Gaston v. Co.
| Decision Date | 29 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:15-cv-13 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
| Parties | TYREE DAJUAN GASTON, Plaintiff, v. CO II GRIMER; LT. STEEDLY; SGT. PRATT; WARDEN GRAMIACK; NURSE BRAD; and COUNSELOR CHARMER, Defendants. |
Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Ware State Prison in Waycross, Georgia, filed a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contesting certain conditions of his confinement. The undersigned has conducted the requisite frivolity review of Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Based on that review, and for the reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS Plaintiff's right to privacy, stand-alone verbal threats, compensatory and punitive damages, and official capacity claims be DISMISSED. I also RECOMMEND Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Pratt, Gramiack, Regional Director for Ware State Prison, Valdosta State Prison Mental Health Staff, and Counselor Charmer be DISMISSED.1 I further RECOMMEND Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief be DENIED.
The undersigned ORDERS a copy of this Order and Plaintiff's Complaint be served upon Defendants Grimer, Brad, and Steedly. The Court provides additional instructions toPlaintiff and Defendants Grimer, Brad, and Steedly pertaining to the future litigation of this action, which the parties are urged to read and follow.
In any civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, Section 1915A requires the Court to screen the complaint for cognizable claims before or as soon as possible after docketing. The Court must dismiss the complaint or any portion of the complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) & (2).
In conducting this initial review, the Court must ensure that a prisoner plaintiff has complied with the mandates of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 & 1915A. However, in determining compliance, the Court shall be guided by the longstanding principle that pro se pleadings are entitled to liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Walker v. Dugger, 860 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir. 1988).
In addition, the Court is guided by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion in Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). In Mitchell, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the language contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which is nearly identical to that contained in the screening provisions at Section 1915A(b). As the language of Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) closely tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court held that the same standards for determining whether to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) should be applied to the initial review of prisoner complaints under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1490. While the court in Mitchell interpreted Section 1915(e), its interpretation guides this Court in applying the identicallanguage of Section 1915A. See also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007) ().
To prevent dismissal for failure to state a claim, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation omitted). A plaintiff must assert "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not" suffice. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Because "[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys[,]" they are liberally construed. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff asserts he was housed in the K-2 building in administrative segregation at Ware State Prison on January 29, 2015, and Defendants Grimer and Pratt conducted an unnecessary search of his cell. Plaintiff contends Defendant Grimer told him that he and Defendant Pratt wanted to see his genitalia. (Doc. 1, p. 10.) Plaintiff asserts Defendant Pratt sexually assaulted him by "palm[ing] Plaintiff's right buttock[.]" (Id.) Plaintiff avers Defendant Grimer also sexually assaulted him by "aggressively pull[ing]" on Plaintiff's penis. (Id.) Plaintiff maintains Defendant Grimer threatened to kill Plaintiff if he reported the sexual assault, but Plaintiff nevertheless reported the alleged assault. Plaintiff contends Defendant Brad, a nurse, examined him after the assault, and Defendant Brad threatened to bring disciplinary charges against Plaintiff if he reported the assault. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts he informed Defendant Brad and Defendant Steedly he wanted mental health assistance, in accordance with the Prison Rape Elimination Act's ("PREA") guidelines. However, Plaintiff states Defendants Brad and Steedlyinformed him that the Valdosta State Prison Mental Health staff for PREA ( Counselor Charmer), which handles PREA reports arising out of Ware State Prison, would refuse to see him. Plaintiff also states he wrote Defendant Gramiack and Defendant Regional Director for Ware State Prison regarding the foregoing incidents, and he requested mental health treatment and the removal of Defendants Grimer, Pratt, Brad, and Steedly. Plaintiff maintains these two Defendants failed to respond to his requests. (Id. at p. 11.)
Plaintiff also alleges Defendants Grimer and Steedly escorted him from the medical unit on February 2, 2015. Plaintiff avers Defendant Grimer sexually assaulted him again by grabbing both of his buttocks and dragging his tongue across Plaintiff's neck. Plaintiff contends Defendant Grimer told him he no longer cared whether Plaintiff reported the sexual assault which occurred three days prior. Plaintiff also contends Defendant Grimer threatened to kill him if he lost his job and told Plaintiff he "belong[ed] to him." (Id.) Plaintiff asserts he once again notified Defendant Gramiack and Defendant Regional Director of this sexual assault and requested mental health services for his psychological and emotional trouble, but the Defendants did not respond. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief.
Plaintiff's allegations implicate numerous theories of liability, and the undersigned addresses each of these theories in turn. The Court accepts Plaintiff's non-conclusory factual allegations as true, as it must at this stage.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes "that inmates have a constitutional right to bodily privacy and that the involuntary exposure of their genitals in the presence of members of the other sex states a claim for violation of privacy rights[.]" Caffey v. LimestoneCty., Ala., 243 F. App'x 505, 508 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024 (11th Cir. 1993)); see also Mitchell v. Stewart, 608 F. App'x 730, 733 (11th Cir 2015) (). However, a prisoner "does not state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation where there is only de minimis injury." Caffey, 243 F. App'x at 508 ().
Here, Plaintiff does not allege he was forced to expose his genitals in the presence of any female correctional officer. Rather, Plaintiff asserts Defendant Pratt touched his right buttock and Defendant Grimer pulled his penis in an aggressive manner on January 29, 2015, and that Defendant Grimer grabbed both of Plaintiff's buttocks on February 2, 2015. These actions easily could have occurred while Plaintiff was fully clothed. In addition, even if Plaintiff was not clothed when he was allegedly sexually assaulted, he was not forced to expose himself in the presence of a member of the opposite gender, which is the essence of a right to privacy claim under Fortner. See Baker v. Welch, No. 03Civ.2267(JSR)(AJP), 2003 WL 22901015, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2003) (); Jensen v. Satran, 633 F. Supp. 1187, 11910 (D.N.D. 1986) ().
Further, Plaintiff does not set forth any facts indicating he suffered any physical injury as a result of these alleged sexual assaults, let alone any physical injury resulting in more than a deminimis physical injury. Accordingly, Plaintiff's right to privacy claims against Defendants Pratt and Grimer should be DISMISSED.
Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants Pratt and Grimer sexually assaulted him appear to give rise to Eighth Amendment claims. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. It is a basic tenet of law that prison or jail officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they are deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to inmates. Marsh v. Butler Cty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1027 (11th Cir. 2001). "[A]n 'inmate has a constitutional right to be secure in [his] bodily integrity and free from attack by prison guards.'" Boyd v. Nichols, 616 F. Supp.2d 1331, 1339 (M.D....
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