Gaston v. Hazeltine
| Decision Date | 04 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-CV-896 JD |
| Parties | KEDRON GASTON, Plaintiff, v. JACKIE C. HAZELTINE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
On February 2, 2023, Plaintiff Kedron Gaston (“Kedron”) filed a second motion for partial summary judgment. In this motion, Kedron seeks summary judgment on the duty and breach of duty elements of her spoliation claim against Defendant Grange Mutual Casualty Company (“Grange”). For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant this motion in part and deny this motion in part.
On a foggy day in 2015, Plaintiff Kedron Gaston was a passenger in a car which collided with a stopped semi-truck driven by Jackie Hazeltine and owned by his employer Royal Paper Stock Company, Inc. Kedron and her mother, Jessica Gaston, were injured during the crash. (DE 12 ¶¶ 16, 61.) The driver of the car, Kedron's aunt Cheryl Koehler, was decapitated. (Id. ¶ 16; DE 63-8 at 116:24-117:1.) Due to her injuries, Jessica Gaston was unable to care for Kedron, causing Kedron to move into foster care. (DE 81-2 ¶ 6.)
When investigating the crash, Royal Paper and Hazeltine's insurer, Grange, hired Cooper Barrette Consulting and Adam Hyde to perform testing on the trailer lighting system of the semitruck. (DE 35-3 at 18; DE 41 at 2 ().) Hyde issued a report on March 1, 2016, which found that one of four lights on the back of the truck was not “functioning at the time of the inspection” and failed to illuminate. (DE 87-5 at 6.) This non-functional light was the third light from the left on the rear side of the truck (“Light Number 3”). Hyde noted that, during a “cursory inspection of the lights, [the bulb of Light Number 3] was found to be broken” and that “[u]pon further examination through the red lens, I found parts of the bulb unit were broken resting at the base of the unit.” (Id. at 7.) This initial inspection was not invasive or destructive. (Hyde Deposition, DE 81-3 at 161:3-6.) Hyde limited his inspection in this way because that was what Jennifer Davis, Grange's retained attorney, directed him to do. (Id. at 161:10-15.)
Davis then instructed Hyde to perform other testing. (Id. at 161:16-19.) Following this direction, Hyde conducted additional field testing on the rear facing lights on July 23, 2016. (DE 87-6 at 3.) Hyde examined the lights while still affixed to the truck before proceeding to remove the light assemblies from the truck. (Id. at 5-8.) Hyde then cut through the back side of the assembly of Light Number 3 to access and view the bulb and filaments. (Id. at 6.) According to Hyde, rather than being broken as he earlier reported, the bulb was found to be undamaged and intact. (Id. at 6-7.) Hyde stated that the filament displayed a condition known as “hot shock,” where during a crash “the ductile filament is suddenly accelerated and, due to the inertia, it stretches and uncoils.” (Id. at 11.) Partially relying on the hot shock, Hyde concluded that all “four taillights were illuminated at the scene of the crash.” (Id. at 13.)
The parties dispute the impact the July 23, 2016, testing had on the condition of the brake light evidence. According to Kedron's expert Paul Thogersen, Hyde failed to properly preserve the condition of the brake lights during this examination. (DE 81-5 ¶ 6.) For example, Thogersen finds that “the condition of the lighting connectors” was not preserved and that “[d]irt and dust deposits on the lamp housings were removed which removes and alters evidence of the connections to the lamps.” (Id.) Thogersen concludes that based on inconsistencies in Hyde's report, “it is impossible to draw conclusions about the status of the lamp at the time of the collision.” (Id. ¶ 7.) Defendant's expert, Erik Anderson, determined that there was sufficient evidence to determine if the right-inside taillight was energized and illuminated at the time of impact, finding that the “cutting of the plastic rear housing on [July 23, 2016] did not and does not prevent the examination and analysis of the bulb filaments for hot-shock.” (DE 87-1 at 15.)
On November 2, 2021, Plaintiff Kedron Gaston filed this lawsuit, bringing two claims: (1) negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress against Hazeltine and Royal Paper, which alleges that the stopped truck did not have active taillights or brake lights at the time of the accident and that there were no other mechanisms to alert approaching drivers of the truck's presence in the fog; and (2) spoliation of evidence against Grange, alleging that Hyde took the taillights and brake lights (“lighting system”) from the truck and performed destructive testing, thereby making crucial evidence unavailable. (DE 9 at 3, 11.)
Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment, which the Court denied on January 24, 2023. Then, on February 2, 2023, Kedron filed a second motion for partial summary judgment. This motion is now ripe for review.
On summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that there “is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The Court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, making every legitimate inference and resolving every doubt in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Summary judgment is not a tool to decide legitimately contested issues, and it may be granted only if no reasonable jury could decide in favor of the nonmoving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading, but must “marshal and present the court with the evidence she contends will prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). There must be more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the opposing party's position and “inferences relying on mere speculation or conjecture will not suffice.” Trade Fin. Partners, LLC v. AAR Corp., 573 F.3d 401, 407 (7th Cir. 2009); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Instead, the opposing party must have “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find” in his or her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Indiana recognizes spoliation as an independent tort, which “is analyzed either as a species of negligence or under the rubric of intentional interference with prospective or actual civil litigation.” J.S. Sweet Co. v. Sika Chem. Corp., 400 F.3d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Thompson ex rel. Thompson v. Owensby, 704 N.E.2d 134, 140 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998). A defendant is liable in Indiana for negligent spoliation if a plaintiff shows the other party alleged to have lost or suppressed the evidence owed a duty to the person bringing the spoliation claim to have preserved the material, “that the duty was breached, that [the plaintiff was] harmed by the breach, and ‘that the harm resulted in damages that can be proven with reasonable specificity.'” J.S. Sweet Co., 400 F.3d at 1034 (quoting Thompson, 704 N.E.2d at 140)).
In her motion, Kedron argues that partial summary judgment must be granted on the elements of duty and breach of duty in its spoliation claim. Before addressing Kedron's arguments on these elements, the Court must address an issue that neither party raised: whether Kedron should be permitted to file a successive motion for summary judgment.
(1) Successive motion for summary judgment
A district court may allow a party to file successive motions, particularly if there is a good reason. Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 1995). Allowing a successive motion for summary judgment is especially appropriate “if one of the following grounds exists: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence or an expanded factual record; and (3) need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Id. In considering whether to allow a successive motion, the Court also takes into account whether addressing the second motion promotes judicial economy. See Gordon v. Veneman, 61 Fed.Appx. 296, 298 (7th Cir. 2003) ().
Kedron's second motion for summary judgment does not present an intervening change in controlling law or a need to correct clear error. In her first motion for summary judgment, Kedron argued that Grange was collaterally estopped from relitigating the spoliation of the lighting system, based on prior findings adjudicated in a state trial court. (First Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, DE 33 at 6 ()). The Court denied this motion, explaining that the “same issue requirement [for collateral estoppel was] not met as to Grange” because the state trial court did “not mention Grange at all,” but “only issued findings as to . . . Mr. Hazeltine and Royal Paper.” (DE 77 at 11-12.)
Kedron now asserts that the record supports granting summary judgment as to duty and breach of duty on the merits. (DE 78 at 3.) In no way does this successive ...
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