Gaskins v. Runyon

• Decision Date: 30 March 1994
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 91-2098 (HHG).
• Citation: 921 F. Supp. 779
• Parties: Alberta P. GASKINS, Plaintiff v. Marvin T. RUNYON, Postmaster General, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

921 F. Supp. 779

Alberta P. GASKINS, Plaintiff v. Marvin T. RUNYON, Postmaster General, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 91-2098 (HHG).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

March 30, 1994.

Lawrence C. Lanpher, Helen M. Barch-Kuchta, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff.

Douglas A. Wickham, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Washington, D.C., for Defendant.

OPINION

HAROLD H. GREENE, District Judge.

This case came before the Court for a bench trial. With the benefit of the full record now before the Court, including Proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law presented by both plaintiff and defendant, this case is ripe for a decision on the merits.

I

Plaintiff began her employment with the United States Postal Service in 1963 as a "Distribution Clerk" and was later promoted to the position of "Special Distribution Clerk" or "Review Clerk." These positions essentially involved the sorting of mail while standing in front of a metal "case" that contained various slots for receiving mail. However, the duties of these positions also involved considerable physical activity, including lifting, pushing, and pulling large quantities of mail.

In 1979, plaintiff allegedly injured her back while on the job.¹ As a result, plaintiff was absent from work a significant amount of time from 1979 through 1983. During 1983 she was terminated by the Postal Service. Subsequently, however, an arbitrator ordered defendant, pursuant to her rights under the then existing collective bargaining agreement in effect between her union and the Postal Service, to re-employ plaintiff in a position which could be performed in a chair with a back support. As a result, plaintiff returned to work in January 1985 and was assigned a position as a Review Clerk in the Rehabilitation Unit, a unit that had been established and designated especially for postal employees with back problems; employees who required reduced work loads, and positions that could be accomplished through the use of chairs with back supports.

While working in the Rehabilitation Unit during 1985 and 1986, plaintiff was not required to engage in heavy lifting or other strenuous activities normally required of a Review Clerk. In addition, employees in the Rehabilitation Unit worked in front of shorter "cases" than those ordinarily used by Review Clerks. This allowed the clerks to perform their sorting functions while seated.

Sometime prior to plaintiff's return to work in 1985, a number of "blue" chairs were purchased specifically for use in the Rehabilitation Unit. These chairs were purchased for that unit based upon their alleged "orthopedic" characteristics. After these chairs were purchased, it became defendant's policy to require all employees in the unit to use the chairs. However, several employees, plaintiff among them, apparently disliked the "blue" chairs and requested the use of other chairs available in the facility. Specifically, plaintiff repeatedly requested the use of an "orange" chair apparently available in the cafeteria. This request was denied.

Plaintiff alleged that the "blue" chair she was required to use worsened her back condition and caused her great pain. She further alleged that as a consequence, she was forced to miss substantial periods of work in 1985 and 1986, and eventually to leave the Postal Service in May 1986, never to return. Plaintiff retired based upon disability in 1989.

Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 791 and 794 (sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act) alleging that defendant's refusal to accommodate her request to use the "orange" chair, or any chair other than the mandated "blue" chair, represented discrimination on the basis of her handicap. She further alleged that defendant's actions in this regard caused her "constructive discharge" and forced her into a disability retirement in 1989.² The complaint sought, inter alia, back-pay for work allegedly missed due to defendant's wrongful behavior, reinstatement to her former or a comparable position, and attorney's fees.

II

To establish a prima facie claim under the Rehabilitation Act, an employee must first establish (1) that she is a "handicapped person," (2) that she is "otherwise qualified," and (3) that defendant's practices which prejudiced her were motivated "solely by reason of her handicap or caused by a handicap-related disparity."³ See Matzo v. Postmaster General, 685 F.Supp. 260, 262 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd, 861 F.2d 1290 (D.C.Cir.1988); Guerriero v. Schultz, 557 F.Supp. 511, 513 (D.D.C.1983).

A

The initial inquiry, then, is whether plaintiff was a "handicapped person" during 1985 and 1986, the period in question, for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act. A handicapped person is "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B).⁴ "Physical or Mental impairment" is defined, in pertinent part, as:

any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfiguration, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: Neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine....

29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(b)(1). "Major life activities" is defined as "functions, such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(c).

The Court concludes that, at all times relevant, plaintiff was a "handicapped person." Although the testimony of defense witness Dr. Robert Gordon, an orthopedic specialist, raises substantial doubts as to whether plaintiff actually suffered from back ailments, and in particular whether plaintiff suffered from a herniated disc, that testimony is, at bottom, irrelevant for purposes of the instant inquiry.⁵

The record amply demonstrates that defendant had long regarded plaintiff as suffering from an impairment that substantially limited her ability to work.⁶ In this regard, it is clear that plaintiff (1) had a record of a substantial physical impairment and (2) was regarded as having such an impairment.⁷ This is all that is required to bring plaintiff within the protection of the Rehabilitation Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(a).

B

The next inquiry is whether plaintiff was "otherwise qualified" for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act. An individual is otherwise qualified if she can meet all the requirements of the position in spite of the handicap, with or without reasonable accommodation. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2367, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979).⁸ Here again the Court concludes that plaintiff was "otherwise qualified."

Despite defendant's contention that the Court should make this determination based on whether plaintiff was fit to perform the ordinary duties of a Review Clerk — and the Court would certainly find that plaintiff was unable to do so, see Florence v. Frank, 774 F.Supp. 1054, 1061 (N.D.Tex.1991) (if handicap would prevent plaintiff from performing job in question without eliminating essential functions of the job, he cannot be found "otherwise qualified") — under the facts presented in the instant case, the Court must disagree with defendant.

As previously noted, plaintiff was re-hired in 1985 as a result of an arbitration award. That award specifically dealt with the fact that plaintiff had sought permanent re-assignment, under the terms of her collective bargaining unit's agreement with the Postal Service, to a "light duty" position which could be performed in a chair with a back support. It is also clear that upon plaintiff's return in 1985, her assignment to the Rehabilitation Unit was designed to meet precisely the requirement of a permanent light-duty position. Thus, the Court finds that the determination as to whether plaintiff was "otherwise qualified" must be made based on her ability to perform the duties assigned in the Rehabilitation Unit upon her return in 1985.

In this regard, the Court concludes that plaintiff was otherwise qualified for this position. The record demonstrates that she possessed the skill, training, and experience necessary to accomplish all the tasks required in that limited position. Defendant's contention that plaintiff was incapable of holding any full-time job due to her back pain is rejected — at least as it relates to the period in 1985 and 1986.⁹ While it may be true that plaintiff's condition might have required periods away from work, there is no evidence to indicate that this leave could not have been accommodated based upon plaintiff's regular earned leave accruals or defendant's policies in connection with such leave.

C

Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in this case result from plaintiff's handicap. It cannot be disputed that plaintiff's back problems are at the heart of her complaints and defendant's defenses. Plaintiff need not establish a discriminatory intent on the part of defendant. See Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372, 1384 (10th Cir.1981).

III

Concluding that plaintiff has made a prima facia showing, the Court shifts the burden of persuasion to defendant to show that either he reasonably accommodated plaintiff's handicap or that it was not possible to reasonably accommodate the handicap without undue hardship on the Postal Services operations. See Carter v. Bennett, 651 F.Supp. 1299, 1300-01 (D.D.C.1987), aff'd, 840 F.2d 63 (D.C.Cir.1988). See also Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C.Cir.1993) (discussing burden shifting).¹⁰

Thus, we reach the crux of this action, that is, whether, when the evidence is viewed in its entirety, defendant reasonably accommodated plaintiff's handicap?¹¹ Although less than thrilled with the overall conduct...