Gaspari v. FMC Techs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 04 February 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. H-13-2353
• Parties: JOHN E. GASPARI II, ARJUN RAVISHANKAR, and NANCY A. SMITH, Plaintiffs, v. FMC TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

JOHN E. GASPARI II, ARJUN RAVISHANKAR, and NANCY A. SMITH, Plaintiffs, v. FMC TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-13-2353

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

February 4, 2016

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Magistrate Judge upon referral from the District Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), is Defendant FMC Technology, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document No. 26) and Defendant FMC Technologies, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Gaspari's Termination Claim (Document No. 53) . Having considered the motions, the responses in opposition (Document Nos. 27 & 57), Defendant's replies (Document Nos. 32 & 63), the supplemental briefing (Document Nos. 59 & 64), all the summary judgment evidence, and the applicable law, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS, for the reasons set forth below, that Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment (Document Nos. 26 & 53) be GRANTED.

I. Background and Procedural History

This is an employment discrimination case brought by three members of Defendant's Global Sourcing and Manufacturing Department: John Gaspari ("Gaspari"), Arjun Ravishankar ("Ravishankar"), and Nancy Smith ("Smith"). Each of these three Plaintiffs alleges that they were discriminated against on the basis of their sex (Gaspari and Smith), race and national origin (Ravishankar), and age (Smith); subjected to a hostile work environment; and retaliated against. Gaspari alleges sex discrimination claims under both Title VII, and § 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code. Ravishankar alleges race and national origin discrimination claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and § 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code. Smith alleges sex discrimination claims under Title VII and § 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code, and age discrimination claims under the ADEA. Gaspari, Ravishankar and Smith all also allege retaliation claims under Title VII, and Ravishankar additionally alleges a retaliation claim under § 1981.

According to the allegations in Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (Document No. 38), Gaspari is a 38 year old, white homosexual male. He alleges that he "was subjected to discriminatory conduct and a hostile work environment by his superiors and managers based solely on their preconceived stereotypes of male masculinity and their perception of [his] sexual orientation. [He] also became the target of reverse discrimination by his superior Ana Santiago, who favored Hispanic employees and openly disparaged [him] for being white." (Document No. 38 at 3). Plaintiff Ravishankar is a 30-year old male of Indian origin. He alleges that he "was subjected to Defendant FMC's racial animosity and open hostility based [on] his race and national origin[,] [and] a continuous barrage of racially disparaging comments, insults, and degrading treatment from FMC's supervisory and managerial employees[,which] harassment was of such a severe and pervasive nature that it created a racially hostile work environment that adversely affected the terms and conditions of Ravishankar's employment with Defendant FMC." (Document No. 38 at 18). Plaintiff Smith is a 54 year old white female. She alleges that she "was discriminated against and harassed because of her age, 54, and because of her sex, female. Defendant FMC's supervisory and managerial employees subjected [her] to different and less favorable terms and conditions ofemployment than what was afforded to male employees and other employees who were substantially younger than [her]. Defendant's supervisory and managerial employees also subjected [her] to a sexually hostile and ageist work environment." (Document No. 38 at 25).

In its comprehensive Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant FMC Technologies, Inc. ("FMC") seeks summary judgment on all the claims asserted against it by Plaintiffs Gaspari, Ravishankar and Smith. According to FMC, summary judgment is warranted on each Plaintiff's hostile work environment claims based on its affirmative Ellerth/Faragher defense, which it has established with uncontroverted evidence and upon which there is no genuine issue of material fact. Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). In addition, FMC argues that none of the Plaintiffs can establish the essential elements of a hostile work environment claim. As for the disparate treatment discrimination and retaliation claims, FMC maintains that none of the Plaintiffs can, or have, established a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination, none have come forth with evidence of pretext, and none have any summary judgment evidence to support a claim of retaliation. Plaintiffs, in their initial 72-page response to the motion, first argue that summary judgment should be denied, or the motion continued, because they have not been able to conduct sufficient discovery to oppose the motion. Plaintiffs then argue that FMC had not met its burden on its affirmative Ellerth/Faragher defense, that there is summary judgment evidence, which raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether actionable harassment occurred, whether they were subjected to retaliation in response to their workplace complaints, and whether they suffered adverse employment actions based on their respective, protected classifications.

Subsequent to the completion of briefing on Defendant FMC's Motion for SummaryJudgment, this case was transferred to the docket of United States District Judge Alfred H. Bennett. Upon transfer, a new Docket Control Order was entered and any prior restriction on the scope of discovery was lifted. In addition, an Amended Complaint (Document No. 38) was filed, whereupon Defendant FMC filed an additional Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Gaspari's Termination Claim (Document No. 53). Then, after having conducted additional discovery, Plaintiffs sought and were granted leave to file supplemental summary judgment evidence in opposition to Defendant FMC's initial Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant was, concurrently, given the opportunity to respond to any additional/supplemental summary judgment evidence. As of this date, Defendant FMC's two Motions for Summary Judgment are now fully briefed and ripe for ruling, with both sides having been given a full and fair opportunity to submit their arguments and summary judgment evidence.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56(a) provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The moving party must initially "demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant, "who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists" and that summary judgment should not be granted. Norwegian Bulk Transport A/S v. International Marine Terminals Partnership, 520 F.3d 409, 412 (5^th Cir. 2008); see also Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc.,144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998).¹ A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in a pleading, and unsubstantiated assertions that a fact issue exists will not suffice. Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2548. Instead, "the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a 'genuine' issue concerning every essential component of its case." Morris, 144 F.3d at 380.

In considering a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences to be drawn from both the evidence and undisputed facts are be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986). "If the record, viewed in this light, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find" for the nonmovant, then summary judgment is proper. Kelley v. Price-Macemon, Inc., 992 F.2d 1408, 1413 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. at 1351). On the other hand, if "the factfinder could reasonably find in [the nonmovant's] favor, then summary judgment is improper." Id. Even if the standards of Rule 56 are met, a court has discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment if it believes that "the better course would be to proceed to a full trial." Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2513.

III. Applicable Law

Plaintiffs have alleged claims of disparate treatment discrimination, hostile work environment and retaliation under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Texas Labor Code, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Title VII proscribes an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against any individual because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and the ADEA proscribes similar treatment on the basis of age. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 651 (5th Cir. 2004). Title VII also proscribes an employer from retaliating against an employee for opposing an unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. While parallel claims of discrimination and retaliation can additionally be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Texas Labor Code, the elements and standard of proof applicable to Title VII claims are also applicable to race and national origin discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, see Jones v. Robinson Property Group, L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 992 (5^th Cir. 2005); Tanik v. Southern Methodist University, 116 F.3d 775 (5^th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1015 (1997); Southard v. Texas Board of Criminal Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 554 (5^thCir. 1997), and discrimination claims brought under the Texas Labor Code. Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 403-404 n. 2 (5^th Cir. 1999).

Actionable employment discrimination under ...