Gatewood v. State
Citation | 857 A.2d 590,158 Md. App. 458 |
Decision Date | 08 September 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 3063,3063 |
Parties | Troy Arness GATEWOOD v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Bradford C. Peabody (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), for appellant.
Zoe Gillen White (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee.
Panel SALMON, BARBERA, SHARER, JJ.
Appellant, Troy Arness Gatewood, appeals from his convictions on three counts of distribution of cocaine, after a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Cecil County. In his timely appeal, appellant presents for our consideration four issues, which, as recast and reordered, are:
Finding neither error nor an abuse of discretion, we shall affirm the judgments, but shall remand for correction of the docket entries and sentencing documents.
BACKGROUND
As appellant does not challenge the evidentiary basis for his convictions, we need not dwell on the underlying facts except as they become relevant to our discussion of the issues. See Craig v. State, 148 Md.App. 670, 674 n. 1, 814 A.2d 41 (2002),
cert. denied, 374 Md. 83, 821 A.2d 370 (2003).
The grand jury indictment charged appellant with six offenses, three counts each of possession and distribution of a controlled dangerous substance (cocaine). The case went to trial before a jury, which, on February 3, 2002, returned guilty verdicts on three counts of distribution of cocaine. Appellant was sentenced to 20 years in prison on each count, with the sentences on two counts suspended. Additionally, terms of probation were imposed to commence upon his release from confinement. This appeal followed.
The assistant State's Attorney who was assigned to try this case, Christopher J. Eastridge, had previously represented appellant in other cases while serving as an assistant public defender. Appellant, concerned that Eastridge might try to impeach him with convictions in those prior cases, moved for Eastridge's disqualification.
At a bench conference following jury selection and opening statements, defense counsel challenged Eastridge's continued participation in the case, based on the former representation. Responding to questions by the court, Eastridge said that he remembered Gatewood "but ... [had] no specific recollection of a specific case with [him]." The following dialogue was had:
After hearing additional argument, the trial judge denied the defense motion to disqualify:
Following opening statements, defense counsel again raised the issue:
The prosecutor responded:
Mr. Gatewood did testify, and he was cross-examined briefly:
On cross-examination, neither case in which Eastridge had represented appellant was specifically referred to. Defense counsel did not again raise the issue.1
It is important that counsel carefully scrutinize their records for the potential for conflicts from successive representations. The likelihood of such conflicts, it would seem, is greater among those who practice criminal law, for it is not uncommon for defense counsel, both private and public defender, to have been formerly employed as prosecutors. It is also likely that the converse would occur. Although the better practice would be to avoid such situations whenever possible, disqualification is not mandated in all cases.
Although Eastridge could not recall having represented appellant, defense counsel had little difficulty in determining, through a check of records in the Office of the Public Defender after the question arose at trial, that Eastridge had previously represented Gatewood.
We reiterate that the decision to disqualify counsel is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and should appropriately be judged on a case-by-case basis. Disqualification is not per se required in every instance of successive representation. Judge Smith pointed out for the Court of Appeals:
We hold that the proper action to be taken by a trial judge, when he encounters circumstances similar to those in the case at bar which he determines to be so grave as to adversely affect the administration of justice but which in no way suggest the bringing of a prosecution for improper motives ..., is to supplant the prosecutor, not to bar the prosecution. Of course, a trial judge may determine that the facts presented to him are not sufficiently grave to require even this action. Normally, the evaluation of such circumstances is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge who is upon the scene and able to sense the nuances of that before him.
Lykins v. State, 288 Md. 71, 85, 415 A.2d 1113 (1980) (emphasis added).
This Court has reinforced the view that successive representation does not require the disqualification of counsel in every instance:
The mere fact that as a private attorney the prosecutor had once represented appellant in an unrelated case did not, standing alone, result in a conflict of interest such as to disqualify that attorney from acting as prosecutor in the instant case.... Nor is there any claim or indication that in investigating or prosecuting the present case the prosecutor made use of any confidential information he may have received from the appellant in the prior case. In short, we perceive no error to be corrected, "plain" or otherwise.
Green v. State, 49 Md.App. 1, 5, 430 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 291 Md. 775 (1981).2
We now examine whether the trial court correctly ruled that disqualification was not warranted in this case. It is not disputed that Eastridge, while a public defender, represented appellant in other criminal cases. The salient point in this case is whether the former representation was "in the same or a substantially related matter."
MRPC Rule 1.9, entitled "Conflict of interest: former client[,]" provides:
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