Garvin v. Shewbart

• Decision Date: 02 December 1983
• Citation: 442 So.2d 80
• Parties: Gwenetta L. GARVIN v. V.A. SHEWBART, et al. 82-898.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 80

442 So.2d 80

Gwenetta L. GARVIN v. V.A. SHEWBART, et al.

82-898.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 2, 1983.

Allen Edward Cook, Andalusia, for appellant.

A. Neil Hudgens and Michael S. McGlothren of Brown, Hudgens, Richardson, Whitfield & Gillion, Mobile, for appellees.

TORBERT, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's dismissal of her amended complaint. Plaintiff filed the complaint in the Circuit Court of Covington County, alleging that the conduct of the defendants, V.A. Shewbart (Shewbart), CNA Insurance Companies (CNA), Jr. Food Stores of West Florida, Inc., (Jr. Food), and other fictitious defendants, in failing to pay certain medical expenses she incurred arising from an on-the-job injury, was outrageous, in bad faith, done with a bad faith failure to determine the validity of her claim and was a tortious violation of duty. The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint.

On June 18, 1981, plaintiff, Gwenetta Garvin, was injured while working for Jr. Food. Mrs. Garvin subsequently received medical treatment, including two operations on her back. She duly reported the injury to her employer, Jr. Food, and the employer turned the matter over to its workmen's compensation carrier, CNA. Mr. Shewbart, an employee of CNA, handled Mrs. Garvin's claim. Initially CNA paid all the medical bills and provided a compensation award based on Mrs. Garvin's temporary total disability.

In 1982, CNA began to refuse to pay certain medical bills. Mrs. Garvin contacted Shewbart, who requested that she supply him with copies of the unpaid bills. She did so, but the bills still were not paid. Subsequent attempts to contact Shewbart were unsuccessful. During this period some medical expenses, including the bills for the second back operation, were paid, and she continued to receive compensation benefit checks for her disability. Upon notification from Mrs. Garvin's doctor that her condition had changed from temporary total to permanent partial disability, CNA stopped all benefit checks. Garvin filed a workmen's compensation action and this separate tort action on the theories alleged, in the face of the exclusivity provisions of the Alabama Workmen's Compensation Act (Act). This issue, exclusivity, was raised by the defendants in their briefs in support of the motion to dismiss, and was apparently the basis of the trial court's order granting dismissal.

The exclusive remedy provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act states:

"No employee of any employer subject to this article, nor the personal representative, surviving spouse or next of kin of any such employee shall have any right to any other method, form or amount of compensation or damages for any injury or death occasioned by any accident proximately resulting from and while engaged in the actual performance of the duties of his employment and from a cause originating in such employment or determination thereof other than as provided in this article."

Code 1975, § 25-5-52. The immunity from civil liability also extends to the "workmen's compensation insurance carrier of such employer and to any officer, director, agent, servant or employee of such carrier...." Code 1975, § 25-5-53. This immunity from certain common law actions was granted by the legislature in return for the employee's right to recover for work-related injuries under the Act without proof that the employer was negligent. Waldon v. Hartford Insurance Group, 435 So.2d 1271 (Ala.1983).

The statutory scheme is designed to provide certainty that those who are injured on the job are compensated, Alabama By-Products Co. v. Landgraff, 32 Ala.App. 343, 27 So.2d 209 (1946), by placing the financial burden on the employer. Ford v. Mitcham, 53 Ala.App. 102, 298 So.2d 34 (1974). The employer can shift this burden by contracting with a workmen's compensation insurance carrier (carrier). The Act also creates an expedited scheme of recovery in case of disputed claims. Code 1975, § 25-5-88.

In Waldon v. Hartford Insurance Group, 435 So.2d 1271 (Ala.1983), we held that the employee's actions against the employer or carrier for negligence or bad faith in processing or paying claims were barred under the exclusivity provisions. We did so because, essentially, the claim was based on the failure of the employer or of the carrier on the employer's behalf to supply financial responsibility for the employee's physical injury. ¹ In such a situation the Act provides a remedy in that the employee can file a workmen's compensation action in circuit court. Code 1975, § 25-5-81. The Act contemplates that the circuit court will handle such an action in an expedited manner. Code 1975, § 25-5-88. Professor Larson points out another reason why we found that bad faith tort actions were barred by the exclusivity provisions:

"[I]t seems clear that a compensation claimant cannot transform a simple delay in payments into an actionable tort by merely invoking the magic words 'fraudulent, deceitful and intentional' or 'intentional infliction of emotional distress' in his complaint. The temptation to shatter the exclusiveness principle by reaching for the tort weapon whenever there is a delay in payments or a termination of treatment is all too obvious, and awareness of this possibility has undoubtedly been one reason for the reluctance of courts to recognize this tort except in cases of egregious cruelty or venality."

2A A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 68.34(d) (1982)....