Gassner v. Raynor Mfg. Co.
| Citation | 350 Ill.Dec. 246,948 N.E.2d 315,409 Ill.App.3d 995 |
| Decision Date | 27 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 2–10–0180.,2–10–0180. |
| Parties | Gunther GASSNER, Plaintiff–Appellant and Cross–Appellee,v.RAYNOR MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Defendant–Appellee and Cross–Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jason Esmond, Law Offices of Jim Black & Associates, Rockford, for Gunther Gassner.James M. O'Brien, Law Offices of James M. O'Brien, Montgomery, for Raynor Mfg. Co.
[350 Ill.Dec. 249 , 409 Ill.App.3d 996] OPINION
On May 30, 2000, plaintiff-appellant and cross-appellee, Gunther Gassner, sustained a work-related back injury and, following surgery for the injury, a staphylococcal (staph) infection originating in his back area. On May 1, 2002, in settlement thereof, the Industrial Commission (Commission) approved a “settlement contract” between Gassner and his employer, defendant-appellee and cross-appellant, Raynor Manufacturing Company (RMC). The settlement contract contained an “open medical provision,” the scope of which is at the center of the instant appeal. In that provision, despite Gassner's general release, RMC agreed to pay for certain approved treatment for a year following the Commission's approval of the settlement contract. After the approval, the staph infection spread to Gassner's heart, and Gassner incurred approximately $190,000 in medical expenses for treatment to his heart. Gassner thought that the open medical provision covered the expenses related to the staph infection surrounding his heart (provided he could prove that it was the same staph infection that began in his back), but RMC disagreed.
On October 31, 2008, Gassner petitioned for entry of judgment pursuant to section 19(g) of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act (Act), which allows for a circuit court to enter judgment in accordance with an arbitration award (or a Commission-approved settlement contract). 820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2008). RMC moved to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations barred Gassner's claim. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. RMC then moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion. Gassner appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to RMC. RMC maintains that summary judgment was proper, but it cross-appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's denial of RMC's motion to dismiss, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment to RMC, and we remand the cause.
On May 30, 2000,1 Gassner fell down the stairs while at work for RMC. As a result,
[350 Ill.Dec. 250 , 948 N.E.2d 319]
Gassner suffered a herniated disk at L4–L5, which required a fusion that was performed on February 25, 2002. Following the surgery, Gassner developed a deep staph infection at the site of the surgical incision. He was treated with oral and intravenous antibiotics. Gassner and RMC subsequently entered into an agreement entitled “Illinois Industrial Commission Settlement Contract Lump Sum Petition and Order” (settlement contract). The settlement contract stated in pertinent part:
“Terms of Settlement: Attach a recent medical report signed by the physician who examined or treated the employee.
[RMC] offers and [Gassner] accepts the sum of $47,500 [less attorney fees and expenses], subject to approval by the Industrial Commission, in full settlement of all claims, known or unknown, including all claims for specific loss, temporary total compensation[,] or compensation pursuant to Sections 8(d)(1), 8(d)(2) or 8(f) of the Act resulting from said alleged accident of 5/30/00 and any other accident, injury, or aggravation of a pre-existing condition arising out of and in the course of [Gassner's] employment with [RMC] to the date he signed this contract, involving alleged disability to any portion of [Gassner's] anatomy. This general release includes but is not limited to the rights under Sections 8(a) and 19(h) of the Act, [which] are expressly and mutually waived. * * * Liability, causality, necessity and propriety of certain medical care, and nature and extent of permanent disability are the matters in issue. This settlement shall not be construed as a commutation of or a substitution for periodic payments; rather it represents a compromise of each disputed issue and has been effectuated to terminate litigation. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, as additional consideration, [RMC] agrees to pay reasonable and necessary medical expenses for treatment to the low back causally related to the alleged injury of 5/30/00 for a period of one year after the date of approval of this settlement contract, but not thereafter.” (Emphasis added to the controversial “open medical provision.”)
Additionally, the signature line of the contract, which Gassner signed, read:
“PETITIONER'S SIGNATURE. Attention, petitioner. Do not sign this contract unless you understand all of the following statements. I have read this document, understand its terms, and sign this contract voluntarily. I believe it is in my best interests for the Commission to approve this contract. I understand that I can present this settlement contract to the Industrial Commission in person. I understand that by signing this contract, I am giving up the following rights:
1. My right to a trial before an arbitrator;
2. My right to appeal the arbitrator's decision to the Commission;
3. My right to any further medical treatment, at the employer's expense, for the results of this injury;
4. My right to any additional benefits if my condition worsens as a result of this injury.”
The Commission approved the settlement contract on May 1, 2002.
A few months later, in September 2002, Gassner began to experience chest pain, shortness of breath, and fever. By late October 2002, doctors diagnosed Gassner with septic pericardis near his heart, and
[350 Ill.Dec. 251 , 948 N.E.2d 320]
Gassner underwent multiple surgeries as a result of the infection. Between May 1, 2002, and May 1, 2003, Gassner incurred $190,000 in medical expenses for treatment of his heart infection. Dr. Jeffrey Coe examined Gassner, and Dr. Coe provided the opinion that Gassner's heart infection was caused by the same bacteria responsible for Gassner's low back infection.
On October 1, 2003, Gassner petitioned the Commission to enforce 2 the settlement contract pursuant to sections 8(a) and 19(h) of the Act, seeking payment for expenses related to the heart infection. 820 ILCS 305/8(a), 19(h) (West 2008). On November 19, 2007, the Commission entered an order (which is contained in the record), noting that the parties had become involved in a disagreement concerning the interpretation of the “reasonable and necessary medical expenses” for which RMC was responsible under the open medical provision. The Commission found, however, that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, because the settlement contract stated that all statutory rights of review, including but not limited to the “rights under sections 8(a) and 19(h) of the Act, are expressly and mutually waived.” The Commission then advised that Gassner could pursue relief in the circuit court under section 19(g) of the Act.
Nearly one year after the entry of the Commission's order, on October 31, 2008, Gassner petitioned the trial court for entry of judgment pursuant to section 19(g) of the Act, which states:
“(g) Except in the case of a claim against the State of Illinois, either party may present a certified copy of the award of the Arbitrator, or a certified copy of the decision of the Commission when the same has become final, when no proceedings for review are pending, providing for the payment of compensation according to this Act, to the Circuit Court of the county in which such accident occurred or either of the parties are residents, whereupon the court shall enter a judgment in accordance therewith.” 820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2008).
In his section 19(g) petition, Gassner alleged that RMC did not pay all of the medical expenses that it had agreed to cover in the open medical provision. Gassner attached the bills in question, which in large part pertained to the staph infection surrounding his heart (which, according to Gassner, originated in his low back) and which totaled approximately $190,000. Gassner contended that these expenses were covered by the open medical provision because they were incurred between May 1, 2002, and May 1, 2003, and the open medical provision stated that RMC would “pay reasonable and necessary medical expenses for treatment to the low back causally related to the alleged injury of 5/30/00 for a period of one year after the date of approval of this settlement contract [ i.e., May 1, 2002], but not thereafter.”
On December 9, 2008, RMC moved to dismiss pursuant to section 2–619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2–619 (2008)), arguing that Gassner's section 19(g) petition was time-barred. RMC asserted that the five-year limitations period set forth in section 13–205 of the Code applies because that section governs “awards of arbitration * * * and all civil actions not otherwise provided for.” 735 ILCS 5/13–205 (West 2008). RMC noted that Gassner's “purported” cause of action accrued on May 1, 2003, the last day
[350 Ill.Dec. 252 , 948 N.E.2d 321]
on which Gassner could arguably seek compensation for his medical expenses, and that Gassner did not file his petition until October 31, 2008, more than five years later.
On April 30, 2009, the trial court denied RMC's motion to dismiss. The court found that the limitations period was tolled from October 1, 2003, to November 19, 2007, when Gassner's petition to enforce the settlement contract was pending before the Commission. The court reasoned that, therefore, Gassner satisfied a five-year limitations period. Rather than end...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. DiMucci
...or conclusory statements do not comply with the rule governing summary judgment affidavits.” Gassner v. Raynor Manufacturing Co., 409 Ill.App.3d 995, 1005, 350 Ill.Dec. 246, 948 N.E.2d 315 (2011) (citing Jones v. Dettro, 308 Ill.App.3d 494, 499, 241 Ill.Dec. 888, 720 N.E.2d 343 (1999) ). Se......
-
Wilson v. Career Educ. Corp.
...evidence that will resolve the ambiguity. The Illinois Appellate Court discussed this rule in Gassner v. Raynor Mfg. Co., 409 Ill.App.3d 995, 350 Ill.Dec. 246, 948 N.E.2d 315 (2011), as follows: In any case, under both the four corners rule and the provisional admission approach, the first ......
-
Tilschner v. Spangler
...sweeping and unnecessary statements about the authority of this court. It is well established that a court should avoid constitutional [409 Ill.App.3d 995] questions when a case can be decided on other grounds. In re Detention of Swope, 213 Ill.2d 210, 218, 290 Ill.Dec. 232, 821 N.E.2d 283 ......
-
Makindu v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n
...IL App (4th) 110869, ¶ 12, 359 Ill.Dec. 755, 967 N.E.2d 485 ) and whether a contract is ambiguous (Gassner v. Raynor Manufacturing Co., 409 Ill.App.3d 995, 1006, 350 Ill.Dec. 246, 948 N.E.2d 315 (2011) ).¶ 33 Here, there was a factual component to the trial court's decision. Specifically, t......
-
Evidence
...fact been paid; invoices were receipts for payment that could be denied or explained by parol. ILLINOIS Gassner v. Raynor Mfg. Co. , 409 Ill. App. 3d 995, 1006 (2011). Under the “four corners rule,” a court initially looks to the language of the agreement alone. If the language is facially ......