Gaston v. Richardson
Decision Date | 01 December 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 71-1056.,71-1056. |
Citation | 451 F.2d 461 |
Parties | Reba U. GASTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Elliott L. RICHARDSON, Secretary, Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Robert H. Gorman, Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellant ; B. Wm. Heidkamp, Cincinnati, Ohio, on brief.
J. T. Frankenberger, Asst. U. S. Atty., Lexington, Ky., for defendant-appellee ; Eugene E. Siler, Jr., U. S. Atty., Lexington, Ky., on brief.
Before MILLER and KENT, Circuit Judges, and O'SULLIVAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
O'SULLIVAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Reba U. Gaston appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Covington Division, dismissing her complaint whereby she sought an award of social security benefits. Her claim had been denied by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. Claiming to be unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity" as the result of an industrial accident which occurred on February 28, 19581, plaintiff, on August 8, 1966, filed an application for disability benefits. Her application was denied initially on December 9, 1966, and again, upon reconsideration, by order entered on June 21, 1967. In the initial notice of denial, appellant was told :
In the Notice of Reconsideration Determination, dated June 21, 1967, she was again told that her application was denied, and was also advised :
No request for a hearing before an examiner was made, nor was any appeal or review of the June 21, 1967 Reconsideration Determination attempted.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, appellant on June 28, 1968, filed another application. This gave the same date for the onset of disability, February 28, 1959, and described her disability as "severe pain in back, arms and legs." She advised in this application that she was receiving Workmen's Compensation benefits. No mention was made that a previous application had been denied. No new evidence, medical or otherwise, was proffered. An initial disposition of the second application was made by an order entered August 5, 1968, asserting as its basis:
(Emphasis supplied.)
At that time and by that order Mrs. Gaston was told, inter alia:
On January 28, 1969, appellant filed a Request for Reconsideration, advising that she had an attorney and naming him. The form called for submission of or reference to any additional evidence. To this, the answer was "none." On February 5, 1969, both Mrs. Gaston and her attorney were notified of the denial of the Request for Reconsideration and the reasons therefor. A letter to appellant's attorney told of his client's right to a hearing before an examiner, and that:
"At a hearing she can appear in person, submit any additional evidence, bring witnesses in her behalf and be represented by counsel."
A request for a hearing before an examiner was made and the matter came on for such hearing before Charles M. Gowdy, Hearing Examiner. On March 14, 1969, this examiner entered an Order of Dismissal which made reference to the 1967 denial of benefits to appellant and concluded:
"In view of the fact that the claimant last met the special earnings requirement for disability purposes on March 31, 1965 and all issues were considered in prior determinations from which no appeal was taken, this request for hearing filed on January 9, 1969 is hereby dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata, pursuant to the 1965 provisions of the Social Security Act and the clarifications of the 1967 amendments to the Act."
The Appeals Council affirmed this action of the examiner on May 1, 1969, and the District Court proceeding before us was commenced by a Complaint filed June 30, 1969.2 When faced with a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, appellant's principal reliance was upon the Administrative Procedure Act which in 5 U.S.C. § 706 permits review of any agency ruling which is found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." District Judge Mac Swinford would not pass upon this contention without having the full administrative record before him. Accordingly, he directed the Secretary to file a transcript of the proceedings which had been had relating to plaintiff's claim. Gaston v. Finch, 312 F.Supp. 1327, 1330 (E.D.Ky. 1970). In that opinion, Judge Swinford expressed his doubt as to the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act to proceedings under the Social Security law. Upon the filing and his examination of the transcript returned to him, he held that they disclosed no "abuse of discretion" on the part of the Secretary, even if the Secretary's action was subject to review under the Administrative Procedures Act. He concluded also that res judicata foreclosed further prosecution of appellant's application. We are of the view that what was done by the Secretary and by the District Judge in this matter was procedurally correct.
Appellant's main contention is that res judicata cannot attach until there has been a hearing. This is stated in appellant's brief as follows :
"The Doctrine of Res Judicata under the terms of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 405(h), does not attach until an administrative hearing has been held, and therefore, defendant\'s motion to dismiss should have been overruled by the District Court."
But no request for such a hearing was made after the June 21, 1967, Reconsideration Determination. By the provisions of 20 C.F.R. § 404.916, such failure to request a hearing rendered the Reconsideration Determination final and binding. The mentioned section provides:
The claimant again sought benefits after the denial of her first application in the form of a second application for disability benefits. The second claim was denied and the request for a hearing was refused by the hearing examiner, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.937(a) which states :
"(a) Res judicata. Where there has been a previous determination or decision by the Secretary with respect to the rights of the same party on the same facts pertinent to the same issue or issues which has become final either by judicial affirmance or, without judicial consideration, upon the claimant\'s failure timely to request reconsideration, hearing, or review, or to commence a civil action with respect to...
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