Gates v. Capozza, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-2392
| Decision Date | 01 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-2392 |
| Parties | JOHN RUSSELL GATES, Petitioner v. MARK CAPOZZA, ET AL., Respondents |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Nealon)
On November 21, 2014, Petitioner, John Russell Gates, an individual currently on parole, instituted the above-captioned action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). That petition was then transferred to this Court on December 9, 2014. (Doc. 6). Petitioner argues that 1) his sentence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions; 2) his sentence exceeded the maximum sentence for the offense; 3) the "minimum sentence of fifty-four (54) months, [is] thirty-eight (38) months, and two (2) consecutive years probation in excess of the upper range of the standard guideline sentence;" and 4) the sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing a excessive aggregate sentence for the offenses charged and based the sentence on "illegal and improper considerations." (Doc. 1, pp. 5, 7, 8, 10). Petitioner seeks an order vacating his sentences, "reverse and remand the case" to the trial court, allow Petitioner to withdraw his guilty plea, and/or releasing Petitioner for time served. (Doc. 1, p. 15). For the reasons stated below, the petition will be denied.
On or about August 6, 2012, Pennsylvania State Police arrested Petitioner and charged him with eight (8) counts of theft by unlawful taking, eight (8) counts of theft by deception, nine (9) counts of theft by failure to make required disposition of funds received, eight (8) counts of misapplication of entrusted property, and two (2) counts of bad checks. Pa. v. Gates, CP-31-CR-0415-2012.1 These charges arose from allegations that between April 1, 2011, and December 31, 2011, Petitioner, a former attorney, had received $455,158.00 from nine (9) families and failed to distribute those funds as required. Id.
On February 13, 2013, Petitioner entered guilty pleas to nine (9) counts of theft by failure to make required disposition of funds pursuant to 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3927(a). (Doc. 19-6, p. 2); Gates, CP-31-CR-0415-2012; Pa. v. Gates, 1255 MDA2013, at p. 1 (filed Aug. 20, 2014).2 The remaining twenty-six (26) charges were nolle prossed. Gates, 1255 MDA 2013, at p. 2. On May 17, 2013, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of fifty-four (54) months to one hundred and forty-four (144) months imprisonment. Gates, 1255 MDA 2013, at pp. 1-2. The sentencing court then found Petitioner eligible for the Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive ("RRRI"), which reduced Petitioner's minimum sentence to forty-five (45) months. Id. Petitioner also was ordered to pay $455,158.31 in restitution. (Doc. 19-6, p. 2); (Doc. 19-9, pp. 24-27); Gates, 1255 MDA 2013, at p. 1.
On August 20, 2014, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the sentencing court's judgement and granted Petitioner's counsel's petition to withdraw. Gates, 1255 MDA 2013, at pp. 1-2. In reaching that determination, the Superior Court noted that Petitioner raised twelve (12) issues on appeal. Id. at p. 4. According to the Superior Court, "[s]everal of those issues concern the adequacy of the trial judge's oral guilty plea colloquy." Id. Petitioner claimed "the judge's colloquy did not comply with legal requirements showing that his conduct proved all the elements of the offenses for which he pled guilty and thatthe colloquy failed to set forth sufficient facts to support the criminal elements." Gates, 1255 MDA 2013, at p. 4. The Superior Court initially found that Petitioner waived those claims," but determined that "even if [the Superior Court] did not deem these issues waived, [the Superior Court] would conclude that they are frivolous." Id. According to the Superior Court, "[a] review of [Petitioner's] oral and written guilty plea colloquies demonstrates that the judge complied with the applicable rules regarding the tender of pleas and plea agreements." Id. (citing PA. R. CRIM. P. 590). Specifically, the Superior Court noted that the sentencing court "discussed the nature of the charges brought against" Petitioner, and "the deputy attorney general gave detailed accounts of each of [Petitioner's] conduct in relation to the elements of the offenses for which he pled guilty and that there was a sufficient factual basis for this plea." Id. at p. 5. "Accordingly," the Superior Court concluded, "the oral plea colloquy sufficiently set forth [Petitioner's] conduct in relation to the elements of the offenses for which he pled guilty and that there was a sufficient factual basis for his plea." Id.
The Superior Court also noted that Id. "First, [Petitioner] claim[ed] that the court erred in sentencing him on nine counts consecutively, rather than running all nine counts concurrently to one anotherbecause they are all part of 'a single scheme.'" Gates, 1255 MDA 2013, at p. 6. The Superior Court stated that "[t]he imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent sentences lies within the sound discretion of the sentencing court." Id. The Superior Court noted that "[h]ere, nine individual victims and their families were affected by [Petitioner's] actions, with the total theft exceeding $450,000." Id. at p. 8. Further, "[t]he client funds that [Petitioner] misappropriated for personal use included: (1) proceeds from decedents' estates he represented; (2) money that should have been distributed to a nursing home for the care of a client's father; and (3) money held in escrow for clients." Id. The Superior Court also noted that Petitioner "signed a written plea colloquy acknowledging the extent of his criminal actions, indicating that he understood the factual nature of the offense to which he was pleading guilty and that he was aware of the permissible range of sentences and/or fines that could be imposed." Id. "Moreover," the Superior Court found, Petitioner "stated that he understood that the trial court could impose consecutive sentences." Id. "Under such circumstances," the Superior Court concluded that:
we do not find [Petitioner's] aggregate sentence of 54 to 144 months' imprisonment (consisting of nine counts running consecutively) is excessive, especially where the Commonwealth agreed to nolle prosse 26 criminal charges and the sentence for each individual count was within the standardrange of the guidelines.
Gates, 1255 MDA 2013, at p. 8 ().
The Superior Court also denied Petitioner's claim that "pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 3902 his theft offenses should have constituted a single offense for sentencing purposes." Id. The Superior Court found that while Petitioner "pled guilty to only one theft offense," located at 18 Pa.C.S. § 3927(a), "[t]he fact that [Petitioner] was sentenced on nine separate counts for a single theft offense is legally permissible and does not violate section 3902." Gates, 1255 MDA 2013, at p. 9 (comparing Fiascki, 886 A.2d 261 with Pa. v. Haines, 442 A.2d 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)).
Additionally, the Superior Court rejected Petitioner's claims that:
his sentence is illegal for the following reasons: (1) the prosecution committed "sentencing manipulation" by separating one crime into nine counts and (2) several of the counts should have merged, for sentencing purposes, into the one offense as
Id. at pp. 9-10. As to sentencing manipulation, the Superior Court concluded thatPetitioner was not entrapped into committing additional acts "beyond the monies he misappropriated from his first client-victim." Gates, 1255 MDA 2013, at p. 10. "In short, the prosecution or government had no involvement in encouraging his criminal conduct or prolonging his illegal actions beyond the first criminal act in April 2011." Id. "Therefore," the Superior Court determined, "this claim has no merit." Id.
In regards to Petitioner's claim that the "nine counts should have merged for sentencing purposes," the Superior Court found that Petitioner "failed to properly dispose of the funds of nine clients, nine separate times." Id. at p. 11. "As a result, his conduct was not part of a single criminal episode; rather, he violated section 3927 each time he committed theft against each of his nine victims." Id. "Therefore," the Superior Court concluded, "merger, as defined in section 9765, is inapplicable." Id.
Section 2254 confers jurisdiction on the United States district courts to issue a "writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
As states above, Petitioner argues that 1) his sentence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions; 2) his sentence exceeded the maximum sentence for the offense; 3) the "minimum sentence of fifty-four (54) months, [is] thirty-eight (38) months, and two (2) consecutive years probation in excess of the upper range of the standard guideline sentence;" and 4) the sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing a excessive aggregate sentence for the offenses charged and based the sentence on "illegal and improper considerations." (Doc. 1, pp. 5, 7, 8, 10). Of these four (4) claims, Respondent only raises a question as to whether Petitioner's double jeopardy...
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