Gates Rubber Co. v. Cantrell
Decision Date | 19 April 1996 |
Citation | 678 So.2d 754 |
Parties | 11 IER Cases 1125 GATES RUBBER COMPANY v. Phillip CANTRELL. 1941438. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Cary Schwimmer of Young & Perl, P.C., Memphis, Tennessee, Grant A. Wright of Ashe, Tanner, Moore & Wright, Tuscumbia, for Appellant.
J. Tony Glenn, Russellville, for Appellee.
Pursuant to Rule 5, Ala.R.App.P., the defendant, Gates Rubber Company ("Gates"), appeals from an interlocutory order denying its motion to dismiss the plaintiff Phillip Cantrell's retaliatory discharge claim. The issue is whether, as a matter of law, Cantrell's claim is precluded by the language of a prior settlement agreement between the parties.
On August 19, 1990, Cantrell received an on-the-job injury while employed by Gates. Based on this injury, Cantrell made a worker's compensation claim. On June 24, 1994, Cantrell and Gates entered into a written settlement of that claim. The settlement agreement provided:
(Emphasis added.)
On the same day the agreement was executed by the parties, June 24, 1994, the trial court entered an order approving the settlement. Nine months later, on March 24, 1995, Cantrell filed this action against Gates, seeking damages for an alleged violation of the "retaliatory discharge" provision at Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-11.1, a part of the Workers' Compensation Act. 1 Gates moved for a dismissal of this claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala.R.Civ.P., for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Gates argued specifically that the claim was barred by the earlier settlement agreement.
In support of its motion to dismiss, Gates submitted a copy of the settlement agreement, which the trial court considered in ruling on the motion to dismiss. Because the settlement agreement was a matter outside the pleadings, we understand the trial court to have treated Gates's Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a Rule 56 motion for a summary judgment. See Graveman v. Wind Drift Owners' Ass'n, Inc., 607 So.2d 199 (Ala.1992) ( ).
In most cases, perhaps, the critical issue in determining whether a summary judgment motion was properly granted or properly denied relates to whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988) ( ). Here, however, the material facts are not in dispute. The issue here is simply whether the language of the settlement agreement entitles Gates to a judgment as a matter of law.
In denying Gates's motion, the trial court held simply that "the plaintiff's claim for retaliatory discharge is not barred by his Worker's Compensation settlement agreement." Cantrell argues that the trial court was correct in so holding, because, he says, the agreement only released Gates from paying "vocational rehabilitation benefits" and "compensation" benefits, "compensation" having a meaning, he says, consistent with the definition found at § 25-5-1(1).
Section 25-5-1(1) contains one of many definitions found at the beginning of the Workers' Compensation Act. In pertinent part, it defines "compensation," as that word is used within the provisions of the Act, see § 25-5-1, as "[t]he money benefits to be paid on account of [work-related] injury or death." The plaintiff says that he was releasing Gates from liability only for this type of benefits when he released Gates from liability for "compensation." Damages payable on a retaliatory discharge claim, says the plaintiff, would not fit within this definition of "compensation," and thus, he says, that claim was not within the matters settled by the agreement.
The language of the settlement agreement, settling claims as to "any and all liability now accrued or hereafter to accrue for compensation and vocational rehabilitation benefits," is not substantially different from the language this Court examined in Sanders v. Southern Risk Services, 603 So.2d 994 (Ala.1992). In Sanders, this Court examined a settlement petition, which stated the terms agreed to by the parties in settlement of a...
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...workers' compensation claim giving rise to the release. Sanders v. Southern Risk Servs., 603 So.2d 994 (Ala.1992); Gates Rubber Co. v. Cantrell, 678 So.2d 754 (Ala.1996); and Walton v. Beverly Enters.-Alabama, Inc., 4 So.3d 537, 545 (Ala.Civ.App.2008). Based on those cases, the trial court ......
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