Gary W., In re

• Decision Date: 07 July 1971
• Docket Number: Cr. 15215
• Citation: 486 P.2d 1201,96 Cal.Rptr. 1,5 Cal.3d 296
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 486 P.2d 1201 In re Gary W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Law. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Gary W., Defendant and Appellant. In Bank

Page 1

96 Cal.Rptr. 1

5 Cal.3d 296, 486 P.2d 1201

In re Gary W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Law.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Gary W., Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 15215.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

July 7, 1971.

Richard S. Buckley, Public Defender, Laurance S. Smith, Kathryn J. McDonald and James L. McCormick, Deputy Public Defenders, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch and Evelle J. Younger, Attys. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Blanche C. Bersch, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

WRIGHT, Chief Justice.

In this case we are called upon to determine whether the procedures by which the California Youth Authority is empowered to extend its control over a ward beyond his normal release date are constitutional.

We have concluded that confinement pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 1800--1803 ¹ does not violate the Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, but that persons who are subjected to proceedings initiated thereunder are entitled, upon request, to a jury trial.

Gary W., who was a minor ward of the California Youth Authority at the time this proceeding commenced, appeals from an order of the juvenile court directing his continued detention by the Youth Authority for treatment. He contends that the statutory scheme of sections 1800--1803 and the judicial procedures by which those sections are implemented permit imprisonment for status and deny due process and equal protection in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 6, 11, 13 and 21, of the California Constitution. He complains in particular of the denial of the right to trial by jury. In addition, appellant contends that the order appealed from is not supported by substantial evidence and that he was erroneously denied the right to pretrial discovery and to subpoena out-of-county witnesses.

The contentions of the parties and our analysis are better understood if, before reciting the factual background of the case, we summarize the scope and impact of the statutory scheme under review. Sections 1800--1803 apply only to wards of the California Youth Authority, i.e., to minors committed to the Youth Authority by the juvenile court pursuant to the authority of sections 730, 731, and 777, and to young adults committed by the superior court pursuant to sections 1730--1731.5. Under the procedures here reviewed the California Youth Authority may petition the court which initially committed the ward to the Youth Authority for an order directing the Youth Authority to retain control over the ward beyond the date upon which his release would otherwise be mandatory. The court may order the ward detained for treatment, for a period of up to two years if he was committed by the juvenile court or five years if he was committed after conviction of a criminal offense, if the ward is found to be physically dangerous to the public because of mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality. The proceedings apply only to the detention of adults, including persons who have committed no criminal offense. The theoretical maximum period of detention is life as successive petitions may be filed at biennial intervals. Finally, the Youth Authority may place the ward in a facility of the Department of Corrections if, because of age or other factors, he is deemed unsuitable for treatment in a facility of the Youth Authority.

On November 8, 1967, the juvenile court committed Gary to the Youth Authority after finding that he had molested a child and was thus a person described by section 602. ² He was then 19 years old. His discharge was mandatory, under section 1769, ³ at the end of two years or on his twenty-first birthday, whichever was later, ⁴ unless an order for further detention had then been made pursuant to section 1800. ⁵ Gary became 21 on August 10, 1969. The Youth Authority filed a petition under section 1800 on August 11, 1969, alleging that Gary was 'a person who would be physically dangerous to the public due to his mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality * * *,' and requesting an extension of control over him for a period of two years, to and including his twenty-third birthday. After a hearing at which both the Youth Authority and Gary presented evidence on the issue of his 'dangerousness,' the juvenile court found the allegations of the petition to be true, and, on October 27, 1969, ordered that Gary remain subject to the control of the California Youth Authority through his twenty-third birthday. He appeals from that order.

I Punishment for Status

Preliminarily we dispose of appellant's contention that he is being punished for his alleged status of 'dangerousness' in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 6, of the California Constitution (Robinson v. California (1962) 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758).

Respondent concedes that if Gary were to be imprisoned as a criminal under these procedures his detention would be unconstitutional under Robinson as cruel and unusual punishment. (In re De La O (1963) 59 Cal.2d 128, 136, 28 Cal.Rptr. 489, 378 P.2d 793.) Implicit in this concession is an admission that continued confinement pursuant to section 1800 is predicated on status. As in De La O, therefore, 'The issue is whether the statutory scheme here challenged (a) 'imprisons' petitioner 'as a criminal,' or (b) constitutes 'compulsory treatment' of petitioner as a sick person requiring 'periods of involuntary confinement." (59 Cal.2d at p. 136, 28 Cal.Rptr. at p. 494, 378 P.2d at p. 798.) The question is easily resolved, for the Legislature has been at pains to assure that confinement pursuant to sections 1800--1803 shall be only for the purpose of treatment. Thus, we need not decide whether confinement under these sections, with the potential for confinement in a state prison, would be constitutionally permissible solely for the purpose of protecting society.

Section 1800 provides in pertinent part: 'Whenever the Youth Authority Board determines that the discharge of a person from the control of the Youth Authority at the time required by Section 1769 * * * would be physically dangerous to the public because of the person's mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality, the board * * * shall make application to the committing court for an order directing that the person remain subject to the control of the authority beyond such time.' Potential danger to the public is thus made the criterion upon which jurisdiction to order continued control rests. But the Legislature has also specified that if the court finds that discharge of the ward would be physically dangerous, 'the court shall order the Youth Authority to continue the treatment of such person.' (§ 1801.) Thus, as to any person committed to its control pursuant to sections 1800--1803, the Youth Authority is under an affirmative duty to provide treatment for the underlying cause of the ward's dangerousness. If the cause is not a physical or mental condition or the condition is not amenable to treatment, the Youth Authority may not extend its control over the ward pursuant to sections 1800--1803. ⁶

In view of the demonstrably civil purpose of sections 1800--1803, and in the absence of any evidence that persons committed thereunder are incarcerated in penal institutions among the general prison population, or are customarily detained without treatment, we conclude that the statutory scheme of sections 1800--1803 and the confinement of Youth Authority wards thereunder does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of Robinson v. California, supra, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758.

Appellant also contends, however, that he was not given treatment while confined under the original commitment. Indeed, he elicited testimony from respondent's expert, Dr. Alfred Owre, the chief medical officer of the Atascadero State Hospital, where he had been confined for observation, that 'he had been kept on ice in the Youth Authority and he hasn't received any significant psychiatric treatment there, either.' The evidence of lack of treatment was sufficiently disturbing to the juvenile court judge that in ordering Gary's continued detention he declared his intention to communicate to the Youth Authority his conclusion that it had been derelict in its responsibility to Gary.

The failure of the Youth Authority to provide treatment to a particular ward committed to it under statutory provisions other than those here under review is not a basis for invalidation of sections 1800--1803. As we have noted, the Youth Authority is under an affirmative obligation to provide treatment for the ward's mental or physical abnormality when he is committed pursuant to those sections. Detention of such wards without treatment is unauthorized by statute. Accordingly, any person confined pursuant to a section 1800 commitment, but who is not receiving treatment may seek his release through appropriate habeas corpus procedures. (Pen.Code, § 1473; cf. People v. Succop (1966) 65 Cal.2d 483, 488--489, 55 Cal.Rptr. 397, 421 P.2d 405; In re De La O, supra, 59 Cal.2d 128, 156, 28 Cal.Rptr. 489, 378 P.2d 793.)

II Due Process and Equal Protection

Appellant next contends that due process and equal protection preclude his commitment to a period of involuntary confinement unless he is afforded a right to trial by jury. He argues that the procedure leading to detention under section 1800, applying as it does only to persons under jurisdiction of the Youth Authority, irrationally and unreasonably discriminates between youthful persons dangerous because of physical or mental abnormality and other persons similarly dangerous but not within the jurisdiction of the Youth Authority. He contends that because no rational distinction can be drawn...