Garza v. Marine Transport Lines, Inc.
| Decision Date | 09 February 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 84 Civ. 6610 (IBC).,84 Civ. 6610 (IBC). |
| Parties | Ricardo GARZA, Plaintiff, v. MARINE TRANSPORT LINES, INC., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. NORFOLK SHIPBUILDING & DRYDOCK CORPORATION, Third-Party Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Healy & Baillie, New York City, for defendant and third-party plaintiff; Thomas L. Rohrer, of counsel.
Frederick W. Meeker, New York City, for third-party defendant.
Third-party defendant Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corporation ("Norshipco") moves for summary judgment, asserting that this third-party action is time-barred by the terms of its agreement with third-party plaintiff Marine Transport Lines, Inc. ("MTL"). MTL opposes the motion, contending that this is a personal injury claim not precluded by the exculpation language in the contract. Upon all of the pleadings and papers filed with this Court and the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, we are compelled to grant Norshipco's motion. This third-party action is therefore dismissed in all respects.
Plaintiff Richard Garza commenced the instant litigation to recover damages for personal injuries sustained while a crew member on the MARINE CHEMIST, a vessel owned by defendant/third-party plaintiff MTL. The MARINE CHEMIST entered Norshipco's yard for repairs on October 11, 1983. Norshipco performed repair work pursuant to the repair contract until November 10, 1983 at which time the vessel was redelivered to MTL. Within the first week after the vessel was returned, it was docked without incident. However, on November 17, 1983, the second time the ship docked, the starboard head mooring line parted and struck plaintiff, causing him to sustain injuries to his right leg. Plaintiff settled with MTL for $200,000 in June, 1985 and is no longer an active party.
MTL, having notified Norshipco of plaintiff Garza's claim in May 1985, commenced this third-party action in June, 1985 and now seeks indemnification and legal fees from Norshipco, contending that the mooring line parted because it had been damaged by Norshipco employees during the repairs to the vessel at Norshipco's shipyard. MTL's claim is based on a September 1, 1983 contract between the parties that provided Norshipco would perform certain repairs to the MARINE CHEMIST. Norshipco denied liability and points to "red-letter" clauses contained in the written agreement which it contends relieves it from all liability.
The "red-letter" clause upon which the instant motion for summary judgment is based reads as follows:
We shall be discharged from all liability for defective workmanship or material or for loss or damage, unless the same is discovered prior to and claim in writing made to us within sixty (60) days and litigation is commenced within one year after our work has ceased for whatever reason or has been completed, or the vessel has been redelivered, whichever first occurs.
A reproduction of the entire Terms and Conditions document is attached hereto as Appendix A.
FRCP Rule 56 provides for summary judgment where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Because summary judgment is such a drastic remedy, we should proceed with caution lest we improperly deprive MTL of its day in court. Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2716 (hereinafter Wright). Accordingly, we may grant summary judgment only when "the requirements of Rule 56 have clearly been met." United States v. Bosurgi, 530 F.2d 1105, 1110 (2d Cir.1976). Our function here is to decide whether there remain any triable issues of fact. Id. In doing so we must "`resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of MTL with the burden on Norshipco to demonstrate the absence of any material factual issue genuinely in dispute.'" Id. (quoting Heyman v. Commerce and Industry Insurance Company, 524 F.2d 1317, 1320 (2d Cir.1975)).
The only potentially triable issue of fact for purposes of the instant motion is whether the "red-letter" clause in the contract is applicable to this third-party action for indemnity.
The parole evidence rule often precludes the presentation of factual matters that appear to raise triable issues, thus making summary judgment appropriate in those cases. 6- Pt. 2 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.1743 (hereinafter Moore). We must examine the "red-letter" clause to determine whether it is sufficiently ambiguous to overcome the parole evidence rule and thereby permit proof of the subjective intent of the parties. Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 617 F.2d 936, 940 (2d Cir.1980). A mere assertion by one of the parties that the language is ambiguous or evinces a divergence of subjective intent between the parties is not enough to prevent summary judgment. Wright at § 2730.1. This is a question of law properly decided by this Court. Tokio Marine, 617 F.2d at 940.
If we decide that the "red-letter" clause unambiguously time-bars the instant action and that no triable issue of fact remains, we grant summary judgment. Id. If, on the other hand, we find the terms of the contract ambiguous, we must deny summary judgment. Moore ¶ 56.1743.
MTL does not dispute that the time limitations contained within the "red-letter" clause would have been exceeded and the action contractually time-barred had the limitations provision been applicable to the instant claim. Rather, MTL opposes the motion on the ground that this is a personal injury claim excepted from the exculpatory language quoted above. MTL has raised three arguments in support of this position.
The crux of MTL's first argument is that the limitations clause is embedded within a portion of the document that seems to deal with defective workmanship or materials. MTL, assuming that to be the case, urges us to conclude that the limitation pertains only to actions arising from defective workmanship or material and not to personal injury claims.
This argument is grounded in the traditional contract law rule of construction that ambiguous language is to be construed against the draftsman. Edward Leasing Corp. v. Uhlig Associates, Inc., 785 F.2d 877, 889 (11th Cir.1986). MTL has attempted to resolve the perceived ambiguity by including with its memorandum opposing the motion an enlarged copy of the Terms and Conditions document which contains the limitations provision. MTL marked certain passages and encircled certain phrases in support of its interpretation of the contract.
We must point out, as Judge Weinfeld did, that the principle "only applies where the contract language is ambiguous — where it is susceptible of two reasonable and practical interpretations." American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., as the owners of the S/S Export Ambassador v. United States, 390 F.Supp. 63, 66 (S.D. N.Y.1975) (). The limitations clause at issue discharges Norshipco from "all liability for defective workmanship or for loss or damage." (emphasis ours). The emphasized language is clearly broad enough on its face to include this third-party action. MTL has failed to explain why "all liability ... for loss or damage" should not be read to include this third-party action, whether it be labeled one for personal injury or for indemnity. The clause is "broadly inclusive" and there is no substance to MTL's attempt to limit it to claims arising from defective workmanship or materials. Tokio Marine, 617 F.2d at 940 (). MTL's contention can only be upheld if the words "or for loss or damage" are omitted from the clause. It would be a "distortion of language" to read into this clause an exception for personal injury claims. American Export, 390 F.Supp. at 65. Since we find the contractual language clear and unequivocal, we must disregard the structure MTL seeks to impose on the contract at this late date. Id. at n. 6.
MTL next argues that Norshipco has, in effect, excepted personal injury claims from the "red-letter" clauses by the following provision:
We do not agree to the accident, indemnity, and insurance provisions, if any, contained in your invitation or specifications, relating to liability for death or personal injury, and in such cases we accept only such liability as is imposed upon us by law.
MTL interprets this provision as an acceptance by Norshipco of amenability to personal injury actions for the entire statutory limitations period. Our close reading of the Terms and Conditions document reveals that MTL's reading of this provision is flawed. It is simply a rejection by Norshipco of any "accident, indemnity, and insurance provisions" contained within MTL's specifications. There is nothing in the language or structure of this provision indicating that the parties intended this provision to affect the limitations period set by the parties elsewhere in the contract.
Furthermore, Norshipco responds that since this is an action sounding in indemnity rather than personal injury, MTL's personal injury approach is irrelevant. This is an interesting argument having a great deal of appeal. However, we cannot say that "relating to liability for death or personal injury" clearly excludes actions for...
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Garza v. Marine Transport Lines, Inc.
...action on the ground that it was time-barred by the terms of the agreement between MTL and Norshipco. Garza v. Marine Transport Lines, Inc., 680 F.Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y.1988). MTL argues on this appeal that the district court erred in concluding that the contract clauses were unambiguous, and ......