Gassman v. Governing Board, S

• Decision Date: 30 September 1976
• Docket Number: No. S,S
• Citation: 554 P.2d 321,18 Cal.3d 137,133 Cal.Rptr. 1
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 554 P.2d 321 Frederika GASSMAN et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GOVERNING BOARD OF RINCON VALLEY UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SONOMA COUNTY, Defendant and Appellant. Richard TRAVIS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF RINCON VALLEY UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Appellants. F. 23463. In Bank

Page 1

133 Cal.Rptr. 1

18 Cal.3d 137, 554 P.2d 321

Frederika GASSMAN et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GOVERNING BOARD OF RINCON VALLEY UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SONOMA COUNTY, Defendant and Appellant.

Richard TRAVIS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF RINCON VALLEY UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. S.F. 23463.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Sept. 30, 1976.

A. Leonard Bjorklund, Jr., and Christopher R. Savage, Sausalito, for plaintiffs and appellants.

James P. Botz, County Counsel, and John C. Gaffney, Asst. County Counsel, Santa Rosa, for defendants and appellants.

No appearance for plaintiff and respondent.

TOBRINER, Justice.

This case presents the narrow issue of whether a school district may refuse to rehire a probationary teacher for budgetary or financial reasons Pursuant to Education Code section 13443, subdivision (d) (hereinafter section 13443(d)) or whether such an economic layoff may only be affected Pursuant to Education Code section 13447. From the outset of the present controversy, defendant school district has contended that the terms of section 13443(d)--relating generally to the termination of a probationary teacher 'for cause'--are broad enough to authorize the district to terminate a probationary teacher because of anticipated financial difficulties of the district; defendant district has explicitly and repeatedly eschewed any reliance upon section 13447, the statutory provision which deals specifically with a school district's authority to lay off probationary and permanent teachers as part of a general reduction of its workforce.

The trial court in this administrative mandamus proceeding rejected the district's proposed statutory construction of section 13443(d) and determined that all economic layoffs of probationary teachers must be affected pursuant to section 13447; the court accordingly entered judgment in favor of plaintiff probationary teachers. The school district now appeals from that judgment.

We have concluded that the trial court judgment should be affirmed. As we explain, section 13447 affords permanent and probationary teachers numerous protections when such teachers lose their employment through no fault of their own as a result of the economic condition of their school district. Under the district's proposed interpretation of section 13443(d), however, the special protections adhering in section 13447 would be completely eviscerated, for a school district would be empowered to terminate a teacher 'for cause'--thus circumventing section 13447--even when such termination was occasioned by the very circumstances encompassed by section 13447.

Although the district argues that in its present form section 13447 unduly restricts the district's authority to dismiss probationary employees on economic grounds, we have no occasion to determine the proper scope of section 13447 or to decide whether or not the layoffs at issue here were authorized under that section, for the district deliberately foreswore any reliance on section 13447 at the very outset of this proceeding. Accordingly, we hold only that the trial court correctly ruled that all economic layoffs of probationary teachers must be undertaken pursuant to section 13447 and that the defendant's action in the instant case was consequently invalid.

1. Facts

The facts in this case are not in dispute. On March 14, 1974, defendant district notified plaintiffs, probationary teachers employed by the district, that the school board had decided not to reemploy them for the upcoming 1974--1975 school year. The notice that plaintiffs received explained that the school board anticipated financial difficulties in balancing its budget for the following school year due to several factors, including a decline in student enrollment and a return of several teachers who were then on leave; the notice also indicated that the board was contemplating reducing 'certain other kinds of service' presently provided by the district. On the basis of these circumstances, the board had decided not to reemploy seven probationary employees. Although the notice clearly indicated that plaintiffs were not being laid off for misconduct or professional incompetency of any kind, it specified that the district, in affecting the layoff, was purporting to act under the authority of section 13443(d), the dismissal 'for cause' provision, rather than under section 13447, which specifically authorizes dismissals relating to a district's reduction in its workforce. ¹

After receiving this notice of the district's intention not to rehire them, plaintiffs requested a hearing as authorized by statute. (Ed.Code, § 13443, subd. (b).) The district superintendent thereafter prepared and served plaintiffs with a formal 'accusation' (Ed.Code, § 13443, subd. (c); Gov.Code, § 11503) which largely repeated the grounds for termination contained in the earlier notice. In explaining the legal basis for such termination, the accusation stated, inter alia, that 'if the district is to stay within the limits of the income and revenue which the district will receive in 1974--1975, as required by Article XIII, section 40 (now Article XVI, section 18) of the State Constitution, it has been recommended and is in the best interest of the school district to reduce its staff of certified personnel.' The accusation, like the earlier notice, specified that the district's action was taken pursuant to section 13443, rather than under section 13447, and that the district contended that its economic situation constituted 'cause' for dismissal within the meaning of section 13443(d).

At the administrative hearing, held shortly thereafter, the school district's counsel confirmed that the district's recommendation of termination was not attributable to any alleged deficiency in the teachers' performance, but rested solely on the district's financial condition. At the hearing, defendant's counsel also formally stipulated that the district was not acting pursuant to section 13447, but was contending that the terminations were justified as terminations 'for cause' under section 13443(d). With one minor exception not relevant to the instant appeal, ² plaintiff teachers did not challenge the district's factual allegations with respect to the reasons for the termination or the financial situation of the district, but contended simply that the stated grounds for termination did not constitute 'cause' for termination within the meaning of section 13443(d).

A week after the administrative hearing concluded, the hearing officer issued his proposed decision. Although finding that from currently available estimates of revenue and proposed expenditures the district did face financial difficulties in the upcoming year, the hearing officer concluded that such difficulties did not amount to 'cause' for dismissal under section 13443(d). The hearing officer accordingly recommended that the pending accusation be dismissed.

On May 8, 1974, the school board met to consider the hearing officer's decision and recommendation. After hearing legal arguments from their own counsel and the teacher's counsel, the board voted to accept the hearing officer's findings of fact, but to reject his conclusions of law. Accordingly, the board concluded that its anticipated financial difficulties did constitute 'sufficient cause for termination . . . pursuant to section 13443,' and determined that plaintiffs would be terminated on that basis.

Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed the instant petitions for writ of mandate, seeking orders compelling the district to set aside its decision terminating their employment and requiring the district to reemploy them for the 1974--1975 school year. In addition, plaintiffs prayed for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Government Code section 800, contending that the district's action in the matter was 'arbitrary and capricious.' In its answer, the district defended the legality of its action and also contended that the action should be dismissed as moot since the district, in the interim, had offered employment to all of the plaintiffs.

After reviewing the administrative record and listening to oral argument, the superior court determined initially that the action should not be dismissed as moot, ³ and then concluded, on the merits, that the anticipated financial problems of the school district did not amount to 'cause' for termination within the meaning of section 13443(d). The court accordingly granted judgment in favor of plaintiffs, issuing the requested writ of mandate. At the same time, however, the court ruled that the district's action could not be characterized as 'arbitrary or capricious' and it denied plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees.

Defendant school district now appeals from the issuance of the peremptory writ and plaintiffs cross-appeal on the issue of attorney's fees. We turn first to defendant's contention. 2. A school district which wishes to lay off a probationary teacher because of financial difficulties must terminate such an employee pursuant to section 13447 and may not terminate such employee 'for cause' under section 13443, subdivision (d).

We note at the outset that the question presented on this appeal is Not whether the school district, under All statutory provisions, possessed the authority to refuse to rehire plaintiff probationary teachers because of its anticipated financial difficulties. Instead, the issue before us is the much narrower question of whether the district was required to effect any such economic layoffs pursuant to section 13447, ⁴ as the trial court held, or whether the district could proceed by terminating such teachers for 'cause' under section 13443(d), ⁵ as the district contends.

Although at first blush this narrow issue may seem of only technical and bureaucratic importance, the significance of the matter to the affected employees becomes apparent upon...