Gates v. Collier

• Decision Date: 14 May 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-1844,79-1844
• Citation: 616 F.2d 1268
• Parties: Nazareth GATES et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. John COLLIER, Superintendent of the Mississippi State Penitentiary, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1268

616 F.2d 1268

Nazareth GATES et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. John COLLIER, Superintendent of the Mississippi State Penitentiary, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 79-1844.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

May 14, 1980.

P. Roger Googe, Jr., Peter M. Stockett, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Jackson, Miss., for defendants-appellants.

Carmack M. Blackmon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Baton Rouge, La., for State of Louisiana, amicus curiae.

Frank R. Parker, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Jackson, Miss., for Gates et al.

Stephen P. Berzon, San Francisco, Cal., William E. Rittenburg, New Orleans, La., Danial Yohalem, Marion W. Edelman, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs in Gary W. v. State of La., amici curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.

Before BROWN, HILL and RANDALL, Circuit Judges.

JAMES C. HILL, Circuit Judge:

This Court is not unanimous in its resolution of the two issues presented. All of us agree on the resolution of the issue presented in Part I. However, in Part II, Judges Brown and Randall concur with Judge Hill dissenting. ¹

This litigation over conditions at Mississippi's Parchman Penitentiary began in 1971. In 1974 we affirmed the district court's finding that various practices existing at Parchman violated the constitutional rights of inmates. 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974). The succeeding 5 years of litigation primarily involved the issue of attorneys' fees. In our most recent consideration of this case we affirmed awards of attorneys' fees plus expenses in favor of the plaintiffs and reversed the district court's order denying fees for appellate proceedings. 559 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1977). On January 25, 1979, the district court entered an order reaffirming its original award and awarding fees for appellate work. Two aspects of that order are now challenged by the defendants. First, the order directs that Mississippi's Auditor and Treasurer be added as defendants and that the other defendants submit a requisition to the Auditor for the issuance of a warrant upon the Treasurer to satisfy the judgment out of funds appropriated for the operation of Parchman or out of any other funds subject to the control of the Treasurer. Second, the order adds, to the principal amounts owing for attorneys' fees and other costs, post-judgment interest at the rate of 8% per annum. ²

I. The Directive to Pay

Defendants contend that the district court acted outside the scope of its authority in ordering the State Auditor to issue a warrant upon the State Treasurer and ordering the State Treasurer in turn to satisfy the judgment. We are directed to several provisions of the Mississippi Code which limit the authority of the State Treasurer to disburse state funds. In particular, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-45-5 (1972) prohibits the satisfaction of any judgment against the State "except by an appropriation therefor by the legislature." ³ The district court's order, it is urged, is contrary to the laws of Mississippi and requires the State Auditor and the State Treasurer to violate these valid laws. Thus, we are urged to hold that, unless the Mississippi statutes are declared unconstitutional, these plaintiffs must simply wait until the State voluntarily satisfies the judgment. ⁴

The awards which the district court has ordered the defendants to satisfy out of state funds were made pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988. In providing statutory authority for the award of attorneys' fees to successful civil rights claimants, Congress was acting pursuant to the enforcement powers conferred on it by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-94, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2575-76, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978). Hutto made it clear that, by exercising its power under Section 5, Congress successfully abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. ⁵ Thus, it is now beyond dispute that a federal district court has the authority to order that attorneys' fees be paid out of a state's treasury. The defendants do not disagree. Their position is, in effect: you can order us to pay, but you can't make us pay if we don't want to.

Neither Hutto nor the legislative history of the Act address the question of how to make an unwilling state or its officials satisfy a judgment for attorneys' fees. This is not surprising however, for it has never been the practice of Congress, when providing a statutory basis for the recovery of money damages or costs including attorneys' fees, to specify in the same legislation the appropriate means of enforcing the judgment. In all likelihood, Congress assumed it was unnecessary to consider the subject because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains a provision for the execution of district court judgments, Fed.R.Civ.P. 69, and a provision authorizing the court to appoint an individual to do any act on behalf of a party who has refused to comply with the judgment himself, Fed.R.Civ.P. 70. We have been cited to no authority, nor have we found any, to indicate that these statutes do not apply to a state and its officials. Cf. Gary W. v. State of Louisiana, 601 F.2d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 1979). In addition, "(a) federal court's interest in orderly, expeditious proceedings," Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. at 696, 98 S.Ct. at 2577, justifies any reasonable action taken by the court to secure compliance with its orders. In Hutto, the Court remarked: "(A) federal court may treat a State like any other litigant when it assesses costs," 437 U.S. at 696, 98 S.Ct. at 2577, and "(w)hen a State defends a suit for prospective relief, it is not exempt from the ordinary discipline of the courtroom," id. at 695-96 n. 24, 98 S.Ct. at 2576 n. 24. We think this is adequate support for the proposition that, where a state expresses its unwillingness to comply with a valid judgment of a federal district court, the court may use any of the weapons generally at its disposal to ensure compliance. "(F)ederal courts are not reduced to issuing (judgments) against state officers and hoping for compliance." Id. at 690, 98 S.Ct. at 2574. Only when the district court's response to the recalcitrance of a litigant is so inappropriate under the circumstances as to amount to an abuse of discretion will the Court of Appeals intervene. Here, the district court acted well within its authority to ensure compliance with its lawful orders. If statutory authority is needed for the court's actions, it may be found in Fed.R.Civ.P. 70. ⁶ The defendants have made it abundantly clear that they intend to resist the judgment until the bitter end. Given such obstinance, we think it beyond peradventure that the remedy fits the wrong.

We recognize that our discussion thus far does not directly address the defendants' argument that they cannot be required to violate the laws of Mississippi. The defendants misconceive the issue. As Judge Rubin of this Court, sitting by designation in Gary W. v. State of Louisiana, 441 F.Supp. 1121 (E.D.La.1977), responded when recently confronted with the identical argument: "The issue here is not one of judicial confrontation with the state. It is one of implementation of a Congressional mandate." Id. at 1125 (emphasis added). The italicized words provide the key. Congress has declared that states and their officials who violate federal civil rights laws must reimburse the successful plaintiff for costs incurred in seeking redress. To strike down the order in this case because it conflicts with the laws of Mississippi would be no different than reversing a bare judgment for attorneys' fees. In either case, we would be allowing the state, by legislative action, to recloak itself with the Eleventh Amendment immunity which Congress has chosen to remove. Such a result would be contrary to the command of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. ⁷

II. Interest on the Awards ⁸

Defendants challenge the authority of the District Court to add post-judgment interest on attorneys' fees and out-of-pocket costs. We believe that interest was properly awarded on attorneys' fees but not on costs.

A.

Defendants vigorously contend that under this Court's decision in Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 567 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1978), we are precluded from awarding interest on attorney's fees and costs under the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Awards Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (hereafter referred to as § 1988 or the Act). ⁹ Despite Judge Hill's strong expressions, see (dissent), pp. 1283-1284, we fully subscribe to principles of stare decisis and recognize that a decision by one panel of this Court is binding on other panels. E. g., Trunkline Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 608 F.2d 582, 583 (5th Cir. 1979). But we are convinced that Carpa is not controlling on the question before us and we have not been unfaithful to it in deciding the way we do.

In Carpa, this Court held that under 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (hereafter referred to as § 15), interest on attorneys' fees cannot be recovered. Section 15 provides: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." The Court's holding was a very narrow one. As the Court stated: "Our holding that attorneys' fees in antitrust cases are not to bear interest implies nothing whatsoever about the propriety of interest on attorneys' fees authorized by other statutes." 567 F.2d at 1323 (emphasis added). This language suggests in clear and unmistakable terms that each attorneys' fees statute must be carefully analyzed to determine whether interest should be awarded.

The Court in Carpa gave two reasons which together led to its conclusion. First, the Court pointed out that attorneys' fees are defined under § 15 as part of costs and that costs do not...