Gattis v. State

• Decision Date: 24 July 2008
• Docket Number: No. 628, 2005.,628, 2005.
• Citation: 955 A.2d 1276
• Parties: Robert Allen GATTIS, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below-Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

955 A.2d 1276

Robert Allen GATTIS, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below-Appellee.

No. 628, 2005.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: June 27, 2008.

Decided: July 24, 2008.

Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County, ID No. 90004576DI.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.

Kevin J. O'Connell, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, DE, for appellant.

Loren C. Meyers, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE, for appellee.

Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.

RIDGELY, Justice:

Defendant-Appellant Robert A. Gattis was convicted by a Superior Court jury in 1992 of Murder First Degree and other charges relating to the shooting death of Shirley Y. Slay. After a penalty hearing, the jury recommended the death penalty, which the Superior Court imposed. The convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.¹ Gattis's first motion for postconviction relief was denied by the Superior Court and this Court affirmed.² Gattis filed a second motion for postconviction relief in the Superior Court, and a motion for the assigned judge to disqualify herself. The Superior Court denied both motions.

In this appeal, Gattis raises six claims that the Superior Court reversibly erred: (1) the current trial judge improperly denied his motion to disqualify;³ (2) the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying his request for an extension of the time period for filing and of the page limitations for his postconviction motion brief; (3) the Superior Court improperly denied reconsideration of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim; (4) Delaware's capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because the presiding trial judge applied a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than a beyond a reasonable doubt standard in determining the finding of fact that the aggravating circumstances outweighed those offered in mitigation; (5) the presiding trial judge made impermissible extrajudicial contact with several of the trial jurors before imposing sentence; and (6) the presiding trial judge gave undue weight to the jury's non-unanimous vote favoring the death sentence. On the first issue, we remanded this matter for the current trial judge to explain her rationale for summarily denying Gattis's motion to disqualify pursuant to the two-part test required under Los v. Los⁴ and its progeny. The current trial judge has filed her written report. After considering the expanded record, we find no merit to Gattis's appeal. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. Facts

Gattis was charged and convicted of Murder First Degree, Burglary First Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited, and two counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony. These offenses all related to the May 9, 1990 shooting death of his girlfriend, Shirley Y. Slay.⁵ During the penalty phase of his trial, the jury recommended by a vote of ten to two that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The presiding trial judge, after making his independent determination, imposed the death sentence. On Gattis's automatic direct appeal, his convictions and sentence were affirmed.⁶ Gattis filed a motion for postconviction relief, and this Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision to deny his motion.⁷ Gattis next applied for federal habeas relief in the United States District Court of Delaware,⁸ and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of that petition.⁹

Gattis filed a second state motion for postconviction relief in April 2002. The Superior Court stayed proceedings in the case pending the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona.¹⁰ Gattis twice amended his postconviction motion. His second amendment alleged that the presiding trial judge had improper contact with jurors after Gattis's trial but prior to sentencing. Given that allegation, the Superior Court expanded the record and conducted evidentiary hearings on the matter. Following briefing, the Superior Court denied the postconviction motion. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

This Court reviews the Superior Court's decision on an application for postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.¹¹ Questions of law are reviewed de novo.¹²

A. Denial of Gattis's Motion to Disqualify

Gattis first argues that the current trial judge abused her discretion in denying his motion to disqualify her from considering of his second motion for postconviction relief. The basis for the motion was the alleged personal bias of the current trial judge against Gattis's defense attorney.¹³ A two-part test is required for a recusal motion under Los v. Los.¹⁴ In Jones v. State,¹⁵ we reiterated the two-step analysis in which a trial judge must engage to determine whether disqualification is appropriate, as well as the appropriate standard of review:

The first step requires the judge to be subjectively satisfied that she can proceed to hear the cause free of bias or prejudice concerning that party. Even if the judge is satisfied that she can proceed to hear the matter free of bias or prejudice, the second step requires the judge to examine objectively whether the circumstances require recusal because there is an appearance of bias sufficient to cause doubt as to the judge's impartiality. On appeal, we review the trial judge's analysis of the subjective test for abuse of discretion. Because a claim of appearance of impropriety implicates a view of how others perceive the conduct of the trial judge, we review the merits of the objective test de novo.¹⁶

On appeal of the judge's recusal decision, "the reviewing court must be satisfied that the trial judge engaged in the subjective test and will review the merits of the objective test."¹⁷ Because the current trial judge summarily denied the motion to disqualify without articulating her analysis of the subjective or objective portions of the Los test, we remanded this matter for the judge to provide a written report on her rationale. In a seventeen-page report to this Court, she detailed the reasons why she denied the motion to disqualify. We find no abuse of discretion with her explanation of the subjective prong.¹⁸ Although we also agree with the current trial judge's assessment of the objective prong,¹⁹ we provide further explanation of the objective portion of the test given the nature of the arguments Gattis has made on appeal.

Under the objective portion of the test, for the judge to be disqualified, "the alleged bias or prejudice of the judge `must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.'"²⁰ Gattis argues that the current trial judge's attitude toward defense counsel, as evidenced by the Jones opinion, is an "extrajudicial source" of bias sufficient to meet this prong. To support his argument, Gattis cites two decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh and Tenth Circuits,²¹ and represents that those decisions require disqualification where a judge's attitude toward a particular lawyer is so hostile that the judge's impartiality toward the lawyer's client may reasonably be questioned.

The "extrajudicial source" language from Los was adopted from the case of United States v. Grinnell Corp.,²² a 1966 United States Supreme Court case evaluating the federal statutory standard for disqualification of judges. Thirty years later, in Liteky v. United States,²³ the United States Supreme Court revisited that specific language from Grinnell. There, the Court explained that because "neither the presence of an extrajudicial source necessarily establishes bias, nor the absence of an extrajudicial source necessarily precludes bias, it would be better to speak of the existence of a significant (and often determinative) `extrajudicial source' factor, than of an `extrajudicial source' doctrine, in recusal jurisprudence."²⁴ This "extrajudicial source" is merely one, but not the exclusive, reason a predisposition can be wrongful or inappropriate.²⁵ The Court in Liteky also recognized that judicial rulings alone are an insufficient basis for recusal motions and "judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge."²⁶ In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy agreed with this general rule,²⁷ which is also consistent with our precedents.

In Liteky, the majority opinion held that "opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible."²⁸ The concurring Justices in Liteky argued that this standard effectively asks the reviewing court to determine "whether fair judgment is impossible" and could be construed to require "some direct inquiry to the judge's actual, rather than apparent, state of mind. ..."²⁹ Justice Kennedy advocated a more straightforward standard, to focus on "the appearance of partiality, not its place of origin":³⁰ "Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified."³¹

This Court has noted that "the mere fact that a Judge has made some pre-trial rulings against a given defendant is not in itself sufficient to require his disqualification."³² We have also recognized that "[t]here is no general rule that a judge is disqualified ...