Gary B. v. Snyder, Case No. 2:16-cv-13292

Citation329 F.Supp.3d 344
Decision Date27 July 2018
Docket NumberCase No. 2:16-cv-13292
Parties GARY B., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Richard SNYDER, et al., Defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Michigan)

329 F.Supp.3d 344

GARY B., et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Richard SNYDER, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:16-cv-13292

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed July 27, 2018


329 F.Supp.3d 348

Alisa L. Hartz, Kathryn Ann Eidmann, Mark Dale Rosenbaum, Public Counsel, Joshua E. Anderson, Mark Edmonde Haddad, Michael C. Kelley, Sidley Austin LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Bruce A. Miller, Miller Cohen, PLC, Detroit, MI, Carter Glasgow Phillips, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, Cary S. McGehee, Pitt, McGehee, Palmer, Rivers & Golden, Royal Oak, MI, Tacy F. Flint, Jennifer M. Wheeler, Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Jonathan S. Ludwig, Joshua S. Smith, Katherine J. Bennett, Timothy J. Haynes, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [60]

STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs are minor children who attend, or attended, public schools in Detroit. They have alleged that the conditions of their schools are so poor, and so inadequate, that they have not received even a minimally adequate education. Specifically, they alleged they have been denied access to literacy on account of their races, in violation of their rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. They brought suit against the Michigan state officials they believe to be responsible. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, principally because they believe Plaintiffs sued the wrong parties. Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs' alleged harm is not cognizable under the Constitution. Many amici weighed in on the matter and the Court held a hearing. For the reasons below, the Court must grant the motion and dismiss the case.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court may grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if the complaint fails to allege facts "sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,’ and to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc. , 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). The Court will view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, presume the truth of all well-pled factual assertions, and draw every reasonable inference in favor of the non-moving party. Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n , 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). If "a cause of action fails as a matter of law, regardless of whether the plaintiff's factual allegations are true or not," then the Court must dismiss it. Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc. , 553 F.3d 1000, 1005 (6th Cir. 2009).

DISCUSSION

The Complaint contains five counts:

Count One is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleges the deprivation of a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

Count Two is also a § 1983 claim under the Due Process Clause and alleges that Defendants, as state actors, created or increased a danger.

Count Three is also a § 1983 action and alleges disparate treatment on the basis of race, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

329 F.Supp.3d 349

Count Four is brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and related federal regulations and alleges that Defendants used federal funds to intentionally discriminate against Plaintiffs on the basis of race.

Count Five seeks a judicial declaration that Defendants violated the Constitution and federal law.

Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Counts Two and Four, see ECF 64, PgID 1445 n.11; ECF 109, PgID 2590–91, so two avenues of relief remain: the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint on two grounds. First, they insist that they cannot be sued. According to Defendants, the State of Michigan and its officials never operated Plaintiffs' schools, so they are the wrong parties to enjoin. Moreover, Defendants contend that they are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Second, Defendants argue that access to literacy is not a constitutionally protected right, so the failure to provide such access cannot constitute a valid claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. They also dispute the allegation that Plaintiffs have been treated differently on account of their races.

A description of the background of the matter will help to illuminate the posture of the suit, and the background will in turn help answer whether Defendants are indeed the proper parties to be sued. Thus, the Court will begin with a description of those facts.

I. Who Controls Detroit Schools?

Plaintiffs assert, "[t]he State of Michigan is ultimately responsible for complying with all constitutional mandates regarding public education. But it has particular responsibility for the schools in Detroit, as it has controlled the [Detroit Public Schools] (and now, [Detroit Public Schools Community District] ) schools since 1999." ECF 1, PgID 46, ¶ 61. Accordingly, Plaintiffs hold Defendants "responsible for the education of all Michigan public school students and for the system of Michigan public schools[.]" Id. at 126, ¶ 200. Defendants counter that though the State has a supervisory role in education and eventually appointed an emergency manager, the State never had "direct control" over Detroit schools—at most, one local authority supplanted another. See ECF 60, PgID 505–09.

A. Education in Michigan

1. The Structure of Authority in Michigan Schools

In Michigan, educational responsibilities begin at the state level. The Michigan Constitution requires the legislature to "maintain and support a system of free public elementary and secondary schools" and every school district must "provide for the education of its pupils without discrimination as to religion, creed, race, color or national origin." Mich. Const. art. VIII, § 2.1 The constitution further states that "[l]eadership and general supervision over all public education ... is vested in a state board of education." Id. § 3.

Michigan's legislature exercised its constitutional obligations by passing and periodically updating the Revised School Code.

329 F.Supp.3d 350

The Code governs the various types of school districts in the State, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 380.1131, 380.11a, and requires the board of each district to "establish and carry on the grades, schools, and departments it considers necessary or desirable for the maintenance and improvement of its schools and determine the courses of study to be pursued," id. § 380.1282(1). See also id. § 380.1278 (requiring local school boards to establish certain curricula). Still, the Code also reaffirms the state board of education's role in "leadership and general supervision of all public education[.]" Id. § 388.1009.

2. Michigan's Successive Public Acts

Circumstances sometime require more state involvement—especially when those circumstances involve finances. Over the last few decades, Michigan enacted several statutory schemes permitting state officials to appoint managers in the event of financial crises. See generally Phillips v. Snyder , 836 F.3d 707, 711–12 (6th Cir. 2016) (summarizing Michigan's various statutory schemes since 1988). Michigan used those mechanisms to intervene in Detroit's public schools more than once.

In 1999, Public Act 10 went into effect. The Act required Detroit's mayor to appoint a "school reform board" charged with appointing a chief executive officer. Act of March 26, 1999, §§ 372(1), 374(1). The reform board was initially composed of seven members: six appointed by Detroit's mayor, and the seventh appointed by "the superintendent of public instruction or his or her designee." Id. § 372(2)(b).2 After five years, the mayor would gain the power to appoint the seventh member as well. Id. The arrangement ended in 2004, however, when a voter referendum returned governance of Detroit Public Schools to a locally elected board. ECF 1, PgID 51, ¶ 69; ECF 60, PgID 506.

In 2008, the state again became involved. Plaintiffs assert that the Governor "invoked Public Act 72 to appoint an Emergency Financial Manager" for Detroit Public Schools. ECF 1, PgID 51, ¶ 69. Public Act 72, also known as the "Local Government Fiscal Responsibility Act," went into effect in 1990 and has since been repealed. But in 2008, it required the Governor to appoint an emergency financial manager for the district if certain financial conditions in a school district occurred. Mich. Comp. Laws § 141.1238(1). By the terms of the Act, the State's superintendent of public instruction prepared a list of potential nominees, the State's board of education narrowed the list down to three candidates, and the Governor made a final selection from them. Id. Plaintiffs concede that the emergency financial manager "shared power" with the locally elected school board, but aver the manager nevertheless "exercised authority not only over financial decision-making, but some educational decision-making as well." ECF 1, PgID 51, ¶ 69. Although the Complaint does not go into...

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4 cases
  • Gary B. v. Whitmer
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • 23 Abril 2020
    ...oversaw public education in Detroit from 1999 through the time the complaint was filed in this case. See Gary B. v. Snyder , 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 350–54 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (discussing state interventions in Detroit’s schools). As stated in the complaint, "the State has directly controlled [t......
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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
    • 8 Noviembre 2022
    ... ... (DUAB) authorized a public question to be placed on the ... November 3, 2020 ballot in Gary, Indiana, where Plaintiffs ... reside, own property, and/or are registered to vote. The ... public question was whether to raise taxes to ... Ex parte Young .” (internal citation omitted)); ... Gary B. v. Snyder , 329 F.Supp.3d 344, 353-54 (E.D ... Mich. 2018) (holding that the plaintiffs had adequately ... pleaded that the Governor and other ... ...
  • Oron 2015 LLC v. City of Southfield
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
    • 17 Junio 2019
    ...inspection or paid any fee, because Oron 2015 alleges that its legally protected interest has been invaded. See Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 355 (E.D. Mich. 2018) ("Plainly, a plaintiff who alleges a violation of his right to due process states a legally protected interest[.]"). ......
  • Reed v. City of Detroit
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
    • 22 Julio 2021
    ...fact, "[t]he Supreme Court is historically 'reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process'." Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 363-64 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (Murphy, J.), appeal vacated, Gary B. v. Whitmer, 958 F.3d 1216 (mem.) (6th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quoting Collins v. Cit......
1 books & journal articles
  • VACATUR PENDING EN BANC REVIEW.
    • United States
    • Michigan Law Review Vol. 120 No. 3, December 2021
    • 1 Diciembre 2021
    ...[perma.cc/NQU2-BKC6]. (3.) Gary B., 957 F.3d at 620-21 (quoting Complaint at 1, Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (No. (4.) Id. at 620. Without a right to access to literacy, these conditions are not subject to any viable legal challenge, leaving students in poorly fu......

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