Gateway Atlanta Apartments v. Harris

Decision Date10 March 2008
Docket NumberNo. A07A2071.,No. A07A2070.,No. A07A2072.,No. A07A2073.,A07A2070.,A07A2071.,A07A2072.,A07A2073.
Citation290 Ga. App. 772,660 S.E.2d 750
PartiesGATEWAY ATLANTA APARTMENTS, INC. v. HARRIS, et al. Cline, et al. v. Harris, et al. Douglass Frontier, LLC, et al. v. Harris, et al. Worthing Southeast, Inc. v. Harris, et al.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Alisa W. Ellenburg, Atlanta, for appellant (case no. A07A2070).

Alston & Bird, Jay D. Bennett, for appellant (case no. A07A2071).

Fain, Major & Brennan, Gene A. Major, Michael J. Walker, for appellant (case no. A07A2072).

Gray, Rust, St. Amand, Moffett & Brieske, Harvey S. Gray, for appellant (case no. A07A2073).

Cochran, Cherry, Givens, Smith, Sistrunk & Sams, Shean D. Williams, Jane L. Sams, Warren N. Sams III, Alexander Gordon, for appellees.

RUFFIN, Judge.

Donta Harris was shot and killed by a bail bondsman who was attempting to apprehend him for bond forfeiture. Ruthie Harris, the decedent's mother, brought a wrongful death action against the bail bondsmen who pursued Harris, the bail bonding companies with which they were associated, various issuers or insurers of bail bonds, and the owner and property manager of the apartment complex where Harris was shot. Several defendants moved to dismiss the action or for summary judgment. The trial court denied a number of the motions, and these four appeals followed. As the cases involve the same operative facts, we have consolidated them for this appeal. For reasons that follow, we reverse in all four cases.

The record shows that Edward Tatum was a bail bondsman in North Carolina. He bailed Harris out of jail in North Carolina several times. In November 1998, Harris needed to post a $10,000 bond; Tatum issued a $5,000 surety bond through Frontier Insurance Company,1 and Henry Burke, who was a "runner" for Walter Cline of Fayetteville Bail Bonding Service, issued a $5,000 professional bond to Harris.2

When Harris failed to appear for court in June 1999, the court ordered forfeiture of Harris's bonds. Tatum obtained a copy of the order for arrest of Harris and sought to locate him.3 Tatum and Burke found Harris in Georgia in October 1999, but were unable to capture him. In that instance, Tatum attempted to open the door of the vehicle Harris was driving; Harris "tried to crush [Tatum] in between the vehicles" and escaped following a high-speed chase.

Tatum then obtained an address for Harris in Georgia. In May 2000, Tatum and another bail bondsman, Sam Haynie, came to Atlanta and conducted surveillance of the apartment complex where Harris was living. Tatum had asked Haynie to accompany him to Georgia. Haynie was authorized to write professional bonds for Cline as a "runner" in addition to being a licensed bail bondsman in his own right. Tatum and Haynie spoke to a courtesy officer at the apartment complex about their intent to apprehend Harris. The courtesy officer, who was an off-duty DeKalb County police officer, told them he could not assist in capturing Harris. The officer did, however, indicate the building in which Harris was staying. Although Tatum showed the staff of the apartment complex his identification and the order for Harris's arrest, the staff refused to give Tatum an access code to enter the gated community.

Tatum and Haynie nevertheless gained entry to the apartment complex, where they saw Harris arrive, exit his vehicle, and enter an apartment. Because there were a number of children in the area on their way to school, they did not try to apprehend Harris at that time. Tatum and Haynie waited outside the apartment building for about an hour; when Harris reappeared, they attempted to arrest him, but he locked himself in his vehicle. Although Tatum and Haynie told Harris to put his hands up, he started the vehicle. Using a baton, Tatum broke two windows in the vehicle, then reached into the vehicle and attempted to turn it off. Harris put the vehicle into reverse and began backing up with Tatum hanging from the window. Harris shifted into drive and then reached down beside the seat. Tatum, believing Harris had a weapon, drew his own weapon and shot Harris. Harris died, and Tatum was arrested for involuntary manslaughter.

Case No. A07A2070

1. Gateway Atlanta Apartments, Inc. ("Gateway") owns the apartment complex where Harris was shot. The complex is managed by Worthing Southeast, Inc. ("Worthing"). Harris's estate claims that Gateway was negligent in failing to keep the premises safe, in failing to warn Harris that Tatum and Haynie had access to the property and intended to capture him, and in failing to protect Harris from the actions of Tatum and Haynie. In this appeal, Gateway asserts that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment because: (a) it owed Harris no duty of care as it had relinquished management of the property to Worthing; (b) if Gateway did owe Harris a duty of care, it was only such duty as owed to a trespasser or licensee; (c) Harris's knowledge of the risk was equal or superior to that of Gateway; and (d) Gateway was not responsible for the conduct of the courtesy officer, as he was acting in his capacity as a DeKalb County police officer.

Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.4 We conduct a de novo review of a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences and conclusions drawn from it in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.5 In Georgia,

[w]here an owner or occupier of land, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads others to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose, he is liable in damages to such persons for injuries caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.6

All of the claims against Gateway "stem from [its] alleged failure to keep the premises safe and, essentially, constitute a breach of the same duty to protect [Harris]."7

A landlord is not an insurer of a tenant's safety against third party criminal attacks; "any liability from such attacks must be predicated on a breach of duty to `exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.'"8 A landlord may be liable only for foreseeable criminal acts, as its liability is based upon "superior knowledge of the existence of a condition that would subject a tenant to an unreasonable risk of harm."9 The victim may not recover, however, if he had equal or superior knowledge of the risk and failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety.10

Pretermitting whether Gateway owed Harris a duty of care, whether his status was that of invitee, licensee or trespasser, or whether Gateway was responsible for the courtesy officer's conduct, we conclude that, under these circumstances, Gateway did not have superior knowledge that a criminal act would be committed.11 Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Harris, at most Gateway knew that two armed bail bondsmen intended to seize Harris on a valid order for arrest. Harris argues that Gateway knew "that a potentially dangerous incident would occur when [the bail bondsmen] attempted to arrest [Harris]," that the courtesy officer did not know if Tatum and Haynie were properly trained in arrest techniques, and that the courtesy officer "had no reason to believe that the bondsmen had notified the authorities about their presence as required by state law." We find no authority, however, for Harris's contention that Gateway had a duty to interfere with what appeared to be a valid arrest, to investigate the training or practices of licensed bail bondsmen, or to make an independent determination whether the seizure of Harris would be lawful.12

Moreover, we conclude that in this situation Harris had equal or superior knowledge of any danger posed to him by the bail bondsmen and failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety.13 Harris knew that he was wanted for bond forfeiture and that bail bondsmen were actively seeking him; Tatum had already attempted to arrest him in Georgia several months earlier. And Harris chose to flee rather than to cooperate, increasing the danger to himself. "Although the issue of a plaintiff's exercise of due diligence for his own safety is ordinarily a question for the jury, it may be summarily adjudicated where the plaintiff's knowledge of the risk is clear and palpable."14 Harris's own actions led to the dangerous situation in which he found himself thus, we find that his knowledge of the danger was at least equal to that of Gateway and that he failed to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances.15 The trial court erred in denying summary judgment to Gateway.16

Case No. A07A2071

2. Cline and Fayetteville moved to dismiss the action against them for lack of personal jurisdiction and moved for summary judgment. Both motions were denied, and Cline and Fayetteville appeal. Harris's estate claims that Cline and his company are liable for Harris's death both because Haynie was acting as their agent when Harris was shot and because Cline and his company were involved in a joint enterprise or venture with Tatum. Burke, who was a "runner" for Cline and Fayetteville, had issued a $5,000 professional bond to Harris in 1998 under Cline's authority. Burke, however, was ultimately liable on the bond, not Cline. Haynie, who was with Tatum when he shot Harris, was a "runner" for Cline and Fayetteville but was also a licensed bail bondsman in his own right. Cline and Fayetteville did not submit W-2 tax forms for Haynie or provide health insurance or other employment benefits.

Haynie contends that he came to Georgia in his individual capacity at the behest of Tatum and without Cline's knowledge or encouragement. On appeal, Cline and Fayetteville argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because they cannot be held liable under the theories of joint...

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • Packard v. Temenos Advisory, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia
    • January 29, 2016
    ...by the courts of this state must not offend traditional fairness and substantial justice.Gateway Atlanta Apartments, Inc. v. Harris , 290 Ga.App. 772, 660 S.E.2d 750, 757 (2008) (citing Robertson v. CRI, Inc. , 267 Ga.App. 757, 601 S.E.2d 163, 163 (2004) ). Significantly, Georgia courts bro......
  • Brandenburg v. City of Vidalia
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 3, 2022
    ..."had no right to exercise control over the time, manner, and method of [Centerstone's] work." Gateway Atlanta Apartments v. Harris , 290 Ga. App. 772, 781 (3) (a), 660 S.E.2d 750 (2008) ; compare Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Colemon , 290 Ga. App. 86, 88 (1), 658 S.E.2d 843 (2008) (finding th......
  • Barrs v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia
    • September 29, 2021
    ...Plaintiff's use of the term "agent" does not necessarily mean that Hood was AAA's "employee." See Gateway v. Atlanta Apartments, Inc. , 290 Ga.App. 772, 660 S.E.2d 750, 758 (2008) (stating that the court was "unpersuaded that the use of the term ‘agent’ to describe [a party in the contract]......
  • Lowery v. Noodle Life, Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • February 15, 2022
    ...as a matter of law negate the existence of an agency relationship between the corporations); see also Gateway Atlanta Apts. v. Harris , 290 Ga. App. 772, 778 (2) (b), 660 S.E.2d 750 (2008) ("The mere existence of a business interdependency does not create a joint venture.") (citation and pu......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Business Associations: Veil Piercing in Georgia
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 74-1, September 2022
    • Invalid date
    ...enterprise liability, discussed above. 58. Lowery, 363 Ga. App. at 6, 869 S.E.2d at 605 (quoting Gateway Atlanta Apts., Inc. v. Harris, 290 Ga. App. 772, 778, 660 S.E.2d 750, 756 (2008)). The standard is similar to the test for partnership formation: that the parties intended to share contr......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT