Gatlin v. State

• Decision Date: 08 February 1990
• Docket Number: No. 88-2083,88-2083
• Parties: 15 Fla. L. Weekly D375 Willie GATLIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 772

556 So.2d 772

15 Fla. L. Weekly D375

Willie GATLIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 88-2083.

District Court of Appeal of Florida First District.

Feb. 8, 1990.

Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, Randolph P. Murrell, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Carolyn J. Mosley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

SMITH, Judge.

Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction for possession of cocaine, arguing that the instructions given to the jury were violative of due process as creating a mandatory presumption. We disagree and affirm.

Police were summoned to appellant's residence following an argument between appellant and his girlfriend. The girlfriend claimed to have been attacked by appellant. Police observed abrasions on her face, whereupon appellant was told he was being charged with battery, and he was arrested. At the time of arrest, appellant was only partially dressed, but before being escorted to the police car, he put on a pair of pants which had been lying next to his bed. When appellant and the arresting officer reached the squad car, appellant was searched. The arresting officer testified that he found a matchbox in appellant's pants pocket which contained several pieces of crack cocaine. Appellant was later charged with possession of cocaine.

Appellant testified that his girlfriend had found the matchbox earlier that day. He was uncertain how the matchbox came to be in his pocket, though he conceded he may have put it there. He further stated that he and his girlfriend had assumed the matchbox contained matches, and he also testified that he pulled the matchbox out of his pocket in the presence of police when he attempted to light a cigarette. According to appellant, the police grabbed the matchbox from him and discovered the presence of the crack cocaine.

The appellant's testimony not only conflicts with the arresting officer's version of events; it also conflicts with the testimony given by the girlfriend. According to her, she was told by the appellant following his arrest to tell the police she had found the matchbox. She claimed she actually did not know anything about the matchbox before it was discovered by police. She also testified that she told the police she found the matchbox, as instructed by appellant, because she was afraid of him. On cross-examination, the girlfriend admitted to lying under oath when she previously told counsel for the prosecution and the defense that she had found the matchbox as claimed by appellant.

Following the close of the defendant's case, the trial court instructed the jury using the standard jury instruction for possession of a controlled substance, which includes the language:

If a person has exclusive possession of a thing, knowledge of its presence may be inferred or assumed.

The jury was also given the standard instruction regarding the state's burden of proof and the defendant's presumption of innocence.

Appellant objected to the instruction regarding exclusive possession, arguing that it was a mandatory presumption which allowed proof of an element without a showing of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Alternatively, appellant argued that the instruction shifted the burden to him to prove that he did not know of the presence of the controlled substance in his pocket. The trial court overruled the objection. Appellant was acquitted of the battery charge but was convicted of the possession charge.

As is well understood, there are essentially two kinds of presumptions: mandatory presumptions, and inferences, also known as permissive presumptions. Mandatory presumptions may be either conclusive or rebuttable. A mandatory presumption compels the fact-finder to find the presumed fact regardless of other evidence if there is proof of a basic fact. A mandatory presumption, therefore, violates due process, since it relieves the prosecution of its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as required by In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Such an instruction also forecloses independent jury consideration of whether the facts proved establish the elements of the offense charged. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989). However, an inference is constitutional, because it "leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does not shift the burden of proof," so that "it affects the application of the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference." County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2225, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979) (citations omitted).

As explained in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1984), the first step is to determine whether the presumption is mandatory. The appellant now concedes that the challenged instruction in this case is a permissive, rather than a mandatory presumption. Appellant nevertheless correctly argues, however, that if there is a danger that a juror could have reasonably viewed the instruction in an unconstitutional manner, the instruction violates due process. Francis v. Franklin, supra.

In Francis, the jury was instructed: "[The] acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product of a person's will," and a person "is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts...." 105 S.Ct. at 1972. The Supreme Court observed that the jurors "were not told that they had a choice, or that they might infer that conclusion; they were told only that the law presumed it." Id., quoting Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2454, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979) (emphasis added). ¹

In Ulster County, by contrast, the jury instructions were found to be acceptable. The Ulster County jury was instructed, in part, that:

[u]pon proof of the presence of the machine gun and hand weapons, you may infer and draw a conclusion that such prohibited weapon was possessed by each of the defendants who occupied the automobile at the time when such instruments were found. The presumption or presumptions is effective only so long as there is no...