Gatsby v. Gatsby

Citation169 Idaho 308,495 P.3d 996
Decision Date24 September 2021
Docket NumberDocket No. 47710
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Idaho
Parties Linsay Lorine GATSBY, nka Linsay Lorine Wallace, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Kylee Diane GATSBY, Respondent.

169 Idaho 308
495 P.3d 996

Linsay Lorine GATSBY, nka Linsay Lorine Wallace, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Kylee Diane GATSBY, Respondent.

Docket No. 47710

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, December 2020 Term.

Opinion filed: September 24, 2021


Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., Boise, for Appellant. Howard Belodoff argued.

Michael Doolittle, PC, Boise, for Respondent. Michael Doolittle argued.

MOELLER, Justice.

We have before us an appeal in a custody case brought by a woman whose same-sex former spouse conceived a child through artificial insemination during their marriage. This appeal asks us to reexamine Idaho law pertaining to artificial insemination, paternity, and parental rights in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges , 576 U.S. 644, 647, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015).

The district court affirmed the magistrate court's ruling that Appellant Linsay Gatsby ("Linsay") had no parental rights to the child under Idaho's common law marital presumption of paternity because she conceded that she lacked a biological relationship with the child. The district court also affirmed that Linsay had no parental rights under the Artificial Insemination Act because she did not comply with the statute's provisions. The district court further ruled that Linsay would have had parental rights if she had filed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity or adopted the child, but she did not do so. Finally, the district court affirmed that Linsay did not have third party standing to seek custody and, in the alternative, that custody or visitation would not be in the child's best interest if Linsay did have third party standing. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of the district court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Linsay and Kylee Gatsby married in June 2015. They later decided Kylee would attempt to conceive a child through artificial insemination, using semen donated by a mutual friend. They elected to attempt this procedure on their own, without using the services of a physician. Additionally, without consulting an attorney, Linsay, Kylee, and the semen donor signed an artificial insemination agreement Linsay found online, listing the friend as "donor" and both Linsay and Kylee as the "recipient." The agreement included acknowledgements that the recipient intended to become pregnant and to have rights to the child, and that the donor would not have parental rights or obligations to the child. Linsay performed the insemination procedure on Kylee in their home. After several attempts, Kylee became pregnant. On October 29, 2016, Kylee gave birth to the child.1 It is undisputed that Kylee is the child's biological mother. Linsay was present at the birth. The birth certificate worksheet, which Kylee signed, designates Kylee as "mother," and the word "father" on the form is crossed out and "mother" written by hand in its place to also identify Linsay as the child's mother. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare issued a Certificate of Live Birth identifying both Kylee and Linsay as the child's mothers. The child resided with Linsay and Kylee, who held themselves out as the child's parents. Both Kylee and Linsay shared in caregiving, but Kylee was the child's primary caregiver.

The following summer the couple had an argument. Both Linsay and Kylee had been drinking, and Kylee became drunk. Kylee shoved Linsay off a bed. Then Linsay punched Kylee, breaking her nose. The child was in the bedroom during the fight, and Linsay's two children from a prior relationship were also in the home. Kylee was arrested and subsequently pleaded guilty to domestic battery, a misdemeanor. Kylee had also committed an act of domestic violence years earlier. On July 5, 2017, a No Contact

495 P.3d 1000

Order ("NCO") was issued, which prohibited Kylee from seeing the child except at daycare. On August 29, 2017, Linsay filed for divorce. Kylee filed an Answer and Counterclaim, asserting that Linsay had "no legal claim or standing to any custody or visitation" to the minor child.

Due to the NCO, Linsay had sole custody of the child from Kylee's arrest on July 3, 2017, until December 27, 2017, when the magistrate court issued a Temporary Order giving Kylee and Linsay equal custody. In the meantime, Kylee had successfully participated in a Domestic Violence Offender Intervention/Treatment class. After sharing custody for nearly one year, on November 15, 2018, the magistrate court granted sole custody of the child to Kylee. The magistrate court found that Linsay was not the child's legal parent, Linsay had established no third-party rights, and, in the alternative, it was not in the child's best interest for the court to award Linsay custody or visitation rights as a third party based on the evidence in the record.

Regarding Kylee's rights to custody, the magistrate court found "Kylee is the natural, biological parent of [the child]. Therefore, Kylee has a fundamental constitutional and statutory right to the custody, care, and control of [the child]." Regarding Linsay's rights to custody, the magistrate stated:

A rebuttable presumption exists that Linsay is [the child's] parent due to the parties being married when [the child] was born. Alber v. Alber , 93 Idaho 755, 760-61, 472 P.2d 321, 326-27 (1970). The presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. Id. The parties agree that Linsay is not [the child's] biological parent. The parties agree that [the child's] biological parents are Kylee and [the semen donor]. The marriage presumption of parentage of a child born during the marriage has been overcome by clear and convincing evidence that Linsay is not [the child's] parent.

Linsay is not a legal parent through other legal avenues due to her failure to utilize legal proceedings to declare her a parent. Linsay did not sign or properly file a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity affidavit pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-1106. Had Linsay done so, she would have been declared a legal parent. Linsay did not adopt [the child] pursuant to Idaho Code § 16-1501 et seq. Had Linsay done so, she would have been a legal parent. Linsay did not comply with the Artificial Insemination Act and cannot receive the benefit. Linsay did not sign or file a consent form pursuant to Idaho Code § 39-5403. Had Linsay done so, she would have been a legal parent. Linsay does not get the benefit of the law that she did not invoke and follow.

In this case, Kylee is the natural, biological parent of [the child]. Therefore, Kylee has a fundamental constitutional and statutory right to the custody, care, and control of [the child].

Further, the magistrate court found Linsay had no grounds as a third party to seek custody or visitation rights. In the alternative, the magistrate found that it was not in the child's best interest to award custody or visitation rights to Linsay as a third party. Among the magistrate's factual findings were the following: that the child had bonded with both Linsay and Kylee; that both sought sole custody in vengeance against the other; that neither was able to control the conflict with the other for the child's sake; that Linsay prioritized her own needs over those of the child; and that "both parties have character flaws that negatively affect them for parenthood." The magistrate court found that Linsay had been dishonest and perjured herself during her trial testimony, and concluded that Kylee's interpersonal relationships were more stable than Linsay's.

Linsay filed a Notice of Appeal, and the district court affirmed the magistrate court's decisions. Linsay now appeals to this Court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When the Idaho Supreme Court reviews the decision of a district court sitting in its capacity as an appellate court, it applies the following standard of review:

The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings
495 P.3d 1001
of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. Thus, this Court does not review the decision of the magistrate court. Rather, we are procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court.

Papin v. Papin , 166 Idaho 9, 454 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2019) (internal quotations omitted).

"Child custody determinations involving minor children are left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." Hopper v. Hopper , 144 Idaho 624, 626, 167 P.3d 761, 763 (2007). The relevant inquiry upon review is whether the trial court "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life , 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018). Findings of fact in a court-tried case are to be...

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