Gartner v. Lombard Bros.

Decision Date29 May 1952
Docket NumberNo. 10663.,10663.
PartiesGARTNER v. LOMBARD BROS., Inc. (E. I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS CO., third party defendant).
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

John J. McDevitt, 3d, Philadelphia, Pa. (Albert C. Gekoski, Peter P. Liebert, 3rd., Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellant.

Sydney L. Wickenhaver, Philadelphia, Pa. (Charles A. Wolfe, Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.

Before GOODRICH, KALODNER and HASTIE, Circuit Judges.

GOODRICH, Circuit Judge.

This case involves the correctness of the dismissal of a third-party defendant.

The plaintiff sued defendant Lombard Brothers for damages occasioned by the death of her husband. She alleged that the defendant struck and killed the decedent while the latter was unloading a truck on the premises of the E. I. DuPont deNemours Company in Philadelphia. The defendant brought in E. I. DuPont deNemours and Company as a third-party defendant under Rule 14, Fed.R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C.1 DuPont objected that the third-party complaint did not state a claim for which relief could be granted against it. The trial judge agreed. The correctness of his dismissal is now before us.

At the start it should be said that the defendant cannot change the action of the plaintiff from one against it to one against somebody else. If the plaintiff makes out a case for recovery for negligence against the defendant, the fact that others might also be liable if the plaintiff had sued them does not defeat the plaintiff's action. It is no defense for one tort-feasor to say that someone else was a wrongdoer too.2

The question is, however, whether Lombard has made out, in its pleadings, a case on which, if the facts are developed, it could recover all or part from DuPont of what it may be called upon to pay Gartner. The Pennsylvania statute provides:

"Contribution shall be enforcible among those who are jointly or severally liable for a tort where, as between them, such liabilities are either all primary or all secondary." 1939, June 24, P.L. 1075, § 1, 12 Purdon\'s Pa. Stat.Ann. § 2081.

If the facts, as developed, could show both Lombard and DuPont to be tort-feasors and both "primarily" liable, it could well be that the case would be one for contribution under the Pennsylvania statute. It is Pennsylvania law which governs here.

Here is what the defendant's amended third-party complaint stated:

"Defendant alleges that the accident was caused at least in part by the negligence of the third party defendant, through their failure to take proper precaution for the safety and movement of individuals and trucks using their premises, despite the knowledge of the third party defendant, that there is always an extremely heavy flow of traffic of vehicles loading and unloading at their platform on the premises. Third party defendant failed to provide some person to direct the flow of traffic so as to prevent confusion and snarling of traffic of the truck drivers going in and out of the platform loading premises."

This statement, for the purpose of considering the problem at this stage of the litigation, must be taken as true. The theory is that DuPont, a possessor of land, has been guilty of negligence in failing to provide traffic direction at a place where there are a large number of vehicles and where difficulty is to be expected unless such direction is provided. DuPont says that even if a traffic officer had been assigned to the job he might have been somewhere else when this particular accident occurred. Of course he might have been. He also might have been on the job directing Lombard's truck so that it would not crash into the driver of another vehicle rightfully on the premises. That is something that cannot possibly be known until the facts are developed on a trial.

The duty of the proprietor of business premises to use reasonable care...

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18 cases
  • Maddocks v. Ricker
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • December 15, 1988
    ...that the plaintiffs lost their claims against Gove because both the defendants and Casson were negligent. See Gartner v. Lombard Bros., 197 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir.1952). Further, in considering another issue collateral to the underlying dispute, we see no valid basis for argument that, as a ma......
  • Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • August 6, 1970
    ...50, Innkeepers, § 62; Rawson v. Massachusetts Operating Co., 1952, 328 Mass. 558, 105 N. E.2d 220, 29 A.L.R.2d 907; Gartner v. Lombard Bros. (3d Cir. 1952), 197 F.2d 53. Illustrative of the weight of authority on this duty of care is Peck v. Gerber, 1936, 154 Or. 126, 59 P.2d 675, 106 A.L.R......
  • Cage v. New York Central Railroad Company
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • February 3, 1967
    ...for death sustained in Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania law governing contribution between joint tort-feasors governs. Gartner v. Lombard Brothers, 197 F.2d 53 (3rd Cir. 1952). There is no case of the appellate courts of Pennsylvania governing this question, nor has any Federal Court made a d......
  • Wilkin v. Shell Oil Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • June 11, 1952
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