Gates v. Rowland, s. 91-16702
| Decision Date | 04 November 1994 |
| Docket Number | 91-16780,93-15363 and 93-16136,Nos. 91-16702,s. 91-16702 |
| Citation | 39 F.3d 1439 |
| Parties | , 7 A.D.D. 1, 5 NDLR P 458 Jay Lee GATES, John Ronald Bertram, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. James ROWLAND and his successor in office James H. Gomez, Directorof the California Department of Correction; Nadim Khoury, M.D., Assistant Deputy Director--CDC Health Services; Eddie Ylst and his successor in office Steve Cambra, Warden (Interim)--California Medical Facility; Kenneth Shepard, M.D., Chief Deputy Warden for CMF Clinical Services; Nicholas Poulos, M.D., and his successor in office George R. Gay, Chief Physician and Surgeon (Acting); CMF; Paul Morentz, M.D., Chief Psychiatrist--CMF Outpatient Psychiatric Program; H. Benton, M.D., and his successor in office A.R. Rotella, M.D., Chief Psychiatrists--Northern Reception Center; D. Michael O'Connor, M.D., and his successor in office William Mayer, Director of the California Department of Mental Health; Douglas G. Arnold and his successor in office Clyde Murrey, Acting Deputy Director for State Hospitals; DMH and Sylvia Blount, R.N., Executive Director--DMH Vacaville Psychiatric Program, Defendants-Appellants. Jay Lee GATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, and George Deukmejian, Governor, Plaintiff, v. James ROWLAND, Director, Defendant-Appellee. Jay Lee GATES, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. George DEUKMEJIAN; Ron Shinn; James Rowland; Nadim Khoury, M.D.; Assistant Deputy Director--CDC Health Services; Eddie Ylst; Kenneth Shepard, Chief Deputy Warden for CMF Clinical Services, et al., Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Allen R. Crown, Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael A. Santoki, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., and James E. Flynn, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, CA, for defendants-appellants-cross-appellees.
Sanford Jay Rosen, Rosen, Bien & Asaro, and Matthew A. Coles, ACLU Foundation of Northern California, Inc., San Francisco, CA, and Donald Specter, Prison Law Office, San Quentin, CA, for plaintiffs-appellees-cross-appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.
Before: HUG, FARRIS, and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.
A consent decree entered into by various California state officials and a class, including all inmates at the California Medical Facility ("CMF") in Vacaville, California, gives rise to these three separate appeals and a cross-appeal. The inmates brought an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 to challenge deficient medical and psychiatric care, indecent confinement conditions, and treatment and segregation of HIV-positive inmates at the CMF--Main and Northern Reception Center. The consent decree included a provision for payment of attorneys' fees.
In No. 93-15363, the defendants-appellants challenge the district court's interpretation of the consent decree, so far as defendants are required to provide additional correctional staff at CMF. In No. 93-16136, the defendants-appellants challenge the district court's order enjoining them from denying food service positions to HIV-positive inmates. In No. 91-16702, the defendants-appellants appeal the district court's award of attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs. In No. 91-16780, the plaintiffs cross-appeal contending that additional attorneys' fees are due.
Plaintiffs brought this action to challenge conditions at the CMF--Main and Northern Reception Center, which they alleged were overcrowded and understaffed. The certified class of all inmates at CMF claimed that the shortages of custody staff and overcrowding exposed them to an unconstitutional risk of harm in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. As a remedy, they proposed limits on the numbers of inmates who could be housed at CMF and an increase in the correctional staff to provide "adequate supervision" for inmates. They also alleged that the denial of access to medical and mental health care and to attorneys, and the segregation of HIV-positive inmates violated their constitutional rights. A subclass of HIV-positive inmates made claims under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794. The section 504 claims of mobility-impaired inmates confined to wheelchairs and of mentally ill inmates were also included in the action.
After two months of trial, settlement negotiations began. The defendants agreed to an alternative dispute resolution procedure, which used a mediator with correctional experience who would assist with negotiations and, if necessary, would file findings and recommendations with the court.
A consent decree was approved on March 8, 1990. The consent decree stated that it was not intended "to prescribe the minimum standards required by the United States Constitution." The consent decree provided for a dispute resolution process, involving mediation and reports to the court. Under the procedure outlined in the consent decree, the mediator is to work with the parties to resolve disagreements through mediation, but also has the power to make findings and recommendations in a report to the court on those matters that are not resolved through mediation. The parties could object to the mediator's report and obtain a court determination of any issue.
NO. 93-15363: CUSTODIAL STAFFING
The defendants agreed to review existing staffing levels and to report on whether they believed there were "adequate custody staff to properly supervise and to provide escorts and other services to inmates in those units." Pursuant to the decree, the defendants submitted a report reviewing the custody staffing level at CMF and concluding that the level was adequate. The plaintiffs disputed the report's conclusions, and a mediator retained a consultant, James Henderson, a correctional staffing expert, to prepare a report that was provided on June 26, 1991. Henderson conducted a staffing analysis to determine the minimum number of correctional officers required to operate the prison safely, and concluded that custodial staffing at CMF should be increased by 36 positions.
The defendants objected to Henderson's report. The mediator was unable to resolve the disagreement over the adequacy of custodial staffing, thus, a formal evidentiary hearing was held on October 8, and November 1, 1991, as provided by the consent decree.
The mediator found that the Henderson report was a "conservative but sound staffing analysis." He deleted all positions in Henderson's recommendation that were added to improve efficiency and management, and that were related to developing an outpatient psychiatric program. In his findings and recommendations filed on March 12, 1992, the mediator concluded that 12 additional positions were necessary.
The defendants objected on the ground that the mediator had not used the constitutional standard of whether inmates were exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm to measure "adequate custodial staffing." Instead, the mediator interpreted the consent decree, according to its plain meaning, as establishing a standard based on whether staffing was adequate from a correctional perspective.
The magistrate judge recommended adoption of the mediator's recommendation. The defendants again objected, but the district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation, with some modifications, on December 9, 1992. The district court held that "adequate custodial staffing," as used in the consent decree, was not ambiguous and when construed according to its ordinary meaning, did not implicate the constitutional standard.
The defendants argue that the consent decree's reference to "adequate supervision" was ambiguous and should be interpreted according to the mutual intentions of the parties at the time the consent decree was entered.
The consent decree stated:
Defendants shall review the staffing levels of each unit at CMF to determine whether there are adequate custody staff to properly supervise and to provide escorts and other services to inmates in those units. Defendants shall submit a report of their conclusions and any recommendations to the Mediator and plaintiffs' counsel.
The primary issue is whether "adequate custodial staffing to properly supervise" means only that staff sufficient to protect inmates from an unreasonable risk of violence, which is the constitutional minimum standard. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3200-01, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). The plaintiffs contend that the district court and the mediator properly applied the higher standard of accepted correctional practices.
Interpretation of a consent decree is a question of law that we review de novo. Thompson v. Enomoto, 915 F.2d 1383, 1388 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 965, 117 L.Ed.2d 131 (1992). The rules of contract interpretation of the situs state govern interpretation of the consent decree. Id. The language of the contract governs if it is clear and explicit. Id. Cal.Civil Code Sec. 1638. Words in a contract are generally understood in their ordinary and popular sense, and technical words are interpreted as usually understood by persons in the profession or business to which they relate. Cal.Civil Code Sec. 1644.
The plain meaning of the terms of the consent decree is clear: the staff must be adequate "to properly supervise prisoners and to provide escorts and other services." The consent decree does not state that the staff must only protect inmates from an unreasonable risk of violence. We must interpret the contract "to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting," Thompson, 915 F.2d at 1388 (citing Cal.Civil Code Sec. 1636), but we determine that by referring to the language of the agreement, if possible. Cal.Civil Code Secs. 1638, 1639. Where the parties negotiated use of a constitutional standard, they specified so in the language of the consent decree. Otherwise, the consent decree is not...
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