Gastineau v. Wright
| Decision Date | 19 January 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-1003.,09-1003. |
| Citation | 592 F.3d 747 |
| Parties | James GASTINEAU and Christy Gastineau, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David M. WRIGHT and Wright & Lerch, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Robert E. Duff (argued), Indiana Consumer Law Group, Lebanon, IN, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
John M. Mccrum (argued), Eichhorn & Eichhorn, Hammond, IN, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before KANNE and TINDER, Circuit Judges, and GRIESBACH, District Judge.1
This is an appeal by Robert Duff, attorney for the plaintiffs-appellants, from the district court's corrected order on plaintiffs' motions for attorney's fees. Following a settlement on the first scheduled day of trial for the sum of $45,045.77, Duff submitted a motion requesting $140,290.00 in fees.2 In its discretion, the district court determined that Duff's experience and performance warranted much less, awarding $52,305.00 in fees. Duff argues that the district court erred in determining a reasonable fee by reducing his billable rate and the number of hours billed. Because we find that the judge did not abuse his discretion in setting the amount of the fee, we affirm.
We review the district court's award of attorney's fees for an abuse of discretion, Laborers' Pension Fund v. Lay-Com, Inc., 580 F.3d 602, 615 (7th Cir.2009), and we review de novo the district court's legal conclusions and methodology for calculating the award, Anderson v. AB Painting & Sandblasting Inc., 578 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir.2009) (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 142 F.3d 409, 412-13 (7th Cir.1998)). An abuse of discretion occurs if the district court reaches erroneous conclusions of law or premises its holding "on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence." Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 491 F.3d 649, 654-55 (7th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the district court is in a better position to evaluate an attorney's merit in determining a reasonable fee, we review the court's fee award under a "highly deferential" version of the abuse-of-discretion standard. See Schlacher v. Law Offices of Phillip J. Rotche & Assocs., 574 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir.2009).
The touchstone for a district court's calculation of attorney's fees is the lodestar method, which is calculated by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended. Id. at 856 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-37, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)). If necessary, the district court has the flexibility to "adjust that figure to reflect various factors including the complexity of the legal issues involved, the degree of success obtained, and the public interest advanced by the litigation." Id. at 856-57. "The standard is whether the fees are reasonable in relation to the difficulty, stakes, and outcome of the case." Connolly v. Nat'l Sch. Bus. Serv., Inc., 177 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir.1999) (quoting Bankston v. Illinois, 60 F.3d 1249, 1256 (7th Cir.1995)).
Duff argues that the district court abused its discretion by lowering his hourly rate from $250 to $150 based on his lack of experience. Duff also contends that the court's additional reduction in the amount of hours reasonably billed constituted an impermissible double penalty.
In deciding a reduction was warranted, the district court observed that Duff became involved in the Gastineaus' case approximately three years after the action commenced, and was the third attorney to represent the Gastineaus. Despite Duff's asserted thirteen years of litigation experience and consumer law practice, this case represented his first Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") case to progress through discovery to trial; his only other FDCPA case resulted in a default judgment. Furthermore, in this case Duff assumed the Gastineaus' representation after substantial discovery work and motions practice had been completed. As the district court noted, the two affidavits that Duff offered in support of his rate are wholly inapposite. Moreover, the defendants' submission of an...
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