisions of their policy. The driver of the car settled, paying the deceased's parents $25,000 for their wrongful death claim and $25,000 for their negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. The parents' insurer paid them an additional $75,000 for the wrongful death claim but refused to pay any damages for their emotional injuries. The insurer contended that (1) emotional distress did not constitute “bodily injury” as defined in the policy, and (2) the “Each Person” limit in the policy had been met, thereby exhausting any available coverage. The parents maintained that recovery for emotional harm was not precluded under the policy definition of “bodily injury” and that the “Each Person” limit had not been met. The trial court agreed with the parents and ruled in favor of coverage. The Court of Appeals reversed. We granted the parents' application for permission to appeal to decide whether “bodily injury” as defined in the policy includes mental injuries standing alone. It does not. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Factual and Procedural History

On June 9, 2006, a car driven by Andy Bickford struck and killed eighteen-year-old Michael Garrison, who was riding a minibike on a road near his home. Garrison's parents, Jerry and Martha Garrison,¹ and younger brother, Daniel Garrison, heard, but did not see, the collision. Jerry and Daniel Garrison, the first people to arrive at the scene, observed the deceased's injuries. Mr. Garrison testified that the deceased was “barely breathing [and] blood [was] flowing everywhere.” Mr. Garrison waited with his critically injured son more than an hour for an ambulance to arrive. Mrs. Garrison testified that when she arrived at the scene a crowd had already gathered and she “was screaming for [Michael], to tell him I was there. I just was calling to him the whole time ... telling him that I was there and to hang on.” The young man was airlifted to a hospital in Chattanooga where he died from his injuries.

The Garrisons filed claims for wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress against Andy Bickford and the owner of the car, Rita Bickford. The complaint, along with an amended complaint, alleged that Andy Bickford was intoxicated, speeding, and traveling in the wrong lane at the time of the accident. The suit further alleged that he did not immediately stop following the collision, and after stopping his car, he fled the scene. The complaint also alleged that Rita Bickford negligently entrusted her vehicle to Andy Bickford because she was aware of his propensity to drive at excessive speeds, drive recklessly, and operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. According to the complaint, the Garrisons, upon hearing the collision, went to render aid when they saw the deceased's “mangled body” face down in a ditch beside the road. As a result of what they saw, the Garrisons “suffered grief, fright, shock, depression, loss of sleep and other problems” for which they sought compensatory damages.

In addition to filing suit against the Bickfords, the Garrisons served a copy of the complaint upon their own insurance company, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), pursuant to the uninsured motorist provisions of their policy.² The Garrisons' policy with State Farm covered “damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle.” The policy defined “bodily injury” as “bodily injury to a person and sickness, disease, or death that results from it.” The uninsured motorist coverage of the policy included a $100,000 limit for “Each Person” and a $300,000 limit for “Each Accident.” ³

As the litigation progressed, the Garrisons settled their wrongful death claim against Andy Bickford for $25,000, plus $25,000 for the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.⁴ The Garrisons also settled their wrongful death claim with State Farm for $75,000, which State Farm asserted was the amount remaining under the “Each Person” limit of the policy. However, State Farm refused to pay damages for the Garrisons' emotional distress claim on the basis that emotional harm was not a “bodily injury” as defined in the policy. State Farm also claimed that because the Garrisons' emotional distress was caused by their witnessing the deceased's injuries, their claims were included in the “Each Person” limit of liability encompassing the deceased's injuries. Pursuant to the partial settlement with State Farm, the Garrisons dismissed their wrongful death claim, but continued to press their claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, arguing that the policy provided coverage for mental injuries.

State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that mental injuries were not covered under the policy and, in any event, its payment of $75,000 to the Garrisons exhausted the “Each Person” limit of the policy. The trial court denied the motion. State Farm then filed a motion to alter or amend and a supplemental motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied these motions as well, but granted an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. In ruling in favor of coverage, the trial court found that the “bodily injury” provision of the uninsured motorist statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 56–7–1201, was broader than the definition of “bodily injury” contained in the policy. Accordingly, the trial court found that the policy provided, by operation of law, coverage for the Garrisons' emotional distress claim.

The Court of Appeals determined that the Garrisons' mental injury claim stemmed from the bodily injuries to the deceased and, therefore, fell within the liability limitations contained in the “Each Person” provision of the policy. Garrison v. Bickford, No. E2010–02008–COA–R9–CV, 2011 WL 3241869, at *10 (Tenn.Ct.App. July 29, 2011). The Court of Appeals concluded that because the $100,000 coverage the policy afforded under the “Each Person” limit had been exhausted by virtue of the Garrisons' $25,000 settlement with Andy Bickford and the $75,000 settlement with State Farm, there was no further coverage available to pay the Garrisons' emotional distress claim. Id.

We granted the Garrisons' application for permission to appeal to determine whether “bodily injury” as defined in the policy includes mental injuries standing alone. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that it does not.

Analysis

I.

Our analysis of this case is guided by several well-established principles. First, Tennessee law is clear that questions regarding the extent of insurance coverage present issues of law involving the interpretation of contractual language. Clark v. Sputniks, LLC, 368 S.W.3d 431, 436 (Tenn.2012); Maggart v. Almany Realtors, Inc., 259 S.W.3d 700, 703 (Tenn.2008). Likewise, questions regarding the interpretation of a statute involve issues of law. In re Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d 483, 490 (Tenn.2012). This case involves the construction of both an insurance contract and a statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 56–7–1201, and therefore our standard of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness afforded to the conclusions reached by the courts below. U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 277 S.W.3d 381, 386 (Tenn.2009).

When interpreting a statute, courts “must ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without restricting or expanding the statute's intended meaning.” U.S. Bank, 277 S.W.3d at 386. Our task is to examine the text of the statute and, if the language used is unambiguous, we simply apply the plain meaning of the words used in the statute. Nye v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 686, 694 (Tenn.2011); U.S. Bank, 277 S.W.3d at 386. As we recently observed, courts “must (1) give these words their natural and ordinary meaning, (2) consider them in the context of the entire statute, and (3) presume that the General Assembly intended to give each of these words its full effect.” In re Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d at 490. Every word in a statute is presumed to have meaning and purpose. Nye, 347 S.W.3d at 694;Highwoods Props., Inc. v. City of Memphis, 297 S.W.3d 695, 701 (Tenn.2009). If, after examining the text of the statute, it becomes clear the statute is ambiguous, “we may reference the broader statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources to discern its meaning.” Highwoods Props., 297 S.W.3d at 701;see also Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn.2012) (“When necessary to resolve a statutory ambiguity or conflict, courts may consider matters beyond the statutory text, including public policy, historical facts relevant to the enactment of the statute, the background and purpose of the statute, and the entire statutory scheme.”). “However, these non-codified external sources cannot provide a basis for departing from clear codified statutory provisions.” Mills, 360 S.W.3d at 368 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Equally well-established is the...