Garrity v. District of Columbia
Decision Date | 31 August 1936 |
Docket Number | No. 6365.,6365. |
Citation | 66 App. DC 256,86 F.2d 207 |
Parties | GARRITY v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
William C. Sullivan, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Leslie C. Garnett, U. S. Atty., John W. Fihelly, Asst. U. S. Atty., E. Barrett Prettyman, Corp. Counsel, and Vernon E. West, Asst. Corp. Counsel, all of Washington, D. C., for appellees.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB, VAN ORSDEL, GRONER, and STEPHENS, Associate Justices.
This is an appeal from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing a bill of complaint filed by the appellant, plaintiff below, against the appellees, defendants below — the District of Columbia, the Zoning Commission of the District of Columbia, the Commissioners of the District of Columbia and the Inspector of Buildings of the District of Columbia. The relief sought was: A mandatory injunction compelling a change of zoning of the appellant's property from a zoning district in which erection of apartment houses is forbidden, to one in which that is not forbidden; a mandatory injunction compelling the Building Inspector and his successors in office to issue permits for building operations for apartment houses upon the appellant's land as if it had never been zoned in a district forbidding them; and a perpetual injunction restraining enforcement against the appellant's land of zoning regulations forbidding apartment houses.
By the Act of March 1, 1920, 41 Stat. 500 (D.C.Code 1929, T. 25, § 521 et seq.), Congress passed "An Act To regulate the height, area, and use of buildings in the District of Columbia and to create a Zoning Commission, and for other purposes." The provisions thereof pertinent to this case are:
Pursuant to the Act, the Zoning Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) in August 1920 by regulations established height, area and use districts in the District of Columbia, with subdivisions in each. Specifically it divided the District of Columbia in respect of use districts into residential, first commercial, second commercial, and industrial use districts; in respect of height districts, into 40-foot, 50-foot, 85-foot, and 110-foot height districts; and in respect of area districts, into "A", "B", "C", and "D" area districts. Area districts are for the purpose of regulating the area of yards and courts and the percentage of lot which may be occupied by buildings.
The land in question in this case was first zoned in the residential use district, the 40-foot height district, and the "A" area district. The erection of apartment houses was not forbidden in any of the original zoning districts. But in June 1923, after hearings with respect thereto, the Commission by regulation defined a new district called the "`A' restricted-area district," as follows:
"In the `A' restricted area district the minimum dimensions of yards and courts and the maximum percentage of the occupancy shall be the same as for `A' area district, except that hereafter no building shall be erected or altered for use as an apartment house, nor shall any building or premises be used for this purpose."
There were subsequent amendments to this definition but they are not material in this case.
After the establishment of this new district the Commission considered at various hearings what properties should be included therein, and on October 26, 1923, it considered the propriety of transferring thereto certain properties including that later purchased by the appellant. Protest had been made, however, by the appellant's predecessor in interest and certain other property owners with respect to the inclusion of their lands in the "`A' restricted-area district," and the Commission determined to except them temporarily from an order of transfer so as to postpone court attack on the creation of an "`A' restricted-area district," and with the expectation that special hearings might later be had with respect to the propriety of their inclusion. Accordingly on October 31, 1923, the properties considered at the hearing of October 26 were ordered changed from their previous zoning to the "`A' restricted-area district," but not those whose owners had filed protests. On January 17, May 15, and June 19, 1924, hearings were held with respect to the propriety of including in the "`A' restricted-area district" these excepted properties. Finally, on June 24, 1924, at an executive hearing of the Commission, an order was made changing the...
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