Gates v. Mack Molding Co.
| Docket Number | 2021-176 |
| Decision Date | 13 May 2022 |
| Citation | 2022 VT 24 |
| Parties | Angela M. Gates v. Mack Molding Company, Inc. |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
On Appeal from Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Civil Division John W.Valente, J.
Richard T. Cassidy of Rich Cassidy Law, South Burlington, and Siobhan M. McCloskey of The Law Office of Siobhan M McCloskey, PLLC, White River Junction, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Timothy E. Copeland, Jr. and F. David Harlow of Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC, Brattleboro, for Defendant-Appellee.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Eaton, Carroll and Cohen, JJ., and Manley, Supr. J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned
¶ 1. Plaintiff appeals the trial court's decision granting summary judgment to defendant, her former employer, on plaintiff's claims for disability discrimination under the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) and retaliation under both the Vermont Parental Family Leave Act (PFLA) and Vermont's workers' compensation law. We affirm.
¶ 2. The record below reveals the following material facts. Defendant hired plaintiff as a "molder" in 1996. In May 2015, plaintiff reported to defendant that she injured her left knee outside of work. She subsequently took approximately twelve weeks of leave under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the PFLA, which ran concurrently.
¶ 3. Plaintiff returned to work full-time as a molder in August 2015 after exhausting her FMLA/PFLA leave.[1] Upon her return, plaintiff handed a note from her medical provider, Dr. Gammons, to the human resources manager. The note stated that plaintiff could return to work full-time. It stated further that plaintiff could lift and carry twenty-one to fifty pounds "frequently." The note defined "frequently" as constituting "34%-66% of a workday" and "continuously" as being "67%-100%" of a workday. Plaintiff did not say anything to the human resources manager when she delivered this doctor's note. She did not make any explicit request for any accommodation to anyone at work.
¶ 4. Duties of the molder position included operating a machine called the Press 30. Operating this machine required lifting totes weighing thirty-three to thirty-five pounds onto pallets every four-and-a-half minutes. Plaintiff operated the Press 30 machine when she returned to work as a molder in August 2015.
¶ 5. Plaintiff left work around one hour into her third shift back in August 2015, due to pain in her left knee. She did not return to work until October 2015. During this period, she received short-term disability benefits, which were unrelated to FMLA or PFLA leave.
¶ 6. When she returned in October 2015, plaintiff provided defendant with a medical note from an orthopedist, Dr. Giering. This note indicated that plaintiff could work for four hours per day without restriction. Defendant assigned plaintiff to work as a "finisher" four hours per day. In the finisher position, plaintiff performed many tasks including operating various molds and machines, sweeping, mopping, and trimming rings. The essential functions of the finisher position required standing, lifting, squatting, and twisting. Plaintiff worked part-time as a finisher-four hours per day-during October and November of 2015. Dr. Giering cleared plaintiff for full-time, unrestricted work in November 2015, at which point she began full-time as a finisher.
¶ 7. Plaintiff continued to work full-time in the finisher position until May 5, 2016, when she left mid-shift due to knee pain. That same day, plaintiff met with a different medical provider, Dr. Dwyer. In a medical note, Dr. Dwyer opined that plaintiff could "return to light duty immediately with the following restrictions: No prolonged standing, lifting, squatting, or twisting." Plaintiff admitted that these restrictions prevented her from performing the essential functions of the finisher position. On the morning of May 6, 2016, plaintiff returned to work and delivered Dr. Dwyer's note to her manager, Kevin Peets. Plaintiff testified that when she presented this note, manager Peets said, "We don't have anything for you." Plaintiff responded by asking if she could solely trim rings, which was a light-duty task. Manager Peets declined. Plaintiff then punched out and went home. Neither plaintiff nor her doctor provided any indication of when her medical restrictions would end.
¶ 8. Defendant sent plaintiff a letter dated May 11, 2016, informing her that she had exhausted her FMLA and PFLA leave, and that she had not completed any paperwork to apply for short-term disability or workers' compensation benefits. The letter noted that an employee had previously communicated with plaintiff on May 9, 2016 and requested that plaintiff complete this paperwork. The letter further advised that defendant would consider plaintiff's absence to be a "voluntary resignation" and terminate her employment if she did not respond by May 16, 2016.
¶ 9. On May 12, 2016, plaintiff completed an incident report to apply for workers' compensation, asserting she was injured at work in August 2015 when she first returned from her medical leave and was operating the Press 30 machine. Apart from going to defendant's offices to fill out this paperwork, between May 6 and May 16, 2016, plaintiff did not return to work, indicate any recovery timeline, or attempt to demonstrate her ability to perform the essential functions of her position.
¶ 10. Defendant sent plaintiff a final letter, dated May 20, 2016, stating that her application for workers' compensation would be reviewed by its insurance company, but that "[d]ue to production schedules it has become necessary to assign another employee to your position at Mack Molding Company and therefore, your employment has been terminated effective Friday, May 20, 2016." This letter also requested that plaintiff update defendant regarding her recovery and any interest in reinstatement with defendant. Plaintiff never informed defendant of her recovery timeline or any interest in future employment. Plaintiff testified that she did not recover sufficiently to be able to perform the essential functions of her prior finisher position until May 2017.
¶ 11. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against defendant later in 2017. She initially asserted many claims-including several varieties of discrimination and retaliation, as well as other statutory and common law claims-but she withdrew most of them before summary judgment. The remaining claims consisted of two temporally distinct allegations of retaliation under the PFLA; two separate allegations of failure to reasonably accommodate her disability under the FEPA; and one allegation of retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim-all described as follows. Plaintiff alleged that defendant violated the FEPA by failing to reasonably accommodate her when she first returned from her knee injury in August 2015 because it assigned her to work on the Press 30 machine, which exceeded her prescribed medical limitations. She also alleged defendant retaliated against her following her return from PFLA leave in August 2015 by assigning her to the role of finisher in October 2015, instead of reinstating her as a molder. Plaintiff's three other allegations all stemmed from events in May 2016. She claimed defendant terminated her employment in May 2016 in retaliation for having taken four hours of PFLA leave and having applied for workers' compensation benefits earlier that month. She also alleged that defendant failed to reasonably accommodate her under the FEPA by not reassigning her to a light-duty position in May 2016.
¶ 12. Following discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment on all of these claims. The trial court granted the motion in full.[2] The court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case as to her two allegations of FEPA discrimination and her claim of PFLA retaliation in October 2015. It determined that she made out prima facie cases of retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim and taking PFLA leave in May 2016, but that defendant proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her employment, and plaintiff failed to demonstrate a triable issue of fact that these reasons were a pretext for discrimination. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to all but one claim: PFLA retaliation in October 2015.
¶ 13. This Court reviews summary-judgment decisions de novo using the same standard as the trial court. Gauthier v. Keurig Green Mountain, Inc., 2015 VT 108, ¶ 14, 200 Vt. 125, 129 A.3d 108. "Summary judgment will be granted 'if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Id. (quoting V.R.C.P. 56(a)). In determining the existence of genuine issues of material fact, courts must "accept as true the allegations made in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, so long as they are supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material." Robertson v. Mylan Lab'ys, Inc., 2004 VT 15, ¶ 15, 176 Vt. 356, 848 A.2d 310. "The nonmoving party receives the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences." Pettersen v. Monaghan Safar Ducham PLLC, 2021 VT 16, ¶ 9, ___ Vt.___, 256 A.3d 604 (quotation and alteration omitted).
¶ 14. To survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment the plaintiff must respond with specific facts to raise a triable issue and demonstrate sufficient admissible evidence to support a prima facie case. Dulude v. Fletcher Allen Health Care, Inc., 174 Vt. 74, 79, 807 A.2d 390, 395 (2002). An issue of fact is material only if it could affect the outcome of the case. O'Brien v. Synnott, 2013 VT 33, ¶ 9, 193 Vt. 546, 72 A.3d 331. A defendant will prevail on summary judgment if they...
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