Gass v. Carducci

Decision Date27 October 1964
Docket NumberGen. No. 49424
Citation202 N.E.2d 73,52 Ill.App.2d 394
PartiesAnna M. GASS and George W. Gass, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Marilyn CARDUCCI, Defendant, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, a corporation, Garnishee-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Querrey, Harrow, Gulanick & Kennedy, Chicago, John T. Kennedy, Chicago, of counsel, for appellant.

John G. Phillips, Chicago, for plaintiffs-appellees, Anna M. and George W. Gass.

Orner & Wasserman, Chicago, John G. Phillips and Norton Wasserman, Chicago, of counsel, for defendant-appellee, Marilyn Carducci.

BURKE, Presiding Justice.

This was a garnishment action filed by Anna M. Gass and George W. Gass as plaintiffs against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company as garnishee. On motion of plaintiffs, Anna Gass and George Gass, and the original defendant, Marilyn Carducci, the court entered a summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the garnishee, from which this appeal is taken.

Prior to September 29, 1956, garnishee issued a policy of automobile liability insurance to Marilyn Carducci and her husband. On September 29, 1956, Anna Gass, the mother of Marilyn Carducci, was a passenger in the Carducci automobile; she was seriously injured when thrown from the automobile as Mrs. Carducci attempted a sudden left turn. George Gass and Anna Gass brought an action for the injuries thus sustained and Anna Gass recovered a verdict of $50,000, while George Gass recovered a verdict of $7,000 for loss of services and consortium. Attorneys designated by garnishee defended the action for Mrs. Carducci, but she retained her own counsel when advised to do so by the garnishee's counsel because the ad damnum clause of the complaint exceeded the coverage limits of the liability policy. The garnishee's counsel did however handle the defense of the action. After certain testimony was given by Mrs. Carducci at the personal injury trial, garnishee's attorney gave her an oral reservation of rights under the policy on the grounds of non-cooperation, which was subsequently given to her in writing by letter the day before the judgments were entered on the verdicts. On appeal to this court (Gass v. Carducci, 37 Ill.App.2d 181, 187, 185 N.E.2d 285) the judgments were affirmed; a Petition for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court was denied.

On May 2, 1963, plaintiffs instituted this garnishment action against State Farm by the filing of an affidavit and the statutory interrogatories to garnishee. Garnishee filed a jury demand and verified answers to the interrogatories denying the indebtedness. Plaintiffs then filed an unverified reply, alleging that garnishee had issued a policy of insurance to Marilyn Carducci against whom judgments had been entered and that garnishee did have in its possession a contract of insurance belonging to the said judgment debtor. Plaintiff requested an immediate hearing upon the issues presented by the answers to the interrogatories and the reply made by the plaintiffs.

On September 12, 1963, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. Hearing on the motion was held on September 26, 1963, at which time plaintiffs were allowed to file nunc pro tunc as of July 6, 1963 and upon agreement between counsel for the parties, discovery interrogatories to garnishee, to which verified answers were filed by garnishee on September 5, 1963. These interrogatories asked, among other questions not important here, whether garnishee had issued a policy to and had defended the personal injury suit brought by plaintiffs against Marilyn Carducci, and whether the refusal of the garnishee to pay the judgments was based upon the lack of cooperation of Marilyn Carducci. The verified answers of garnishee recited, among other things, that a policy had been issued, that the garnishee had defended the personal injury suit, and that the garnishee refused to pay the judgments by reason of the breach by Marilyn Carducci of the assistance and cooperation clause of the policy.

The motion for summary judgment was predicated on the ground that the answers to the interrogatories had removed any material or factual issues from the case and that there was, therefore, no triable issue. According to the motion, these answers established as a matter of law that there was no lack of cooperation, and that even had there been non-cooperation, the garnishee had not been prejudiced thereby, and had waived any coverage defense founded thereon.

Garnishee filed no counter-affidavits, nor attempted to amend its answers to the interrogatories. The court concluded that there was no triable issue as a matter of law since here was no lack of cooperation as a matter of law. The court entered judgment against garnishee in the sum of $32,000, representing the $7,000 recovered by George Gass for loss of services and consortium and the $25,000 insurance policy 'per person' coverage limit constituting one-half of the $50,000 recovered by Anna Gass.

Garnishee first maintains that a motion for summary judgment, made under Section 57 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, Chap. 110, § 57), is not available in garnishment proceedings, for the reason that Section 43(a) of the Garnishment Statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, Chap. 62, § 43(a)) requires an immediate trial of the issues where the judgment creditor contests the truth or sufficiency of the garnishee's answers; that the answers to the statutory interrogatories in the instant case show that there is an issue of fact; and that a trial of the issue must therefore be had. While it is true that Section 43(a) requires a trial where issues of fact arise in a garnishment proceeding, it does not necessarily follow that a trial must be had in all garnishment actions. Proceeding to trial where no issue of fact or genuine issue of material fact is presented would be both wasteful and frivolous. The purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to test whether there is a genuine and material issue of fact. Kruse v. Streamwood Utilities Corp., 34 Ill.App.2d 100, 180 N.E.2d 731. Further, the Illinois Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, Chap. 110, § 1) specifically states that its provisions control in all cases at law and in equity, except, among others, in garnishment proceedings where the procedure to be followed is incorporated into the separate statute relating to garnishment actions; where, however, that separate statute is silent concerning a given matter...

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19 cases
  • Bilodeau v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.
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    ...S.W.2d 186 (1972); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ball, 127 Cal.App.3d 568, 570-571, 179 Cal.Rptr. 644 (1981); Gass v. Carducci, 52 Ill.App.2d 394, 402, 202 N.E.2d 73, 203 N.E.2d 289 (1964); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Cornelsen, 272 Md. 48, 51, 321 A.2d 149 (1974); Lumbermens' Mut. Casualty......
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    ...189, 552 P.2d 308 (1976); State-Wide Ins. Co. v. Flaks, 233 So.2d 400 (Fla.), cert. dismissed, 238 So.2d 427 (1970); Gass v. Carducci, 52 Ill.App.2d 394, 202 N.E.2d 73, supp. op. 52 Ill.App. 402 A, 203 N.E.2d 289 (1964); Stamps v. Consolidated Underwriters, 208 Kan. 630, 493 P.2d 246 (1972)......
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    ...Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 161 Ill.App.3d 223, 224-25, 112 Ill.Dec. 748, 514 N.E.2d 214, 215 (1987); Gass v. Carducci, 52 Ill.App.2d 394, 402, 202 N.E.2d 73, 76-77 (1964). The trial court also relied on the Second District's decision in Gober, which held that the insurer properly set ......
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