Gates v. Goodloe
Decision Date | 01 October 1879 |
Parties | GATES v. GOODLOE |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. Luke W. Finlay for the plaintiffs in error.
Mr. Joseph B. Heiskell, contra.
The original decree in the second Chancery Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, for $8,821.49, was rendered against S. M. Gates, A. M. Wood, and Milton McKnight, partners under the name of Gates, Wood, & McKnight, and on appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, it was, to the extent of $7,840.25, affirmed Oct. 13, 1875. On the 1st of August, 1876, Gates and Wood received discharges in bankruptcy, releasing them individually from all provable debts and claims existing against them on the 22d of April, 1876, other than those which, by law, were excepted from the operation of such a discharge. The present writ of error was sued out Oct. 30, 1876, by all the partners. The defendant in error now moves to dismiss it, upon the assumption that the assignee in bankruptcy could alone prosecute it. Undoubtedly, the assignee had the right to prosecute that rit, so far, as least, as it concerned those whom he represented. If the bankrupts could not themselves, under any circumstances, properly sue it out after their discharge (and upon the question we express no opinion), all difficulty, in that respect, has been removed by the application of the assignee for an order here substituting him as a plaintiff in error. His application is now granted, and he is allowed to prosecute the writ in behalf of the bankrupts. Independently, however, of that application, we are not prepared to say that McKnight, the partner against whom no bankruptcy proceedings were instituted, might not have sued out the writ, using for that purpose, if necessary, the names of all the parties against whom the original decree was rendered. With both the assignee in bankruptcy and McKnight before the court, there is no sound reason why the cause should not proceed to a final determination upon the errors assigned.
Coming, then, to the merits of the case, we find that the original plaintiffs in error specially claimed a right or immunity in virtue of an authority exercised under the United States. The right or immunity, so claimed, was denied, first in the court in which the suit originated, and subsequently in the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee.
The facts upon which that claim rests, or out of which it arises, are, briefly, these:——
On the 6th of June, 1862, military possession was taken of the city of Memphis by the Union forces then engaged in suppressing armed insurrection against the national authority. During the succeeding month General Sherman, having been previously assigned by competent military authority to the command of the district of West Tennessee, reached that city with reinforcements, and assumed control of the forces in that locality.
Shortly thereafter he published orders, reopening trade and communication with the surrounding country, and prescribing rules in conformity with which travel in and out of the city should be conducted. On the 7th of August, 1862, pursuant to orders from General Grant, his superior officer, specific instructions were issued by him to the quartermaster in charge at Memphis, concerning vacant stores and houses in that city, and also as to buildings which were occupied, but the owners of which had 'gone South,' leaving agents to collect rent for their benefit. With reference to the latter class of buildings his instructions, or rather orders, were:
The object of these regulations was thus distinctly set forth by General Sherman in his letter of instructions: 'I understand that General Grant takes the rents and profits of this class of real property, under the rules and laws of war, and not under the Confiscation Act of Congress; therefore the question of title is not involved,—simply the possession, and the rents and profits of houses belonging to our enemies, which are not vacant, we hold in trust for them, or the government, according to the future decision of the proper tribunals.' He concluded his letter in these words:
These instructions do not appear in the present transcript, although they constitute a part of the archives of the War Department, and belong to the public history of the late civil war. Some question may be made as to our right to take judicial notice of the in the determination of this case. But, apart from them, the record sufficiently establishes the fact that the military authorities adopted the general policy indicated by General Sherman's letter of instructions, and a rental agent, designated by those authorities, was charged with the duty, among others, of collecting rents of houses which, although occupied, belonged to persons who had 'gone South.' To that class of property belonged a storehouse, occupied by Gates, Wood, & McKnight, under a lease executed at Memphis, in 1859, by R. C. Brinkley, the testator of defendant in error, for a term of five years, and for the stipulated rent of which the lessees had executed their several promissory notes, payable quarterly during the whole period of the lease. Brinkley, upon the approach of the Union forces, left his home in Memphis, and went within the lines of the Confederate forces, where he remained until 1864.
Gates, Wood, & McKnight were notified by the military rental agent, in the summer of 1862, to pay him the rents going to Brinkley. They refused to recognize that order, or to so pay the rents, and, by reason of such refusal, were dispossessed by the military authorities. Those of their sub-tenants who expressed a willingness to comply with the order were permitted to remain in the occupancy of the premises, paying rent, however, directly to the rental agent of the United States. From the time the lessees were thus dispossessed, until July 11, 1863, the property remained under Federal military control, and all rents arising therefrom were collected by the rental agent, who, in the exercise of his functions, was recognized and sustained by the general commanding the Union forces in that district. During that intermediate period the lessees were neither in possession of the premises, nor permitted by the military authorities to receive any rents accruing therefrom. Their rent notes, covering the period during which they were thus kept out of possession, remained, however, outstanding, in the hands of the lessor or his agent. They constitute the foundation of the judgment or decree in this suit.
Are the lessees liable to the estate of Brinkley for rent, as stipulated in the lease of 1859, for the period when the storehouse was under control of the Federal military? There is no claim here for rents subsequent to July 11, 1863, since, on that day, possession was delivered or control surrendered to the lessor's son, under an arrangement made by him with the military authorities. After the return of the lessor to Memphis, in 1864, the latter took control of the property, and enjoyed the rents. Upon the solution of the foregoing question this case depends.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee was of opinion that the lessees were not discharged from...
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