Gaston v. State

• Decision Date: 29 March 1991
• Citation: 581 So.2d 548
• Parties: Willie Ralph GASTON v. STATE. CR 89-431.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 548

581 So.2d 548

Willie Ralph GASTON v. STATE.

CR 89-431.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

March 29, 1991.

Michael A. Givens, Sylacauga, for appellant.

James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Yvonne A. Henderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

TAYLOR, Judge.

The appellant, Willie Ralph Gaston, was convicted of the murder of Diane Bell, a violation of § 13A-6-2, Code of Alabama 1975. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

The state's evidence tended to show that on the evening of December 30, 1989 James Nixon discovered the body of the victim, Diane Bell, near the Anniston Army Depot near Lincoln, Alabama. Around 4:40 on the afternoon of December 30, 1989, Mr. Nixon, a game warden employed by the depot, heard a shot and about a minute later heard two more shots. He went to investigate and discovered a woman's body in the middle of the road. Mr. Nixon had driven past that same area approximately 20 minutes earlier and had not seen a body. He then called the Talladega Police Department.

The victim had been shot twice; one shot entered the right side of her face and lodged in her sinuses and the other shot entered her right upper leg. The victim also had 24 lacerations, which were the result of extensive blows on her face and head. Alcohol was present in the victim's blood. Cocaine was also found in her system, after a urinalysis was done. Kenneth Warner, of the State Department of Forensic Sciences, testified that either the shot to the head or the extensive blows, would have been sufficient to cause her death. He stated at trial that he felt her death was caused by these injuries since they were all inflicted prior to her death. Mr. Warner also stated that the hairs taken from the victim were consistent with hairs found on a gun owned by the appellant.

The same day, approximately one hour after the body was found, a burning car was discovered about 18 miles from where the body had been found. Several officers who arrived at the scene stated that they smelled gasoline. Blood was found on the passenger side of the car and on the rear bumper. A bloody rag was also found next to the car. Officer Bush stated that a woman at the scene told them the owner of the car was her brother-in-law, the appellant. Three officers went to the home of the appellant, which was approximately one block from the car. A woman who identified herself as the appellant's wife answered the door and told them that her husband was in the bedroom. The appellant told them to come into the room. The appellant eventually came to the door of the room and he was read his Miranda rights. The appellant was taken to the police station and arrested on the charge of failing to register as an ex-felon who had committed a sex crime. One of the officers observed blood on the appellant's arm. Fibers found under the appellant's fingernails matched those taken from the body of the victim.

DNA testimony was admitted to match the blood on the bumper and on the rag found by the car, to the victim. An expert witness, Ms. Vining, of Lifecodes Laboratories, testified that the blood found on the bumper and rag, was subjected to many technical tests dealing with DNA matching and, was found to be the blood of the victim. The appellant raises four issues on appeal.

I

The appellant initially argues that the prosecution violated the rule of Batson ¹ in striking prospective black jurors from the venire. The appellant argues that the prosecution failed to provide race-neutral reasons for its strikes. After a review, we conclude that the prosecution's reasons for the strikes were race-neutral.

"An appellate court may reverse the trial court's determination that the prosecutor's peremptory challenges were not motivated by intentional discrimination only if that determination is " 'clearly erroneous.' " Mitchell v. State, 579 So.2d 45 (Ala.Cr.App.1991), citing Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609, 624 (Ala.Cr.App.1987).

The prosecutor gave the following reasons for striking prospective jurors: he struck juror number 131 because he had been prosecuted by the district attorney and his brother was recently convicted of rape and was currently in prison. The prosecutor struck number 43 because he had a relative that the district attorney's office had prosecuted, was unemployed, and the prosecutor felt that he could not understand the testimony concerning DNA testing which was a significant part of the case. (The prosecutor stated that he struck white jurors for the same reason regarding the DNA testimony.) Juror number 7 was struck because her brother had been prosecuted twice. Number 47 was struck because he was related to a family in which the district attorney had prosecuted approximately 50 people who were "kin" to him. Number 114 was struck because a number of her relatives had been prosecuted. Number 61 was struck because she had recently been arrested by the Talladega Police Department and the prosector stated that she had a mental disorder that he felt would make it difficult for her to understand the DNA testimony. Prospective juror 9 was struck because of three prior DUI convictions. Juror number 48 was struck because she had gotten into trouble with the police in Talladega and there was evidence that she did not like police officers, and some of her relatives had been prosecuted by the district attorney's office. Number 51 was struck because of her known association with an individual who is heavily involved in drugs. We believe that all of the reasons given were valid race-neutral reasons. See Bedford v. State, 548 So.2d 1097 (Ala.Cr.App.1989) (unemployment is a valid race-neutral reason); Powell v. State, 548 So.2d 590 (Ala.Cr.App.1988) aff'd, 548 So.2d 605 (Ala.1989); (family members charged with crimes, connection with criminal activity and dissatisfaction with police are valid race-neutral reason); Hyter v. State, 545 So.2d 194 (Ala.Cr.App.1988) (DUI convictions valid reason); Ex parte Lynn, 543 So.2d 709 (Ala.1988, cert. denied, Lynn v. Alabama, 493 U.S. 945, 110 S.Ct. 351, 107 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); (fact that prospective juror has been prosecuted by the district attorney valid reason). See also Pollard v. State, 549 So.2d 593 (Ala.Cr.App.1989); Jackson v. State, 549 So.2d 616 (Ala.Cr.App.1989) (fact that prospective juror had several prior convictions is valid race-neutral reason); Warner v. State, [Ms. 3 Div. 945, February 23, 1990] (Ala.Cr.App.1990); (physical or mental handicaps which may affect the case may be sufficient reason).

We note that the prosecutor made several references in his explanations indicating that he struck white jurors for the same reasons. "There is no evidence of either " 'disparate treatment' " or " 'disparate examination of members of the venire' " which would tend to indicate racial discrimination." Mitchell, 579 So.2d at 47. "In the instant case, the prosecutor had the burden of articulating clear, specific, and legitimate reasons for the strikes, which relate to the case, and which are nondiscriminatory." Williams v. State, 548 So.2d 501, 504 (Ala.Cr.App.1988). We believe that the prosecution met its burden of articulating race-neutral reasons.

II

The appellant next argues that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for mistrial because the prosecutor failed to provide him with the oral statements he had made to police officers. The state argues that since there was never a ruling on the motion for production, the appellant failed to preserve any issue challenging the failure of the state to produce any statements made by the appellant.

In the instant case, defense counsel filed a motion for production on July 20, 1989. This was seven months prior to the commencement of trial. The record contains no answer by the prosecution and no ruling by the trial court. As this court stated in Jackson v. State, 484 So.2d 1174 (Ala.Cr.App.1985):

"In a factually similar case, this court, per the Honorable Joseph J. Mullins, Retired Circuit Judge, concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion when, on the day of trial, it denied the defense counsel's motion to produce and suppress. Wilson v. State, 395 So.2d 1116, 1118 (Ala.Cr.App.1981). In reaching this conclusion, the court stated the following:

" 'The motion to produce, and the motion to suppress were filed with the clerk of the Circuit Court on May 15, 1979, and a copy of each sent to the District and Assistant District Attorney for Chambers County. The motions were not called to the attention of the trial court, nor was an order setting them down for a hearing requested by counsel for the appellant until after the case was called for trial on May 29, 1980. Among the reasons for pre-trial motions to produce, or to suppress, are to avoid delay and undue interruption during the trial. They should be disposed of before the trial date. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's written motions to produce and suppress. [Citations omitted.]' Id. (Emphasis added)."

484 So.2d at 1179. See also Donahoo v. State, 552 So.2d 887 (Ala.Cr.App.1989). This court went on further to say in Jackson, that " 'review on appeal is limited to matters on which rulings are invoked at the trial level.' " 484 So.2d at 1180.

We are mindful of the fact that "Ordinarily, judges order that the defense attorney be given a copy of the defendant's statement, or district attorneys give it without being ordered to do so, as a matter of fundamental fairness, or with the expectation that such would eventually be deemed essential to due process." Peal v. State, 491 So.2d 991, 994 (Ala.Cr.App.1985). However, there was no ruling on the motion in the instant case.

Furthermore, we believe that the appellant suffered no prejudice, for several reasons. Initially we note that the appellant made several statements to several different law enforcement officials. During the suppression hearing, which was held to suppress...