Gates v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi.
Decision Date | 28 September 2017 |
Docket Number | Case No. 15-cv-1394 |
Parties | FRED GATES, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION of the CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Fred Gates brings this action against his employer Defendant Board of Education of the City of Chicago for age and race discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Currently before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment [59]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion [59] is granted. The Court will enter final judgment and close the case. Finally, as a housekeeping matter, document [60] is improperly labeled as a motion, when it is in fact an exhibit to Defendant's Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) Statement of Material Facts. Therefore, document [60] should be terminated as a motion.
The Court takes the relevant facts from the parties' Local Rule 56.1 statements of undisputed material facts and supporting exhibits: [59-2], [71], and [80]. The Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party—here, Plaintiff. Before discussing those facts, the Court turns to the requirements of Local Rule 56.1.
Local Rule 56.1 requires a party moving for summary judgment to submit a statement of material facts as to which the movant contends there is no genuine issue and entitles the movant to judgment as a matter of law. Each party opposing a motion for summary judgment is then required to file "any opposing affidavits and other materials referred to in [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)]" and a "concise response" to the movant's statement of facts containing "any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials." L.R. 56.1(b)(1), (3). "A general denial is insufficient to rebut a movant's factual allegations; the nonmovant must cite specific evidentiary materials justifying the denial." Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 584 (N.D. Ill. 2000). Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) is not satisfied by "purely argumentative denials," id., or "evasive denials that do not fairly meet the substance of the material facts asserted," Bordelon v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2000). To the extent that a response to a statement of material fact provides only extraneous or argumentative information, this response will not constitute a proper denial of the fact, and the fact is admitted. See Graziano v. Vill. of Oak Park, 401 F. Supp. 2d 918, 936 (N.D. Ill. 2005). Similarly, to the extent that a statement of fact contains a legal conclusion or otherwise unsupported statement, including a fact that relies upon inadmissible hearsay, such a fact is disregarded. Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 1997). "The purpose of the 56.1 statement is to identify for the Court the evidence supporting a party's factual assertions in an organized manner[;] it is not intended as a forum for factual or legal argument." Malec, 191 F.R.D. at 585.
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Facts does not comply with these requirements. Many of Plaintiff's "concise responses" do not directly address Defendant'sstatement of facts but rather amount to lengthy recitations of unrelated allegations, some more than one page long. See, e.g., [71] at ¶ 8. In addition, many of Plaintiff's responses set forth improper arguments, misrepresent the record, and are so repetitive that any relevant facts or responses are obfuscated in a deluge of unrelated or irrelevant assertions. In fact, it appears that Plaintiff has more or less copied most, if not all, of his Statements of Additional Fact and pasted them into his responses to Defendant's fact statements with little or no editing to suit the actual substance of the fact statements.
Nevertheless, the Court will exercise its discretion in the direction of leniency and consider the portions of Plaintiff's responses that arguably meet the requirements of the local and federal rules. Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1169 (7th Cir. 2013) ( ). In doing so, the Court disregards denials that do more than negate its opponent's fact statements—that is, it is improper for a party to smuggle in new facts into its response to a party's Rule 56.1 statement of fact. See, e.g., Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643 (7th Cir. 2008); Tolson v. City of Chicago, 2016 WL 1043326, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2016).1
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. "When we cite as undisputed a statement of fact that a party has attempted to dispute, it reflects our determination that the evidence cited in the response does not show that the fact is in genuine dispute." King v. Chapman, 2013 WL 6709623, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2013).
Plaintiff, an African American man born in 1965 (currently 52), has been employed as a building engineer for Defendant since 2004. Plaintiff is a member of Operating Engineers Union 399 and Local 143, which are operating engineers' unions. [71] (Additional Facts) at ¶ 6. In 2010, Plaintiff (then 45 years old) was hired to work at William C. Goudy Technology Academy ("Goudy") by Principal Pamela Brandt ("Brandt"). While at Goudy, Plaintiff held the only engineer position available at the school. From his date of hire until December 2012, Plaintiff reported directly to Brandt, and Brandt evaluated Plaintiff's performance. In a performance review dated June 12, 2012, Brandt gave Plaintiff an overall rating of "Outstanding" and an overall evaluation percentage of 98%. See [59-2] at ¶ 2; [56-19] (6/12/2012 Educational Support Personnel Performance Evaluation Record). In December 2012, Rafael Rivera ("Rivera")became Plaintiff's supervisor. See [59-2] at ¶ 3. Rivera's title was Facilities Manager, and in that role he supervised engineering work at sixteen schools. As a result, Rivera had little in-person contact with Plaintiff, seeing him approximately three times per month. Id. at ¶ 4.
In November 2012, 24 iPads disappeared from Goudy. Before their disappearance, the iPads were in a room that required a master key to enter, and therefore everyone who had a master key—20 staff members including Plaintiff—was interviewed in the ensuing investigation. In addition, Brandt asked Plaintiff to assist investigators with the search of the school because Plaintiff knew the school very well. Id. at ¶ 34.
Plaintiff was interviewed sometime in late January or February 2013. After his interview, he went to Brandt's office where he became emotional and started crying about the investigation because he felt that he was being "wrongly accused of stealing" the iPads. [59-2] at ¶ 37; see also [1] at Count I ¶ 13, Count III ¶ 12, Count IV ¶ 12, Count V ¶ 12; [59-2] at ¶ 44. Through his verified responses to interrogatories, Plaintiff elaborated that, during this conversation, Brandt See [59-2] at ¶ 54; see also [59-7] (Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's Interrogatories) at 1. Later, at his deposition, Plaintiff testified:
[59-5] (F. Gates Dep. I) at 64:12-24. Brandt denied knowledge of credit reports being pulled in the course of the investigation. [59-2] at ¶ 36. In any event, the parties agree that Defendant's investigator questioned Plaintiff and a 33-year-old white custodian about past judgments against them as part of their interviews. Id. at ¶¶ 36, 40-41. At some point around that time, Plaintiff complained to the school clerk that he felt he was being blamed for the missing iPads because of his race. See [71] (Additional Facts) at ¶ 27; [59-21] (M. Rodriguez-Hatfield Dep.) at 50:2-12. Ultimately, the iPads were not recovered and the investigation concluded that the technology coordinator at Goudy was the responsible party. [59-2] at ¶ 47; [71] (Additional Facts) at ¶ 12; see also [59-15] (Investigative Memorandum). The parties agree that, following the iPad investigation, the relationship between Plaintiff and Brandt, which the parties describe had been "a great professional relationship," deteriorated. [59-2] at ¶¶ 2, 31; [71] (Additional Facts) at ¶ 16. Also following the investigation, Plaintiff asked Rivera to "send him back to the West Side" because of the iPad accusations, although no transfer ultimately was effectuated at this time for administrative reasons. [71] (Additional Facts) at ¶ 29.
In January 2013—during the iPad investigation—Rivera identified Plaintiff as one of his best engineers. Later, in June 2013, Rivera gave Plaintiff a performance evaluation, wherein he rated Plaintiff at 100%. [59-2] at ¶¶ 3-4. However, Plaintiff testified that at his performance review meeting, Rivera allegedly said that Plaintiff would not be promoted because of his age and race. [71] (Additional...
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