Garza v. Escobar, Civil Action No. 7:18-CV-249
Decision Date | 30 April 2019 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 7:18-CV-249 |
Citation | 386 F.Supp.3d 794 |
Parties | Bernice GARZA, Plaintiff, v. Omar ESCOBAR Jr., et al, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Austin Michael Bryan Whatley, Jerad Wayne Najvar, Najvar Law Firm, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.
Myra Kay Morris, Brian Charles Miller, Royston Rayzor et al., Corpus Christi, TX, for Defendants.
The Court now considers the "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings"1 brought by Omar Escobar, Jr. and Starr County, Texas (collectively "Defendants"); the response, as amended, filed by Bernice Garza ("Plaintiff");2 as well as the reply filed by Defendants.3 The Court also considers "All Parties' Unopposed Joint Motion for Stay" filed by the parties.4 After duly considering the record and relevant authorities, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, and DENIES as moot the parties' motion for a stay.
This is a civil rights employment discrimination case, and the instant motion concerns whether Plaintiff was protected from ‘patronage dismissal,’ that is whether she is protected under the First Amendment from termination due to political differences.5 In overview, Plaintiff alleges that she and her former boss, Defendant Omar Escobar, Jr. ("Escobar"), District Attorney of Starr County, "were friends and were aligned with respect to local politics for several years" but that the "friendly relationship" ceased in 2017 due to "political events,"6 eventually leading to Plaintiff's dismissal.7
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that she, along with her sister, Leticia Garza Galvan ("Galvan"), supported Escobar's campaign for District Attorney in 2012,8 and Plaintiff served as a "determined and conscientious organizer and campaign worker" for Escobar's campaign and other related political campaigns.9 In January 2014, Plaintiff was hired by Starr County as a Federal and State Projects Manager,10 and in February 2015 Plaintiff was transferred at Escobar's request to the District Attorney's Office to serve as the Coordinator of the Crime Victims Unit ("CVU").11 Plaintiff was the head of the CVU department and supervised five employees.12 According to Plaintiff's complaint, the CVU was responsible for "communicating with and assisting crime victims," and Plaintiff additionally was responsible for preparing and managing grant requests.13
While CVU coordinator, Plaintiff alleges she worked for Escobar's political re-election campaign in 2016,14 and that after the 2016 election Escobar continued to involve Plaintiff in his political plans, including discussing which candidates for political office Escobar supported and wanted Plaintiff to support.15 The relationship at this point was still friendly and on June 12, 2017, Plaintiff received a $5,000 annual pay increase, at Escobar's request.16
However, Plaintiff alleges her relationship with Escobar "began to deteriorate soon thereafter" because Escobar "objected to the political views and activities of Plaintiff and her family and associates."17 Plaintiff alleges "a rift" developed when Plaintiff's sister, Galvan, engaged in political activities that Escobar disagreed with, including Galvan's desire to run for political office on a slate of candidates opposed to Escobar.18 As a result of this rift, Escobar began to harass Plaintiff at work including by criticizing Galvan daily to Plaintiff at the office and that due to this harassment "Plaintiff became so distressed that she had to start taking medication."19 On April 14, 2017, Plaintiff alleges she had a meeting with Escobar where she told him "she wanted to keep doing her job, but did not want to discuss politics any further."20
On or about September 5, 2017, Plaintiff alleges Escobar ordered Plaintiff to attend a meeting with two of his Assistant District Attorneys and the County Auditor, but Plaintiff objected and did not attend.21 Plaintiff further alleges that Escobar met with her to discuss her failure to attend the meeting with the County Auditor, and in that discussion she told Escobar she did not know anything about the meeting, and reminded Escobar "she had said she did not want to discuss politics."22 Plaintiff alleges Escobar responded by informing Plaintiff she would "need to be out of the office" if Plaintiff assisted Galvan in her political campaign.23
Plaintiff alleges Escobar's harassment at work increased after this incident.24 The harassment included removing work duties from Plaintiff, such as assigning subordinates to take the lead in preparing crime victims for trial, even though "Plaintiff ha[d] more experience and the subordinates were not equipped to do it on their own."25 Plaintiff alleges she ignored Escobar's order and still helped with the trial preparations.26 However, Plaintiff alleges that "[f]or the most part, Plaintiff was relegated to sitting at her desk doing nothing except work related to the grants."27 Plaintiff alleges "it was more important to Escobar to punish an employee's political disloyalty outside of the office than it was to ensure the efficient and effective functioning of the [CVU]."28
Galvan continued her political ambitions and "began to actively campaign and raise money" for her political campaign, and "Escobar's retaliation continued to escalate."29 Plaintiff alleges there had been "little to no direct communication" between Escobar and Defendant since the September 5, 2017 discussion, but that Escobar "began sending cryptic messages intended to intimidate Plaintiff from assisting in her sister's campaign."30
By mid-December 2017, Plaintiff alleges she was "still going in to the office, but was mostly working half-days ... The atmosphere was tense and awkward around the office with no communication with Escobar, despite Plaintiff still being the titular head of the CVU and drawing her regular salary."31 Plaintiff requested—and was granted—leave without pay from January 3, 2018 to March 18, 2018.32
However, when Plaintiff returned to work on March 19, 2018 she was suspended without pay, and then subsequently terminated.33 On April 10, 2018, Plaintiff returned to the office to return all office-issued equipment and as she was leaving, Plaintiff alleges the Human Resources Director, Armandina Martinez, stated, 34
On these facts, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.35 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges retaliation in violation of her First Amendment rights to political association and freedom of speech.36 Plaintiff brings a claim against Starr County and claims against Escobar in his official and personal capacities.37 Plaintiff seeks damages, and any other relief to which she may be entitled.38
Defendants filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings,39 Plaintiff untimely responded,40 and requested leave to file an amended response.41 The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file her amended response,42 and thus considers Plaintiff's amended response43 herein. Defendants replied.44 The Court now turns to its analysis.
Rule 12(c) "is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings."45 The motion "should be granted only if there is no issue of material fact and if the pleadings show that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law."46 Accordingly, a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is analyzed under the standard utilized in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.47
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."48 This does not require detailed factual allegations, but it does require "more than labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action."49 Courts first disregard from their analysis any conclusory allegations as not entitled to the assumption of truth,50 but regard well-pled facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.51 Courts then undertake the "context-specific" task of determining whether the remaining well-pled allegations give rise to an entitlement to relief that is plausible, rather than merely possible or conceivable.52
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims against Starr County and Escobar should be dismissed because Plaintiff's position is not protected from patronage dismissal and therefore Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the First Amendment. Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's allegations regarding her position, and the statutory description53 of the responsibilities of Plaintiff's position, support finding that Plaintiff's job is one in which "political loyalty is a legitimate qualification for continued employment,"54 and thus is not protected from dismissal due to political differences. Defendants further argue that even if Plaintiff establishes a constitutional violation, Escobar is entitled to qualified immunity.55
Plaintiff brings procedural and substantive arguments. Procedurally, Plaintiff argues that there is insufficient information in the pleadings to make a determination regarding whether Plaintiff's position is subject to patronage dismissal.56 Substantively, Plaintiff responds that political affiliation is not relevant to her former position and thus she is entitled to First Amendment protection.57 Specifically, Plaintiff argues that she need only establish a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation, and that Defendants do not meet their burden under Pickering v. Board of Education of demonstrating that the government's interest in ensuring effective governance outweighs Plaintiff's First Amendment rights.58 Plaintiff also argues that Defendants do not show that Plaintiff was a...
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