Garza v. City of La Porte

• Citation: 160 F.Supp.3d 986
• Decision Date: 04 February 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. H-14-0767
• Parties: Everardo Garza, Plaintiff, v. City of La Porte, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

160 F.Supp.3d 986

Everardo Garza, Plaintiff,

v.City of La Porte, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-14-0767

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.

Signed February 4, 2016

Richard Peirce Griffin, Ronald Lee Bair, Bair Hilty PC, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.

Susan L. Bickley, Joshua Andrew Huber, Blank Rome LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SIM LAKE

, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Everardo Garza (“Plaintiff” or “Garza”) sued the City of La Porte, Texas (“Defendant” or “La Porte”) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating a La Porte ordinance governing commercial truck routes and parking.¹ Pending before the court are Plaintiff's Motion for Final Summary Judgment (“Plaintiff's Motion”) (Docket Entry No. 30) and Defendant City of La Porte, Texas' Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendant's Motion”) (Docket Entry No. 31).

I. Background

Garza is a licensed commercial truck driver.² His daily routes run through the La Porte, Texas, area.³ Garza drives these routes from 7:00 a.m., when the Port of Houston opens, until 5:00 or 6:00 p.m., as a driver for Gulf Winds International.⁴ He has driven for Gulf Winds International for twelve years and almost exclusively in La Porte for the two years before this action.⁵ La Porte is a small city with heavy commercial truck traffic due to its location as the only municipality between the Port of Houston's two high-capacity container terminals.⁶ La Porte has selected certain roadways as the “designated truck routes” in the city.⁷ Garza received training from Gulf Winds International regarding the designated truck routes in La Porte, and signs are posted indicating those routes.⁸ Designated truck routes in La Porte include Highway 225 (including frontage roads), Highway 146 (including frontage roads), Underwood Road, and parts of Barbours Cut Boulevard, 16th Street, Fairmont Parkway, West Main Street, Powell Road, Export Drive, South 16th Street, North Broadway, North “L” Street, North “J” Street, and North 8th Street.⁹ Some of these roads, including Highways 225 and 146, are also part of the federally designated “National Network of highways” (the “National Network”).¹⁰ La Porte voluntarily designated any non-National Network roads as truck routes within the city, and Garza does not challenge the truck routes themselves.¹¹

On January 25, 2014, Officer Boles of the La Porte Police Department issued a citation to Garza for driving his truck tractor (without a trailer attached) off the city's designated truck route.¹² Garza was traveling north on Highway 146 through La Porte from the Gulf Winds International terminal in Seabrook and had taken the exit ramp towards Spencer Highway.¹³ He was on his way to pick up a container from Baytown to bring back to the terminal and had decided to stop at Whataburger.¹⁴ After exiting and traveling along the feeder road briefly, Garza made a right turn onto West A Street, past a “no trucks through” sign.¹⁵ Garza then turned left off of West A Street onto South 8th Street in an attempt to access the Whataburger parking lot.¹⁶ Garza testified that he wanted to enter through the back entrance to the lot, rather than continuing along the feeder to Highway 146 and turning right into the lot from the feeder.¹⁷ He believed it would be easier to maneuver the tractor back out of the parking lot from that direction.¹⁸

When Garza was exiting from Highway 14 6, he passed Officer Boles, who was parked on the shoulder of the exit ramp.¹⁹ Officer Boles cited Garza for driving off the designated truck route.²⁰ Garza was not cited for a parking violation.²¹ The Citation against Garza is pending in La Porte municipal court.²²

La Porte's ordinance governing “traffic and vehicles,” Sections 70-212, 70-232, 70-233, 70-235, and 70-237, as amended by the city council in May of 2015, is at issue in this case.²³ The Ordinance regulates various activities, but at issue here are its applications to commercial truck routes and parking.²⁴ Commercial truck drivers are allowed to park at limited places in La Porte and may generally only use the designated truck routes to access destinations in the city limits.²⁵ Available truck stops include the Lion King Travel Plaza, La Porte Travel Center, and Moody Travel Plaza.²⁶ Each of these locations has a convenience store and fuel, and one has a hotel.²⁷ Dining options include Cafe La Porte, a Subway, a Chester's Chicken, a Taqueria, and the Port Cafe.²⁸ There is also another hotel available to truck drivers.²⁹

Garza filed the action on March 25, 2014.³⁰ He sought leave to amend his Complaint after the amendment deadline, but leave was denied for failure to show good cause for the delay and to allege facts that would support his new claim.³¹ After several time extensions, both parties filed motions for summary judgment on June 15, 2015.³²

II. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant establishes that there is no genuine dispute about any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)

. Disputes about material facts are genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if “the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

A party moving for summary judgment “must ‘demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,’ but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp. , 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994)

(en banc) (per curiam) (quoting Celotex , 106 S.Ct. at 2553 ). “If the moving party fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response.” Id. If, however, the moving party meets this burden, “the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings” and produce evidence of specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. (citing Celotex , 106 S.Ct. at 2553–54 ). The nonmovant “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

“In order to avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant must identify specific facts within the record that demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” CQ, Inc. v. TXU Mining Co., L.P. , 565 F.3d 268, 273 (5th Cir.2009)

. “The party must also articulate the precise manner in which the submitted or identified evidence supports his or her claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[P]leadings are not summary judgment evidence.” Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ. , 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir.1996).

In reviewing the evidence “the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)

. The court resolves factual controversies in favor of the nonmovant, “but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little , 37 F.3d at 1075. If the movant bears the burden of proof on an issue at trial, “that party must support its motion [for summary judgment] with credible evidence that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial.” McKee v. CBF Corp. , 299 Fed.Appx. 426, 428 (5th Cir.2008) (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 331, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ).

B. Analysis

1. Which Claims Are Properly Before the Court

La Porte challenges Garza's Motion for Summary Judgment because it contains claims not alleged in the Complaint.³³ Garza responds that he has complied with the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

, which does not “require a plaintiff to set forth all laws which defendant may be violating.”³⁴ The live pleading before the court, Plaintiff's Original Complaint, alleges that the Original Ordinance “is invalid because [sic] unreasonably restricts access to food, rest, or repairs and is thus preempted by 23 C.F.R. 658.19(a)

.”³⁵ Under “RELIEF REQUESTED” the Complaint states:

24. Plaintiff requests this court declare that La Porte Ordinances, Article V, Subpart A—General Ordinances, Chapter 70—Traffic and Vehicles, § 70-179 is invalid because it is preempted by federal law.

25. Plaintiff further requests this court enjoin the City of La Porte or agents acting on behalf of the City of La Porte from enforcing this ordinance.³⁶

Although Garza's Complaint does not allege any state law claims, his Motion for Summary Judgment argues that “The State of Texas expressly prohibits cities from regulating parking on private nonresidential property” and “La Porte has exceeded its authority” under Texas law to regulate “stopping, standing, and parking.”³⁷

Even under the “liberal pleading standard” of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

, a party cannot use a motion for summary judgment to raise new claims. See U.S. ex rel. DeKort v. Integrated Coast Guard Systems , 475 Fed.Appx. 521, 522 (5th Cir.2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court has mandated a liberal pleading standard for civil complaints .... This standard however does not afford plaintiffs with an opportunity to raise new claims at the summary judgment stage. ... At the summary judgment stage, the proper procedure for plaintiffs to assert a new claim is to amend the complaint in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).” (quoting Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald and Co. , 382 F.3d 1312, 1314–15 (11th Cir.2004) )); In re Idearc, Inc. , No. 09–31828–BJH–11, 2011 WL 203859, at...