Gates v. Deukmejian
Decision Date | 02 March 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 91-15270,91-15270 |
Citation | 987 F.2d 1392 |
Parties | Jay Lee GATES; Charles Edward Puett; John Ronald Betram, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. George DEUKMEJIAN, Governor, Defendant and James Rowland, Director, Nadim Khoury, M.D.; Eddie Ylst; Kenneth Sheppard, M.D., Nicholas Poulos, Daniel Thor, Paul Morentz, H. Benton, Bruce Baker, A.R. Rotella, D. Michael O'Connor, Douglas G. Arnold, Clyde Murrey, Sylvia Blount, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
John G. Donhoff, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, CA, for defendants-appellants.
Samuel R. Miller and Sanford J. Rosen, Rosen, Bien & Asaro, San Francisco, CA, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.
Before: CHOY, FARRIS, and RYMER, Circuit Judges.
A number of California state officials appeal the district court's award of over $6 million in attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. We affirm the district court's decision in part, vacate and remand in part, and reverse in part.
This dispute arises out of a complex class action suit brought by prisoners incarcerated at the California Medical Facility ("CMF") and the Main Northern Reception Center ("NRC") ("plaintiffs") against a number of California state officials ("defendants") in which plaintiffs challenged the alleged unconstitutional treatment of inmates at CMF and NRC.
The history of efforts to ameliorate problems at CMF predates initiation of this suit. 1 However, because these efforts were perceived as moving too slowly and as unlikely to ameliorate all the problems at the facilities, plaintiffs resolved to file the complaint in this case. 2
On January 6, 1988 plaintiffs filed a complaint and motion for class certification in the district court. 3 Over the course of the following one and one-half years plaintiffs engaged in extensive discovery which, according to the district court, defendants resisted throughout. Defendants responded with an aggressive posture, for example, challenging the motion for class certification, arguing to limit discovery to class representatives, and filing a motion for summary judgment. 4
Judge Raul Ramirez supervised settlement discussions in early 1989. The negotiations progressed over the course of three months; however, they ultimately broke down and terminated on June 5, 1989. 5 Trial began before Magistrate Judge John F. Moulds, and continued until the end of October 1989 when the parties again agreed to enter into settlement negotiations. Plaintiffs rested their case on October 30th and settlement negotiations began immediately and continued for two and one-half weeks concluding with final negotiations on November 16 and 17, 1989. The proposed settlement was signed on November 20, 1990 and Magistrate Judge Moulds issued his findings and recommendations in support of the consent decree on February 21, 1990. Judge Karlton adopted these and approved the consent decree on March 8, 1990.
The consent decree addresses the primary areas raised in the complaint including medical care, psychiatric care, conditions of confinement, and HIV inmates. It includes a minimum three-year reporting and mediation process designed to ensure proper plan development and implementation of the general provisions of the decree. Under the decree a mediator is appointed by the district court to assist the parties in developing plans of implementation and reports as required by the decree, to resolve disagreements regarding the adequacy of the plans or reports developed by the appellants under the decree, to mediate violations of the decree, and to submit findings and recommendations to the court for its approval.
Although the consent decree settled all disputes on the merits, it did not resolve the question of attorneys' fees. In this regard, the decree merely provided that plaintiffs may seek to recover reasonable costs, attorneys' fees, and other expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) for work performed prior to entry of the decree and reasonably performed during the pendency of the decree. After making an unsuccessful demand for fees, costs, and disbursements on defendants, on April 4, 1990 plaintiffs filed an Application for Attorneys' Fees and Costs with the district court.
On August 27th, after a hearing and prior to its final decision on the merits of plaintiffs' entire fees application, the district court issued two orders. In one the court ordered payment of $253,429.42 of out-of-pocket costs and disbursements since none of these were contested by the defendants. In the other, the court concluded that a minimum of $1 million in fees was not contested or seriously contestable and ordered that amount paid as an interim fee award. The court, however, declined to enforce payment of either the costs and disbursements or the interim award through a writ of execution.
On December 5, 1990 the district court granted plaintiffs' discounted fee request in full thus awarding the total remaining fees of $5,627,399.66. 6 On December 14, 1990 the district court entered an amended order correcting a mathematical error in the original December 5, 1990 order ("amended order").
In its amended order the district court held that the plaintiffs clearly were the prevailing party entitled to full attorneys' fees and costs and that defendants' arguments with regard to partial success were "patently frivolous." Amended Order at 7-8. It also found that "the lodestar amount is reasonable and justified by ample documentation," and that the ten percent across-the-board reduction in the lodestar figure compensated for any overbilling or duplication the court found suggested in the record. Id. at 5-6.
The court found that plaintiffs' counsel had demonstrated that their expertise in complex prison litigation required application of San Francisco rather than Sacramento rates and that plaintiffs adequately had documented that the rates their counsel charged were the prevailing market rates. The court added that defendants' arguments against these rates were also "patently frivolous." Id. at 6. The court further concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to receive current rather than historic rates in order to adjust for the delay in receiving their compensation. The court noted that plaintiffs adequately had documented that the 2.0 contingency multiplier was necessary to attract counsel, that 2.0 was the proper multiplier, and that the enhancement therefore was justified, especially in light of the obvious undesirability of the litigation.
Finally, the court considered defendants' non-compliance with its interim attorneys' fees award, granting plaintiffs' request for reconsideration, and amending its earlier order to allow for a writ of execution in light of defendants' refusal to voluntarily comply with the order.
We review a district court's determination regarding the proper amount of the attorneys' fees award under § 1988 for an abuse of discretion. Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1235 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 640, 116 L.Ed.2d 658 (1991); Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 487 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1035, 110 S.Ct. 757, 107 L.Ed.2d 773 (1990).
In its amended order the district court concluded that the lodestar amount was reasonable and justified by ample documentation. Moreover, it found that plaintiffs' discrete billing judgment reductions, coupled with their proposed ten percent across-the-board reduction in the lodestar, adequately compensated for any overbilling or duplication in the record. Finally, the court noted that "[d]espite finding the reduced lodestar reasonable from a record review," it had offered defendants the services of a special master as long as they bore the cost if the master concluded that the ten percent reduction was reasonable. Amended Order at 5. Defendants declined to accept the offer. On the basis of this refusal, the district court concluded that defendants conceded its finding that the ten percent reduction compensates for any currently identifiable overbilling.
On appeal, defendants urge that the district court abused its discretion in making these findings. Their specific objections are twofold.
First, defendants argue that the district court erred in selecting ten percent as the proper reduction. They contend that the district court abused its discretion in reducing the lodestar by that amount because it neither possessed nor articulated a reasoned basis for selecting ten percent, rather than some other figure. 7 Second, they argue that the district court abused its discretion in failing to review and make findings as to the merit of each of their specific objections to plaintiffs' billing judgment reductions and, on the basis of its independent review, to reduce plaintiffs' claimed hours accordingly.
Section 1988 authorizes a court "in its discretion" to "allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The starting point for determining a reasonable fee is the "lodestar" figure, which is the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. City of Burlington v. Dague, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 2640, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). Although there is a strong presumption that the lodestar represents a reasonable fee, Dague, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2641; Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3098, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986), reversed on other grounds after rehearing, 483 U.S. 711, 107 S.Ct. 3078, 97 L.Ed.2d 585 (1987) (Delaware Valley I ), the...
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