Gastelum v. Tc Heritage Inn 2 of Bakersfield LLC
| Decision Date | 22 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-1230 JLT BAK (SAB) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | FERNANDO GASTELUM, Plaintiff, v. TC HERITAGE INN 2 OF BAKERSFIELD LLC, dba Home 2 Suites by Hilton Bakersfield Defendant. |
Fernando Gastelum asserts the Home 2 Suites by Hilton Bakersfield violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and California law by not having accessible features. (See generally Doc. 25.) Defendants seek dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing Gastelum lacks standing to pursue his claims and the Court lacks jurisdiction. (Doc. 5.)
The Court finds the matter is suitable for decision without oral arguments, and no hearing will be set pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.
Fernando Gastelum reports he is “missing a leg and use[s] a wheelchair for mobility.” (Doc. 1 at 1, ¶ 1.) He reports that on July 1, 2021, he booked an accessible room at the hotel located at 8227 Brimhall Road in Bakersfield, California. (Id. ¶ 3.) According to Gastelum, when he got to the hotel, he “noted that it was not compliant with the Americans with Disabilities act and the California's civil rights laws.” (Id., ¶ 4.) Specifically, Gastelum alleged:
(Id. at 1-2, ¶ 4.) Thus, Gastelum asserts he “was denied equal access to the hotel by defendant not complying with the ADA and California's civil rights laws as stated.” (Id. at 2, ¶ 5.) Further, he reports he “will not want to revisit the Hotel because it is not compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act and the California's civil rights laws and California disabled person's laws.” (Id., ¶ 6.)
Defendant filed the motion to dismiss for failure lack of standing and subject matter jurisdiction on September 9, 2021.[1] (Doc. 5.) Gastelum filed his opposition to the motion on September 13, 2020. (Docs. 6-7.) Defendant did not file a brief in reply.
Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in places of public accommodation and provides: “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). The ADA requires business facilities be “readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, ” unless it would be “structurally impracticable.” 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1); Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit observed, “In general, a facility is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities if it meets the requirements promulgated by the Attorney General in the ‘ADA Accessibility Guidelines,' or the ‘ADAAG.'” Oliver, 654 F.3d at 905. These standards are codified at 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, Appendix A, and are “essentially an encyclopedia of design standards.” See id.
For purposes of Title III, discrimination also includes “a failure to remove architectural barriers … in existing facilities … where such removal is readily achievable.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). Thus, the Ninth Circuit found:
To prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public accommodations by the defendant because of her disability.
Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff need not show intentional discrimination to establish an ADA violation. Lentini v. California Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 846 (9th Cir. 2004).
The district court is a court of limited jurisdiction and is empowered only to hear disputes “authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Exxon Mobil Corp v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005). Federal courts are “presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case, unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” A-Z Int'l. v. Phillips, 323 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, a plaintiff carries the burden of demonstrating the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (citing McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-83 (1936)); Vacek v. United States Postal Serv., 447 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2006).
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may challenge a claim for relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) “may either attack the allegations of the complaint or may be made as a ‘speaking motion' attacking the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact.” Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. & Electronics Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 (1947)). Thus, “[a] jurisdictional challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) may be made either on the face of the pleadings or by presenting extrinsic evidence.” Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000)). The Ninth Circuit explained:
In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.
Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2004). On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the standards that must be applied by the Court vary according to the nature of the jurisdictional challenge.
If a defendant presents a facial challenge to the Court's jurisdiction, the Court must presume the truth of the Plaintiff's factual allegations “and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.” Doe v. Holy, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009); Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1009 (2004). The Court should not “assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). However, the Court “may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment” when resolving a facial attack. Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039.
On the other hand, if a defendant presents a factual challenge to the Court's jurisdiction, the Court “may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989); Warren, 328 F.3d at 1139. The Ninth Circuit explained: “Faced with a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, ‘the trial court may proceed as it never could under 12(b)(6) or Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. No. presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.'” Thornhill Pub. Co., 594 F.2d at 734 (quoting Mortenson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 549 F.2d 884, 891 (1977)). If a moving party presents a factual attack motion, “the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Savage, 343 F.3d at 1039 n.2 (citing St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Assoc. of Am. Med. Colleges v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778-79 (9th Cir. 2000) (same). Thus, the burden of proof remains with a plaintiff, who has “an affirmative obligation to support jurisdictional allegations with proof.” NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 614 (9th Cir. 2016).
The Court may take judicial notice of a fact that “is not subject to reasonable dispute because it (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201. “A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(c)(2).
Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of: (1) “a spreadsheet downloaded from PACER showing Plaintiff's cases filed in the Ninth Circuit and a separate list of cases filed in the Eastern District of California; (2) “complaints filed by P...
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