Gartside v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Metropolitan Chicago Foundation

• Decision Date: 28 November 1978
• Docket Number: Docket No. 77-4211
• Citation: 87 Mich.App. 335,274 N.W.2d 58
• Parties: Sharon Lee GARTSIDE and Stewart Gartside, Plaintiffs, v. The YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF METROPOLITAN CHICAGO FOUNDATION, an Illinois corp., a/k/a The Young Men's Christian Association of Chicago, an Illinois corp., Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LUDINGTON AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Third Party Defendants-Appellees. 87 Mich.App. 335, 274 N.W.2d 58
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 58

274 N.W.2d 58

Sharon Lee GARTSIDE and Stewart Gartside, Plaintiffs, v. The YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF METROPOLITAN

CHICAGO FOUNDATION, an Illinois corp., a/k/a The Young Men's

Christian Association of Chicago, an Illinois corp., Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LUDINGTON AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Third Party

Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 77-4211.

87 Mich.App. 335, 274 N.W.2d 58

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Nov. 28, 1978.

Released for Publication Jan. 25, 1979.

[87 MICHAPP 336] Smith, Haughey, Rice & Roegge by Lance R. Mather, Grand Rapids, for gartside.

McCroskey, Libner, Vanleuven, Kortering, Cochrane & Brock by Barbara Timmer, Muskegon, for defendants-third party plaintiffs-appellants.

Cholette, Perkins & Buchanan by Kenneth L. Block and Edward D. Wells, Grand Rapids, for third party defendants-appellees.

[87 MICHAPP 337] Before DANHOF, C. J., and V. J. BRENNAN and CAMPBELL, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

On June 7, 1973, defendant (hereinafter YMCA), and third-party defendant, Ludington Area School District (hereinafter the school district), entered into a contract which provided that the school would have the exclusive use of the YMCA camp from September 24, 1973, to September 28, 1973. On September 23, 1973, plaintiffs, a teacher for the Ludington Area School District and his wife, were at the YMCA camp in anticipation of the school's use of the camp beginning on the following day. During the evening, plaintiff Sharon Gartside was injured when she was thrown from a horse which she was riding at the camp. As a result of these injuries, plaintiffs filed a suit against the YMCA alleging that they negligently encouraged her to ride a very spirited and quick-tempered horse and negligently provided her with defective riding equipment. The YMCA then filed a third-party complaint against the school district for indemnification. The school district made a motion for summary judgment, GCR 1963, 117.2(1), which was granted, and the YMCA appeals.

The standard of review for determining the correctness of a ruling on a motion for summary judgment pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(1), is set out in Borman's, Inc. v. Lake State Development Co., 60 Mich.App. 175, 179-180, 230 N.W.2d 363, 366 (1975):

"A motion based solely on subsection 1, challenges the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's claim and is to be considered by an examination of the pleadings alone. Todd v. Biglow, 51 Mich.App. 346, 349, 214 N.W.2d 733 (1974). (The) job (of) a reviewing court is to accept as [87 MICHAPP 338] true the well-pleaded facts in plaintiff's complaint, * * *, Weckler v. Berrein (sic) County Road Commission, 55 Mich.App. 7, 9, 222 N.W.2d 9 (1974), and to determine whether these claims are so 'clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can possible (sic) justify a right to recovery.' Crowther v. Ross Chemical & Manufacturing Co., 42 Mich.App. 426, 431, 202 N.W.2d 577, 580 (1972)."

The YMCA's claim for indemnification is based on a provision of its contract with the school district, whereby the school district promised:

"(f) To indemnify YMCA against, and to hold YMCA, its agents and employees harmless from, all claims, demands, costs or damages (including attorneys' fees) because of bodily injury, including death, or property damage to any person or legal entity at any time arising out of or in any way connected with School's use of the Camp and its facilities."

The trial court granted the school district's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the contract provision for indemnification was only intended to apply during the period of the contract: September 24, 1973, to September 28, 1973. While this is one possible interpretation of the contract provision, the indemnity clause is not free from ambiguity on this point. Accepting the well-pleaded facts in the YMCA's complaint as true, its claim that the indemnity provision was intended to apply to an accident which occurred on September 23, 1973, is not so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly sustain it. Accordingly, the trial judge erred in granting the school district's motion for summary judgment on this basis.

The school district also contends that even if the trial judge erred in granting the motion for summary[87 MICHAPP 339] judgment on the basis that the contract provision did not apply to an injury occurring on September 23, 1973, the order of summary judgment should be affirmed because the indemnity provision of the contract did not bind the school district to indemnify the YMCA for damages caused by its sole negligence.

Indemnity contracts, like other contracts, are to be enforced so as to effectuate the intentions of the parties, Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Roehm, 215 Mich. 586, 184 N.W. 414 (1921). Contracts to indemnify the indemnitee for damages caused by the indemnitee's sole negligence are not unenforceable or contrary to the public policy of this state, but see, M.C.L. § 691.991; M.S.A. § 26.1146(1). However, a contract which purportedly indemnifies one against the consequences of his own negligence is subject to strict construction and will not be so construed unless it clearly appears that it was intended to cover the indemnitee's own negligence, Fireman's Fund American Ins. Cos. v. General Electric Co., 74 Mich.App. 318, 253 N.W.2d 748 (1977); Hubbert v. Acme Equipment Co., 55 Mich.App. 313, 222 N.W.2d 224 (1974); Klann v. Hess Cartage Co., 50 Mich.App. 703, 214 N.W.2d 63 (1973); Geurink v. Herlihy Mid-Continent Co., 5 Mich.App. 154, 146 N.W.2d 111 (1966); Meadows v. Depco Equipment Co., 4 Mich.App. 370, 144 N.W.2d 844 (1966). Also, indemnity contracts are construed most strictly against the party who drafts them and the indemnitee, Fireman's Fund, supra. Recognizing these strict rules of construction, the YMCA argues that the contract provisions clearly show the parties' intention that the school district was to indemnify the YMCA even for damages caused by its own negligence. Alternatively, the YMCA argues that even if the language used...